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Preface
In European traditions of political thought, the concept of citizenship
has provided a crucial link between the ideas of democracy and of the
rule of law. In a well-known essay, John Pocock identified the Athenian
and Roman roots of citizenship as active participation in collective self-
rule and as a legal status of freedom within a territorial jurisdiction re-
spectively (Pocock 1992: 35-55). With the emergence of the concepts of
territorial sovereignty in the 17th century and of the nation-state as the
basic unit of a global international order since the end of the 18th cen-
tury, citizenship has acquired a third meaning. It is today often used as
a synonym for nationality, which refers to a legal bond between indivi-
duals and sovereign states. In its external dimension nationality refers
to a rule of mutual recognition between states that entails powers to
protect their nationals abroad and a duty to readmit them into their ter-
ritories. In its internal dimension, nationality does not presuppose de-
mocratic participation, but refers to individuals as subjects of a sover-
eign political authority independent of the nature of the regime.
Since the Age of Enlightenment all three interpretations of citizen-
ship have been combined in democratic revolutions and constitutional
transformations in Europe and the American colonies established by
European settlers. Representative democracy constitutionally con-
strained by the rule of law in a sovereign nation-state has become the
most widely embraced ideal of legitimate exercise of political authority.
As the many dark episodes of authoritarian and totalitarian rule show,
this model has not always been successful. Today it faces new chal-
lenges by national minorities who claim territorial autonomy, by inter-
national migrations that create large populations of non-citizen resi-
dents inside state territories and non-resident citizens abroad, and by a
broad range of phenomena grouped together under the label of globali-
sation that are seen to undermine effective state sovereignty.
These developments have triggered a large and still growing new lit-
erature on citizenship. This revival of interest in citizenship since the
1980s is multidisciplinary and multidimensional. It has inspired com-
parative analyses of nationality laws, feminist political theories and so-
ciological studies of citizenship ideals and practices among different
groups. Yet there is one pervasive limitation. With very few exceptions
this literature is Eurocentric, or more precisely Occidentocentric.
Gianluca Parolin’s account of citizenship in the Arab world is a very
welcome attempt to fill one of the most significant geographical and
historical gaps in the comparative citizenship literature. Drawing exten-
sively on original Arabic sources, Parolin tells a story that is much
more complex than the stereotypical images of authoritarian regimes
governed by Islamic law. In his analysis, citizenship in the Arab world
combines elements of pre-Islamic structures of kinship with the ideal
of ummah as a religious community and with nation-state sovereignty.
Concepts of citizenship derived from these three principles obviously
do not correspond, either with regard to territorial scope and inclusion
of persons, or with regard to the substantive rights and obligations at-
tributed to individuals. This mismatch results in rather unstable legal
constructions that can pull in different directions depending on the de-
mographic composition of the society in question or the direction ta-
ken by a particular regime.
Parolin’s account leaves little doubt that citizenship laws in Arabic
states are commonly characterised by features considered today as illib-
eral by most Western scholars. Among these are the explicit or implicit
link between religious belief and acquisition or loss of citizenship sta-
tus, the second-class status of naturalised citizens compared with citi-
zens by birth, the principle of perpetual allegiance that prohibits re-
nunciation of citizenship by emigrants, the denial of citizenship to
some minorities that are thereby made stateless, the discrimination of
women through the dominance of paternal jus sanguinis and the un-
equal treatment of husbands and wives in the acquisition and loss of
citizenship through marriage and divorce.
None of these features, however, is unique to the Islamic or Arabic
world. As historical comparative studies show, each of these illiberal
principles has had its equivalent in a not too distant European past,
and some traces survive even in the nationality laws of current mem-
ber states of the European Union. This should not come as a surprise.
First, the imperatives of nation-state building after the break-up of mul-
tinational empires created similar problems of minority exclusion from
citizenship in the Habsburg, Ottoman, Soviet and Yugoslav cases. Sec-
ond, ethnicity and religion have also served as bases for national iden-
tity and as obstacles for naturalisation in several European countries
and continue to do so today in Greece or Denmark. Third, as Parolin
shows, international conventions requiring equal treatment of men
and women in nationality law, which has had a major impact on na-
tional legislation in Europe since the 1970s, have more recently also
triggered reforms in some states of the Arab region.
10 CITIZENSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD
These parallels show that citizenship in the Arab world is certainly
not impervious to internal contestation and external influence. How-
ever, the gap between a liberal democratic concept and present legisla-
tion in these countries still remains very wide and difficult to bridge.
Yet bridged it must be, because in a globalising world, citizenship is
no longer a matter under exclusive control of sovereign states. In con-
texts of migration the citizenship status of individuals becomes a joint
product of legislation in two independent states. The Arab world is of
special interest in studying the consequences of migration for citizen-
ship because it includes some of the most important sending countries
as well as those states with the highest percentages of non-citizen im-
migrants in the resident population.
Arab sending countries have often tried to exercise political control
over their large expatriate populations and to prevent their integration
into the receiving society. Yet, eventually, such homeland-driven politi-
cal transnationalism may result in reverse pressure being exercised by
expatriate communities on the governments of their countries of origin
(Brand 2006). Citizenship policies of emigration states also affect
those of European countries of immigration. Consider, for example,
how a principle of perpetual allegiance interacts with the toleration of
dual nationality. Only some Western European states still require that
applicants for naturalisation must renounce a previous nationality. Aus-
tria, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands currently grant excep-
tions for immigrants from countries that do not permit such renuncia-
tion. The perverse effect of this approach is, however, to create a disad-
vantage for immigrants from countries with more liberal nationality
laws. A more general toleration of dual nationality in Europe would
not only avoid such arbitrary discrimination among immigrants, but
would also increase pressure on Arab sending states to reconsider the
principle of perpetual allegiance.
In the Arab world, pressure for liberalising reforms seems to be cur-
rently stronger in contexts of emigration than of immigration. In sev-
eral of the Arab Gulf states the majority of residents are permanently
excluded from citizenship. Citizenship becomes then a minority privi-
lege attached to descent, ethnicity and religion as it was in the Athe-
nian polis or the late medieval Italian city republics. In Gulf states gov-
erned by autocratic regimes whose wealth is wholly derived from oil
revenues, migrants who provide a low-status working class and remain
socially fully segregated have hardly any political clout to demand ac-
cess to citizenship. Yet, as Parolin shows, both Islamic legal concepts
pertaining to protected foreigners and modern nationality law may
eventually provide some leverage for contesting such exclusionary con-
cepts of citizenship.
PREFACE 11
Parolin introduces us to a complex body of social, religious and legal
norms that have shaped citizenship regimes in the Arab world. It is
quite obvious that reconciling these traditions with inclusive and demo-
cratic concepts of citizenship is a daunting task. But this challenge is
raised by the increasingly dense transnational linkages between Eur-
opean and Arab states created through migration, and it has been occa-
sionally embraced by reform minded Islamic scholars. As Parolin ar-
gues, in the Arab world the transformative dynamic of citizenship dis-
course is currently limited by a traditional focus in legal debates on the
status of non-Muslims in Muslim countries and the duties of Muslims
in non-Muslim societies. What is still missing are broader reflections
on the meaning of citizenship that would include all three dimensions
of democracy, the rule of law and the collective identity of the political
community. Taking Arab and Islamic traditions seriously and studying
them as carefully as Parolin does may be the most useful contribution
European scholars can make towards such debates.
Rainer Baubo¨ck
European University Institute, Florence
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Foreword
It is a pleasure to welcome the publication of the book Citizenship in
the Arab World.
The complicated relationship between the concepts of ‘nationality’
and ‘citizenship’ has been the subject of many publications in the re-
cent past. Their precise relationship depends very much on the lan-
guages and legal systems in which these concepts are operating. In sev-
eral languages, the term etymologically related to ‘nationality’ has an
ethnic dimension and indicates that a certain person belongs to a na-
tion in an ethnic sense. On the other hand, the term related to ‘citizen-
ship’ indicates inter alia the formal link between a person and a state.
In many other languages and legal systems, however, ‘nationality’ re-
fers to ‘the legal bond between a person and a state and does not indi-
cate the person’s ethnic origin’ (art. 2(a) of the European Convention
on Nationality). Thus the term etymologically related to ‘nationality’ is
in the latter case more or less a synonym for ‘citizenship’.
Often, the discussion on the relationship between nationality and ci-
tizenship focuses on different European languages and legal systems
with European roots. It is therefore very enriching that Gianluca Paro-
lin opens his work with a description of the notions related to citizen-
ship in Europe and the Arab world. He considers the roots of the con-
cept of citizenship in ancient Greece and classical Rome and then ela-
borates on the views on membership in the kin and the religious
groups in the Arab world. In such a context, it is extremely interesting
to read about the position of non-Muslims – in particular, those belong-
ing to Jewish and Christian minorities – in the Arab world until the
end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. Fascinating is
the description of the development of a law of citizenship in the Otto-
man Empire at the end of the 19th century, as well as the emergence
of a kind of ‘indigenous’ nationality in several Ottoman provinces.
Parolin’s description of the development of nationality legislation
among the independent Arab states in the 20th and early 21st centu-
ries is very informative. He shows the French influence on those na-
tionality laws while pointing out their typical Arab features.
Despite the fact that states in principle are autonomous in national-
ity matters, we are witnessing a growing discussion on the desirability
and feasibility of a certain degree of harmonisation with regard to the
grounds for acquisition and loss of nationality. That is particularly the
case in Europe, where the already mentioned European Convention on
Nationality concluded in Strasbourg (1997) creates some common
ground in this field. The dream of the drafters is that the Convention
may serve as a starting point for a worldwide convention on nationality.
This dream was also incorporated into article 23, which allows non-
member states – by invitation – to ratify the Convention. In view of a
future worldwide discussion on nationality regulations, Parolin’s very
detailed comparative description of the grounds for acquisition and loss
of nationality in the Arab world is of paramount importance. (With re-
gard to the acquisition of nationality, he distinguishes between attribu-
tion and acquisition of nationality, in the narrow sense, in line with the
French tradition followed by Arab scholars.) I am very happy with this
comparison; there is a real need for up-to-date information on the na-
tionality laws of the countries in the Arab world.
The information on the current situation regarding the nationality
laws in the Arab countries will also be very useful to lawyers handling
nationality cases involving persons of Arab origin.
To this end, Parolin’s volume contains a great deal of important data.
The publication of such a book fills an important gap and makes an ex-
cellent contribution to the debate. Hopefully, the author will have the
occasion to participate in the discussions on the possible harmonisa-
tion of some aspects of nationality law, in particular in the Arab world,
and to update the information on the developments of these nationality
laws from time to time.
Gerard-Rene´ de Groot
Maastricht University, Maastricht
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Introduction
Citizenship is one of the key concepts underpinning both the vision
and the philosophical basis of modern Western political thought. A
broad range of disciplines employ it in a variety of contexts and with
quite different connotations. As a result, the suggestive and multifa-
ceted notion of citizenship proves hard to unravel, and even harder to
define.
Identifying the main constituents of the concept, however, is a cru-
cial preliminary step for comparative analysis – especially when com-
paring systems with fairly different approaches and largely distinct ap-
praisals of such a concept. The purpose of capturing the salient fea-
tures of citizenship is precisely to transcend the purely descriptive level
of definitions and to track their development in the Arab world, thus
reaching a deeper understanding of the issues involved.
In the quest for a core notion of citizenship, Aristotle’s definition
can be viewed as a starting point; both Western and Eastern scholars
have used the Aristotelian definition as a basis, at times to refine it,
sometimes to extend its scope or even to contest it.
Basic constituents of citizenship
Investigating the social and political nature of man was the innermost
and earliest level of inquiry into the texture of human relations in an-
cient philosophy. In this context, Aristotle was the first to bring man to
the centre of the stage and to argue that his distinctive character was
his being ‘political’ (politiko`n); human beings, unlike animals or gods,
are political by nature (Politics: 1253a, 2-5). Aristotle opened his treatise
on politics with this axiom, thus marking a sharp contrast with the
structure of Plato’s theory, whose main political work commenced with
the definition of justice (Republic: 330d). Both authors share a teleologi-
cal perspective, essentially believing in the primacy of the polis, but by
assuming man as the cornerstone of the discourse Aristotle somehow
surpassed and turned Plato’s priority of the polis on its head.
Aristotle’s axiom influenced generations of intellectuals both in the
East and in the West. Nearly seventeen centuries after Aristotle’s death,
the famous Arab Muslim polymath ibn Khaldu¯n still referred to the
opening of the Politics in the Prolegomena to his work on universal his-
tory. Ibn Khaldu¯n employed Aristotle’s opening as the first premise to
the discourse on human civilisation (al-cumra¯n al-basharı¯): ‘First: so-
ciety (al-ijtima¯c al-insa¯nı¯) is necessary. Philosophers expressed this idea
with the phrase ‘‘man is political by nature’’ (al-insa¯n madanı¯ bi-l-tabc)’
(al-Muqaddimah: I, 1). Man’s predicate ‘political’ (madanı¯) was built in
Arabic on the word used by Arab translators for polis (madı¯nah), thus
marking continuity with the Greek linguistic and philosophical
pattern.
According to Aristotle, man (a`nthro¯pos) leads by nature a social life,
whose typical form is the polis. Hence, the citizen (polı`te¯s) – namely,
the man who actively takes part in public life by exercising political
and judicial functions (Politics: 1257a, 23-24) – is the human being who
fulfills his humanity. Before being a member of the polis, however,
man is a member of his family (oikı`a), a minor social unit that Plato
looked at as a hindrance to his perfect city, whereas Aristotle consid-
ered it a ‘natural’ form of membership.
Aristotle’s main legacy, however, is the identification of the basic co-
ordinates of citizenship, placing man at the centre and investigating
his relations with the political community. Transcending Plato’s duality,
the philosopher pinned down the dependency of the political element
from a certain conception of mankind, in his reconciled vision of man,
body and soul. Following the developments of citizenship through the
ages, evidence can be gathered that major turning points occur pre-
cisely when the anthropological model changes; such was the case with
the Aristotelian model, a longstanding shared horizon for the Western
and Eastern political discourse.
In the West, Aristotle profoundly influenced ancient philosophy and
later Christian thinkers; through Scholasticism, Aristotle’s conceptions
of man and society pervaded the European culture of the Middle Ages
and beyond, just when the issues of sovereignty and citizenship were
shaping up. Aspects of Aristotle’s thought would continue to appeal to
modern philosophy, even when the latter forsook the systemic ideal. In
the Arab world, Aristotle is regarded as the uppermost philosopher
ever since al-Kindı¯ (d. 873 AD), and Avveroes (ibn Rushd, d. 1198 AD)
defined him as ‘exemplar quod natura invenit ad demonstrandum ulti-
mam perfectionem humanam’ (Commentarium magnum: III, 2, 433).
Aristotle is often remembered simply as the Philosopher both by Scho-
lastic and Arab scholars; Avveroes declared that Aristotle was his first
master, whereas his second master was al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ (d. 950 AD), author
of the Virtuous City inspired by Plato’s Republic.
The treatise on Politics, however, was not included in the Corpus Aris-
totelicum of the Arabs. Avveroes himself, known in the West as Aristo-
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tle’s commentator, ignored Aristotle’s Politics and wrote a commentary
on Plato’s Republic, just as al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ did. In the Latin world, too, Aristo-
tle’s Politics remained unknown until the second half of the 13th cen-
tury, when the two translations attributed to William of Moerbeke ap-
peared. Therefore, Aristotle’s political theories influenced the ancient
and early medieval world, both Latin and Arab, only in an indirect way,
through other writings of the philosopher. Yet, his influence on ancient
and modern political theory is not disputed and proves the underlying
importance of the conception of man in the development of political
thought.
Some scholars attribute the eclipse of Politics to its inherent inability
to relate to any political entity other than the Greek polis, and the trea-
tise sank into oblivion during the Hellenistic period (Viano 2002). It
should cause little wonder, if a closer look into Aristotle’s definition is
taken; his definition of citizen is firmly and tightly bound to an arche-
typal political community that Alexander’s conquests swept away.
The political community is the other major coordinate of citizenship.
If we represent citizenship as an ellipsoid, the individual and the politi-
cal community are its foci, whereas its main intersection points can be
expressed in terms of membership, rights, participation or status, var-
iously considered from the legal, philosophical, political or sociological
planes. When the models of each focus change, the entire figure re-
shapes.
Classical models and early East-West contacts
The relationship between the individual and the political community
has been explored everywhere through the ages. However, there are
some experiences that have given rise to different models of citizen-
ship: above all, the Greek participatory notion and the Roman status
structure. The contrasting paradigms of citizenship in classical Greece
and republican Rome affected the development of citizenship theories
in the West more than in the Eastern world; when the two models
were at their apex, contacts with the Arabs were fairly marginal.1 The
situation partly changed when two more stable political entities were
established in northern Arabia: the Phylarchy of the Ghassanids and
the Kingdom of the Lakhmids, the former in the orbit of the Byzantine
Empire, and the latter allied to the Sassanids. At that point (3rd-7th
centuries AD), though, the epoch of the Greek poleis and the Roman ci-
vitas was long over.
In the Eastern Byzantine provinces, neither the Greek nor the Ro-
man classical concept of citizenship took root. In the Greek polis, the
citizen’s political participation was the cornerstone of city life, but for
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his ecumenical project Alexander preferred the ideal city of Plato’s Re-
public to his own tutor’s notion of citizen; thus, Hellenism did not
spread the Greek idea of citizenship in terms of rights and duties that
the individual had to exercise for the sake of the city. By contrast, the
Roman concept of the citizen’s status (entailing full capacity and sub-
jection to Roman law) was still alive and well at the time of Rome’s
conquest of the eastern territories, but later died down as citizenship
was granted to larger sections of the non-Roman population (especially
under Caracalla and Justianian). Hence, Hellenism and the Roman
Empire presented a fairly composite picture of citizenship to the Ghas-
sanids, who were to become members of the important Syrian elite of
Islam’s early Umayyad caliphate.
As for the Persian Empire, it is quite problematical to define the po-
sition of the individual vis-a`-vis authority in the late Sassanid age. The
Persian tradition, however, placed the ruler and his rigid class system
at the centre; such was most likely the attitude towards the subject that
was perceived by the Lakhmids when brought under direct Sassanid
control.
When Arabs made more direct contacts with Romans and Persians
in the 5th and 6th centuries AD, citizenship did not represent or no
longer represented the axis of the political discourse for these civilisa-
tions. Only after the Arab-Islamic conquest (al-Fath) did Arab scholars
come across the different conceptualisations of citizenship in the an-
cient classics, during the golden age of translations between the 8th
and the 10th centuries AD. Greek, Persian and Indian scientific clas-
sics were translated and easily taken in by the new, Arabic-speaking
culture, but the methods and results of philosophy seemed incompati-
ble with the basic tenets of Islam as they were being framed by Muslim
theologians and jurists. Greek philosophy, whose texts reached Arab
scholars through later, Neoplatonic readings, proved especially thorny
for the Muslim intellectual; among the political works, Plato’s dialo-
gues abounded, and the Muslim scholar was thus called upon to take
uncomfortable positions on irreconcilable conflicts like the one oppos-
ing the king-philosopher of Plato’s Republic and the Islamic caliph. Le-
gal scholars (culama¯’) took a clear stance on the issue; philosophy could
not play any role in an Islamic system and was to be banned from Isla-
mic learning institutions, where the study of law had to prevail (cilm
al-fiqh). This did not prevent the flourishing of Arab-Islamic philoso-
phy; however, it was forced to dwell outside the Islamic curriculum
and only indirectly did it influence the religious sciences, which were
strongly tied to Islamic law.2
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Different civilisational paths
The Latin and the Arab worlds followed different paths, even if they
both drew on Greek philosophy, which supplied categories and termi-
nology later employed to deal with various new issues. In spite of the
differences between Latin-Christian and Arab-Islamic results, the
themes, the processes and somehow even the terms are analogous; this
has always facilitated the comparison between the systems, but at the
same time it has made the (op)positions look more extreme. It is hard
to determine when the two paths drifted apart; up to the 13th century,
anecdotes of Frederick II commending the Islamic caliphal system out
of scorn for papal authority (Kantorowicz 1931) prove that a close com-
parison was still feasible, even if the two worlds were already signifi-
cantly far removed from each other.
Latin and Arab scholars each searched for a foundation of political
authority (sovereignty and wila¯yah) in moments of power crisis. The
masterpiece of literature on Islamic political authority (wila¯yah) –
al-Ahka¯m al-sulta¯nı¯yah (The Ordinances of Government) – was written
by al-Ma¯wardı¯ (d. 1058 AD) at a time when the role of the Abbasid ca-
liph was being challenged by internal and external agents (11th century
AD). Likewise, the theory of sovereignty was developed in Europe when
local and universal powers were competing. Once fixed, though, the
rules of Islamic wila¯yah remained uncontested, whereas the develop-
ment of the Western notion of sovereignty and of the underlying con-
cept of citizenship had a much more intricate story.
The Arab-Islamic world did not suffer the kind of destruction
brought about by the European Wars of Religion, and was thus not
compelled to look for sources of legitimacy other than the religious
one, which is the pivot of the wila¯yah. Timewise, however, when sover-
eignty started being debated on the banks of the Seine, more than
three centuries had elapsed since the waters of the Tigris had gone red
with the blood and black with the ink of Baghdad, when the sack of
the Mongols had delivered a decisive blow to what was left of the Abba-
sid caliphate. Even after the caliphate disappeared, Islam inflexibly
maintained the ideal of the caliphal wila¯yah and did not develop any
other alternative theory; indeed, every once in a while the prospect of
reinstating the caliphate is raised once again.
In the West, the concept of the individual started surfacing in the late
Middle Ages against the backdrop of an orderly socio-political system
characterised by the presence of local and universal powers. When, in
the late 13th century, Aristotle’s Politics reappeared in a Latin transla-
tion, its anthropological perspective of society as an ‘orderly body’ was
adapted by Aquinas and Scholasticism; the famous definition of citizen
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was also accommodated in Remigio de’ Girolami’s version (si non est ci-
vis non est homo) and by Marsilius of Padua in the Defensor Pacis (Costa
1999-2001).
The longstanding influence of political Aristotelianism allowed for
the continued vertical representation of society, and its vertex was the
subject of reflection by intellectuals down to the early 17th century.
Thinkers like Bodin or Althusius kept looking at the top of the pyra-
mid, the former championing the principle of sovereignty, the latter of
community. However, the individual was still immersed in a tangled
web of relations and status within the community.
A major watershed in the history of citizenship was the revolution of
the anthropological paradigm operated by natural law; the individual
came to the centre of the stage, possessing natural rights prior to and
irrespective of his affiliation in a political community. Thus, member-
ship in a political community became a way of ensuring such rights,
not their basis. Hobbes, Grotius, Locke and Pufendorf, as well as the
various schools of natural law, proposed different solutions on how to
frame the power, but all agreed on the individual’s centrality and his
‘absolute’ natural rights. The elements of the political discourse were
accordingly reorganised around the subject-of-rights, while holding on
to the idea that the individual could escape the brutal struggle for sur-
vival only by turning to the ‘absolute’ power of the sovereign.
In the 18th century attention was paid to the individual, whose es-
sence was encompassed within natural law but whose human existence
was neglected, in an attempt to bridge the gap between the Sein and
the Sollen. In a colourful variety of trends and currents, the Enlighten-
ment combined expressions of natural law with corporative visions and
republican values; ancient figures and new models were joined with
unpredicted results, such as the concept of Rousseau’s city. Rousseau,
indeed, retrieved the primacy of the city and of membership in a politi-
cal community (based, however, on the equality of members), drew on
the republican legacy of the civil religion and the individual’s civic vir-
tue (with the individual, however, as a subject-of-rights) and based it all
on the logic of identity (founding a ‘common me’ with some Hobbe-
sian traits).
The French Revolution proudly proclaimed itself to be a turning
point in the history of citizenship, but it actually brought to completion
the design of what revolutionaries called the Ancien Re´gime. The indivi-
dual, his rights and the political community were reshuffled, and the
new foci of the ellipsoid became the subject-of-rights and the nation.
‘Where is the nation to be found?’ asked Sieye`s in his What is the Third
Estate?: in the nation of the twenty million citizens, not of the 200
thousand privileged Frenchmen. Such was the nation, called to estab-
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lish by law – the full expression of its sovereignty – a new order where
the rights of the subjects could take form.
The wind of the Revolution reached the Nile with the fleet of Napo-
leon, who occupied Egypt in 1798 during the war against the British
Crown. The short Egyptian expedition marked the turn of the tide in
Euro-Arab relations; after centuries of lateral political and military con-
flicts and contacts limited to the practical needs of commerce, the two
blocs had once again entered into a face-to-face confrontation. Modern
historiography currently downplays the alleged consequences of the ex-
pedition, but traditional Arab historians considered it one of the main
external factors that generated the Arab renaissance (al-Nahdah). It was
not only the army of the Franks (al-Ifranj, a denomination kept from
the age of the crusades) that debarked in Alexandria, but also ideas that
were alien to the Arab political discourse of the time, which Arabic was
not even able to express. The Egyptian historian al-Jabartı¯ (d. 1825 AD),
for instance, when relating the expedition, preceded the French names
with the title sı¯twaya¯n, a transliterated form of citoyen, for lack of a bet-
ter alternative in Arabic. The singular progression of the European po-
litical discourse since the golden age of philosophical interchanges be-
tween the Arab and the Latin world can be measured in terms of the
lexical gap between the vocabulary of the Revolution and 19th-century
Arabic. Concepts lexicalised as citizenship in Europe did not have lexi-
cal units in Arabic, and Arabic therefore had to draw on its vast lan-
guage resources to fill the gap. Terminological choices, however, are
not neutral or predetermined, but rather attest to the system’s stance
on the reception of a foreign concept.
Arabic terminology
The Eastern and Western worlds share a range of images of the politi-
cal order, the main ones being the figures of the body politic and the
pastoral representation of government. Yet conceptualisations of citizen
and citizenship are alien to the traditional Arab-Islamic political dis-
course, and even their expression in Arabic required a lexical effort to
find or introduce appropriate referents.
The standard term used to refer to ‘people’ in Arabic is ahl, a term
common to all Semitic languages: ahl in Aramaic and ’o¯hel in Hebrew.
It was first used to indicate the tent, and then, by metonymy, those
who dwelled in the tent, i.e. relatives and family. The Arabic ahl, as the
English ‘people’, denotes a body of persons who, indefinitely and col-
lectively, constitute a community, but reference to the individual cannot
be made. Unsurprisingly, the issue emerged when translators into Ara-
bic approached the classics of Greek philosophy, where references to
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the individual polı`te¯s are abundant. Arab philosophers also had to ad-
dress the challenge. A case in point is al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯’s decision to use ra’ı¯s to
refer to the leader and the neologism mar’u¯s to refer to the individual
who is under the leader’s jurisdiction; despite these choices he titled
his work Kita¯b a¯ra¯’ ahl al-madı¯nah al-fa¯dilah (The Views of the People
(ahl) of the Virtuous City).
As far as the pastoral representation of power is concerned, the peo-
ple under a certain authority are called raca¯ya¯ (herd, singular: racı¯yah),
and the ruler is called shepherd (ra¯cı¯). The term racı¯yah is not to be
found in the Qur’a¯n, but it does appear in some problematic tradi-
tions.3 In the mid-8th century it was being used, as is proven by the
works of ibn al-Muqaffac (d. 756) or the Great Qadi abu¯ Yu¯suf (d. 798),
who devoted a section of his Kita¯b al-khara¯j (The Book of Taxation) to
the duties of the caliph as shepherd of the flock. Later on, racı¯yah was
still employed for the ruler-ruled dichotomy, the former being responsi-
ble to God for the latter. Under the Ottomans, the Turkish variant
raiyyet (plural reaya) came to indicate the common subject as opposed
to the entire government apparatus, including its military (askeri), bu-
reaucratic (kalemiye) and religious (ilmiye) classes (Lewis 1988).
Starting in the early 19th century the tendency was to identify the
subject as a ta¯bic (plural atba¯c, in Turkish tebaa) with respect to his ru-
ler; ta¯bic is an active participle from the root t.b.c meaning ‘to follow’,
or ‘to belong’. In the classical Ottoman terminology, ta¯bic as ‘depen-
dent’ or ‘subordinate’ was already being used to refer both to indivi-
duals and to places or functions, but in the 19th century it entered the
legal-diplomatic jargon to translate the French ‘sujet’. The Ottoman te-
baa was thus the individual who owed obedience to the sultan, just like
British or Dutch ‘subjects’ but unlike French or American ‘citizens’.
At the turn of the century, the nation-state and its nationality started
to emerge in the Arab world. The spread of new ideas needed lexical
referents that were not overly bound by traditional views and concep-
tions. For ‘nationality’, in the sense of the individual-state relationship,
the term employed was jinsı¯yah. This is an abstract term built on jins, a
borrowing from the Greek ghe`nos, which in Arabic kept the meaning of
‘genus’, ‘race’, ‘species’, and also acquired the meaning of ‘gender’. The
etymon ghe`nos is itself a stem of ghe`n, which properly accommodates
the role of descent in the attribution of nationality (jinsı¯yah) and stres-
ses at the same time the perpetual nature of membership in the na-
tion-state. Even if the term jinsı¯yah refers to an individual relationship
to a state, it did not allow for the individuation of the national; indeed,
the first Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869 employed the generic ‘Otto-
man’ instead of ‘Ottoman national’.
At the beginning of the 20th century, an Arab neologism – muwa¯tin –
was coined based on watan (originally the place of residence but later
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also the homeland; Ayalon 1987).4 Muwa¯tin is an active participle to a
verb of stem III (fa¯cala) from the root w.t.n; Arab grammarians define
the alif added after the first radical of the verb as an alif al-musha¯rakah,
viz. an alif (a¯) that gives the verb a sense of sharing. The form *wa¯tana,
therefore, would mean residing in the same place, and its active partici-
ple literally means a ‘fellow countryman’, in contrast to the ajnabı¯, or
non-Arab foreigner. Just like ‘citizen’, muwa¯tin relies on a relation with
a place (namely the city) more than with an authority. Unlike ‘citizen’,
however, muwa¯tin does not immediately entail the idea of a status and
rights enjoyed by the subject, but rather the simple distinction between
the national and the foreigner. As Lewis put it, muwa¯tin relates to a re-
publican more than to a liberal citizenship, it being closer to the con-
cepts of homeland and nation than to the concepts of liberties and
rights (Lewis 1988). From the mid-20th century on, some civil and po-
litical implications started to be attached to the status of muwa¯tin, just
as individual political rights began to take root. In legal terms, the
equation of ‘citizen’ and muwa¯tin is generally established, even if the
contents of citizenship vary according to each country’s system. Even
more recent is the shift to the abstract term muwa¯tanah (citizenship),
an expression still not included in many Arab dictionaries.
Subject, membership and rights in the Arab world
Exploring citizenship in the Arab world requires first a disentangle-
ment from all those ideas, images and suggestions that have settled
into the concept in the course of European political thought. Identify-
ing the basic or primary constituents of citizenship demands a fairly
high degree of abstraction and generalisation in order to include all its
different expressions. Along these lines, stating that the discourse on
citizenship has involved a variety of combinations of ‘subject’, ‘mem-
bership’ and ‘rights’ would embrace the Aristotelian definition as well
as the contemporary debate on the new forms of constitutional and su-
pranational citizenship.
The European experience shows that the establishment of ‘member-
ship’, the rise of the ‘subject’ and conquest of ‘rights’ have not been si-
multaneous, even if they are somehow logically interdependent. His-
torically, the framing of membership has preceded the surfacing of the
subject and the establishment of rights. Thus, approaching citizenship
through ‘membership’ seems a viable and promising option, especially
in the Arab world, where ‘subject’ and ‘rights’ depend even more cru-
cially upon it.
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The traditional Arab social structure was exclusively based on kin. The
individual lived as a member of the kin group, and for it. The verse of
Durayd ibn al-Simmah (d. 630 AD) is quite clear: ‘I am but one of [the
tribe of ] Ghazı¯yah, if it strays, I stray, and if Ghazı¯yah leads the right
way, I lead the right way’ (wa-ma¯ ana¯ illa min ghazı¯yata in ghawat gha-
waytu wa-in tarshud ghazı¯yatu arshudi). The kin bond is vivified by kin
solidarity (casabı¯yah), which is – according to ibn Khaldu¯n (d. 1406
AD) – the fundamental bond of human society and the basic motivat-
ing force of history. In a context where an established, common author-
ity is absent, the kin group is the framework by which all the activities
of the individual are encompassed. All interpersonal relations are de-
fined in terms of group relations, especially family ties and private jus-
tice, two key elements of the group’s honour and nobility (sharaf). Even
religious feelings were framed within the kin group, both the aspect of
beliefs and the aspect of communal belonging; on the one hand, the
group worshipped its own deities (along with other common deities)
while on the other hand the choice of belonging and practising a cer-
tain religion rested with the group and not with the individual.
Abrahamic religions also spread in Arabia through group, not indivi-
dual, conversions, but soon afterwards they tried to replace the kin tie
with religious affiliation. Such was the case with Judaism and Chris-
tianity. But Muhammad’s preaching had to engage with the kin system
as well, which at first challenged and later supported him, notably after
his successful political and military operations against Mecca. Even be-
fore the rise of Islam there is a record of at least one attempt to create
a religious community beyond tribal allegiances: the cIba¯d of Hira (a
Christian community of Arab Nestorians). It is only after Muhammad’s
preaching, however, that Arabs who converted to Islam sought to form
a coherent political and religious community. The goal of dissolving all
particular kin ties in one universal religious community was not thor-
oughly achieved; indeed, the formative stages of the Islamic commu-
nity prove on the contrary that traditional bonds were employed to cre-
ate political unity and disseminate Islam. The gap between the ideal
principle and the enculturating compromise can be observed from the
standpoint of the reception of several pre-Islamic religious practices
and legal institutions. Telling cases in point are the planning of newly-
founded cities, the status of non-Arab neo-converts (mawla`s), the prin-
ciple of wedding adequacy (kafa¯’ah) and the restriction of the caliphate
to Quraish kinsmen. The way membership in the religious community
was regulated also drew on fundamental characteristics of membership
in the kin group: automatic, perpetual and exclusive. For many centu-
ries, all the populations of the Middle East – Arab, Arabicised and non-
Arabicised – lived in a political context dominated by the logic of reli-
gious affiliation. Regardless of all historic distinctive features, Muslims
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established political systems where Islam was the cornerstone; non-
Muslims were treated with a discriminating tolerance that in the long
run turned to the advantage of Islam.
The emergence of nation-states opened a new, controversial phase in
Arab-Islamic history. The process that led to the creation of modern
states in the Arab world followed different paths (Ottoman reforms,
mandates of the League of Nations or direct intervention of European
powers in atypical protectorates), introducing a new system of interna-
tional relations no longer based on the principle that each part protects
its fellow coreligionists (like France for Eastern Catholics, or Russia for
the Orthodox Churches of Greece and the Holy Land), but rather on
the premise that each state safeguards its own citizens. During the
same years in Europe, vertical ‘nationality’ (in French nationalite´ and in
German Staatsangeho¨rigkeit) and horizontal ‘citizenship’ (in French ci-
toyennete´, and in German Bu¨rgerschaft) joined in the liberal model state.
The Arab course of action was much more tortuous, definitely more
complicated than what French scholars suggest by quoting a ruling of
a French tribunal.5 Numerous pointers suggest that the kin and reli-
gious orders maintain a certain vitality. Illuminating cases in point can
be found in the judicial systems. Upon attainment of independence,
tribal courts, confessional judges and state tribunals operated simulta-
neously almost everywhere in the Arab world. Afterwards, however, the
trend changed and state tribunals began to take on the jurisdiction of
‘lower’ courts; lower courts were abolished by law, and legislation regu-
lating tribal custom and religious law was often passed. Likewise, the
need to comply with some Islamic precepts required the adaptation of
some rules regarding conflict of laws (or international private law), and
a special ‘Islamic international private law’ (al-qa¯nu¯n al-duwalı¯ al-kha¯ss
al-isla¯mı¯) was then developed. Membership in the kin group and in the
religious community is still a relevant element for modern citizenship,
both for the vertical nationality (e.g. naturalisation or stripping of na-
tionality on grounds of kin or religious affiliation) and the horizontal
citizenship (e.g. kin group political representation or confessional
constituencies).
In the fascinating but extreme variety that characterises the Arab
world, is there any reason to group all the multiform realities in a sin-
gle Arab citizenship? What do the peoples of the foothills of the Atlas,
of the Trucial Coast, of the Nile valley, of the banks of the Euphrates or
of Mount Lebanon share? On the one hand, most of these people are
not even ethnically Arab, since the majority is made up of Arabicised
peoples. On the other hand, the majority are Sunni Muslims, but there
are other significant Muslim, Christian and Jewish minorities. More-
over, while there is no doubt that actual borders do not include homo-
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geneous areas, it is nonetheless undeniable that language and cultural
frontiers run across the Arab world, often making communication and
interchange impossible.
Yet, the composite human arch that bridges the Arab Gulf and the
Atlantic Ocean does share some political and legal modalities which af-
fect the way individuals lead their public life in the Arab legal environ-
ment as well as their relations with the kin group, the religious com-
munity and the nation-state. By looking into each one of these three
main forms of membership, how they influence each other, recipro-
cally interfere and combine, some of the major issues of citizenship in
the Arab world can be addressed.
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1 Membership in the kin group
The first form of membership known by man is membership in the fa-
mily. This fairly obvious consideration, framed in Aristotle’s theory, has
long informed Western political theory and its stance on citizenship in
particular.1 In the Arab world the family (in its broader sense of kin
group) plays an even greater role and proves to be fairly resilient to ex-
ternal pressures. In order to identify the genuine features of the Arab
kin, we need to look through its pre-Islamic patterns, when competing
forms of membership were quite trivial.
A telling starting point is how classical Islamic authors represent the
Arab social system. Their representation turns out to be discrepant
with pre-Islamic sources; historiography accounted for the lack of con-
formity, and anthropology has developed explanatory models for the
Arab social and political order. Once the social context is outlined, the
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion from the kin become easily acces-
sible; the kin arranges and handles its internal affairs and the relation-
ships with other groups on the basis of customs, which are by nature
fluid.
On the eve of Islam, Arabia presented a widely homogeneous social
configuration, despite the different kinds of political organisations.2 In
the heart of the Peninsula, the traditional social order and political life
flourished in the absence of a centralised power. But the development
of more complex political structures in the northern areas – due to con-
tacts with the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires – did not prevent the
perpetuation of the customary social articulations. The same was true
in the southern region in the realm of Kindah. Likewise, the same so-
cial types are shared by nomadic (badw) and sedentary (hadar) groups,
the two opposed icons of Arab society.
1.1 Representing the social prism
No scientific certainty has been reached on the origins of the Arabs.
On the one hand, all the sources available at present date from the Isla-
mic era – that is to say, they are quite late – while on the other hand
none of the pre-Islamic engraved inscriptions support the traditional
structure presented by Islamic scholars, whose accounts are openly or-
iented towards a theological end.3
To begin with, Islamic historians and genealogists divide the Arabs
into three ‘layers’ (tabaqa¯t): ‘extinct Arabs’ (al-carab al-ba¯’idah), ‘pure
Arabs’ (al-carab al-ca¯ribah) and ‘arabicised or arabicising Arabs’ (al-carab
al-mustacribah aw al-mutacarribah). According to these authors, among
the ‘extinct Arabs’ are all the tribes that lived in the Arabian Peninsula
until God determined to punish them (awqaca alla¯h bi-ha¯dhihi al-qaba¯’il
al-ciqa¯b) and wipe them out for having disobeyed their prophets (li-an-
nahum casu¯ anbiya¯’ahum) and not having followed the straight path
(al-tarı¯q al-sawı¯) that God had ordered.4 A distant but clear echo of a
motive dear to the Jewish mentality of the Torah can be heard here.
The roots of present-day ‘Arabity’ (curu¯bı¯yah) are the ‘pure Arabs’, des-
cendants of Qahta¯n or Yaqta¯n (the Yo¯qta¯n that Genesis genealogically
links to Noah; Gen. 10:25).5 The ‘arabicised or arabicising Arabs’, on
the contrary, are believed to be the descendants of Ishmael through
cAdna¯n, but in this case the genealogy does not match the Biblical line
exactly.6 The label ‘arabicised’ is due to the belief that Ishmael spoke
Hebrew (sic!) until he got to Mecca, where he married a Yemeni wo-
man and learnt Arabic. Both genealogical lines go back to Sem, son of
Noah, but only cAdnanites can claim Abraham as their ascendant, and
the lineage of Mohammed, the Seal of Prophets (kha¯tim al-anbiya¯’),
can therefore be traced back to Abraham. Contemporary historiography
unveiled the lack of inner coherence of this genealogical system and
demonstrated that it finds insufficient matching evidence; the distinc-
tion between Qahtanites and cAdnanites is even believed to be a pro-
duct of the Umayyad Age, when the war of factions (al-niza¯c al-hizbı¯)
was raging in the young Islamic Empire.7
According to Islamic tradition, Arabs are the kinsmen of cAdna¯n
and Qahta¯n; the descendants of the former (the cAdnanites) settled in
central and northern Arabia, while the descendants of the latter (the
Qahtanites) in the south. In al-Ma¯wardı¯’s classification (later adopted
by al-Qalqashandı¯), five other levels stem from the cAdnanites-Qahta-
nites partition (the shacb): the qabı¯lah, the cima¯rah, the batn, the fakhdh
and the fası¯lah.
In the author’s view, the shacb of the cAdna¯nites is made up of two
qabı¯lahs, the one of the Rabı¯cah and the other of the Mudar; both are
divided into cima¯rahs. In the qabı¯lah of the Mudar we can mention the
cima¯rah of the Kina¯nah and of the Quraish, and among the Quraish
the two batns of the cAbd mana¯f and the Makhzu¯m. Down the line of
smaller groupings of the cAbd mana¯f we find the fakhdhs of the Ha¯-
shim and of the Umayyah, and we eventually reach the fası¯lahs of cAb-
ba¯s, abu¯ Ta¯lib, or abu¯ Sufya¯n.8
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Not all the authors, however, use the same vocabulary or classifica-
tion. Even al-Qalqashandı¯ presents in his work the different arrange-
ment of ibn al-Kalbı¯, who introduced a middle partition between the
fakhdh and the fası¯lah – the cashı¯rah (a small group stemming from a
relatively close progenitor) – and used fası¯lah in the sense of smaller fa-
mily (Subh al-acsha`: 309). Other Muslim authors employ an even wider
terminology and disregard the rigid structures put forward by genealo-
gists; a whole set of terms like hayy or qawm are used to refer to larger
groups, and bayt or da¯r for the nuclear family.
Moreover, there is no agreement regarding the placement of the
groups in the same categories. For instance, al-Ma¯wardı¯ and al-Qalqa-
shandı¯ consider the Quraish and the Kina¯nah two cima¯ras of the qabı¯-
lah of the Mudar (ibid.), while for the Muntaqa` the Kina¯nah are a qabı¯-
lah and the Quraish an cima¯rah thereof (ed. Wu¨stenfeld: II, 340). Other
patent cases can be found in the works of ibn al-Kalbı¯, ibn Hazm, al-Ja-
wharı¯, ibn cAbd rabbih, al-Qa¯lı¯ or al-Bakrı¯.
As noted, all these classifications are the product of later Islamic the-
ory as well as the search for a rigid terminology, typical of the rigorous
cilm al-nasab (a real ‘science of lineages’) and not of a diverse and politi-
cally fluctuating social context. Textual analysis clearly shows that
terms like hayy, qabı¯lah, batn or fakhdh do not have precise connota-
tions in Arabic; indeed, al-Qalqashandı¯, after describing al-Ma¯wardı¯’s
hexapartition (which he closely follows), dwells on the point that hayy
is used strictly for one of the six categories and collectively for the sons
of a specific individual. No easier is defining cashı¯rah or raht, probably
a group made up of less than ten kinsmen. Relevant discrepancies can
be traced as well when comparing the vocabulary of classical Islamic
authors and pre-Islamic poetry, where terms like cima¯rah or fası¯lah
never occur (Tyan 1954: 14). Adopting a fixed translation of the Arabic
terminology with ‘tribe’, ‘clan’ or ‘sub-clan’ would be inconvenient; on
the one hand English lacks so many and such nuanced expressions for
such unfamiliar social articulations, and on the other hand the opera-
tion would entail choosing between quite different scholarly solutions.
Furthermore, Arabic terms convey a certain symbolism such as the so-
mato-anthropomorphic idea suggested by batn (belly) or fakhdh (thigh).
Anthropology developed different paradigms (like the segmentary
model) to explain the Arab social context and dynamics, and recent
trends – emerging within the traditional segmentary scheme – openly
challenge the rigidity of the classical systematisation of Islamic scho-
lars. The segmentary model was first conceived in the 1940s for the
Nuer of Sudan (Evans-Pritchard 1940) and later adapted to Arab social
organisation. It builds on a generally uncontested representation of the
social order in terms of genealogical relations among groups bound by
the principle of common patrilineal descent. Thus, single groups of
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descent (kin groups), or segments, are key constituents of society, the
structure of which is determined by their mutual relations, being a
complex of segments engrafted one into the other (Fabietti 2002: 66).
In the segmentary model, descendants of a closer ancestor unite
against descendants of a more distant ancestor; that is to say that des-
cendants of brothers join against descendants of cousins, and descen-
dants of cousins of the same stock join against descendants of cousins
of a different stock, and so forth. Likewise, groups – despite their dis-
tance up the genealogical tree – put aside their conflicts in order to face
groups that do not belong to the same lineage.
The rigidity of the segmentary model imposed a serious impoverish-
ment on its heuristic potential, even if the model contributed to the
abandoning of a certain typological and functionalistic vision and al-
lowed a more penetrating analysis of the political and institutional di-
mensions of segmentary societies. By favouring a static vision, the in-
trinsic dynamism of the Arab genealogical system has been largely un-
derestimated, and the resulting limits and flaws have been attributed
to the segmentary model itself. Recent ethnographic reports show ma-
jor variations in the genealogical system surveyed by early scholars; for
instance, in the case of the A¯l Ramma¯l (northern Arabia), Montagne’s
reports of the late 1920s (Montagne 1947) are rather different from Fa-
bietti’s reports of the late 1970s (Fabietti 1984). These are incompatible
findings that can only be regarded as sagacious genealogical rationali-
sations if we consider the continuous process of realignment of seg-
ments operated by prominent personalities of the group (shaykhs), who
conceptually alter the formal order of society according to different po-
litical strategies and current opportunities.9
A number of factors play a role in easing the operations of segmen-
tary reorganisation in the classical Arab world. First of all, the indivi-
dual is identified by a given name (ism) and a patronymic (nasab, in
the form of ‘son of’), while the occurrence of a ‘kin name’ is fairly ex-
ceptional. A ‘surname’ (laqab) follows the name only when the indivi-
dual stands out for a distinctive activity or origin.10 Such a nominal sys-
tem facilitates the contextual definition of the individual identity, since
the relationship with the kin is not enshrined in the name. Secondly,
genealogies in the Arab world are an oral knowledge, and only later
did Islamic scholars – pursuing religious goals – found a science of
lineages (cilm al-nasab) that tried to impose rigidity on the social order
through writing. Thirdly, it is a knowledge in the hands of an elite (the
notables, or shaykhs); the elite determines the major or minor genealo-
gical distance of the segments in a constant process of manipulation –
deliberate or unintentional, as Fabietti underlines – by omissions, addi-
tions or replacements. In the shaykhs’ operation the ‘historical’ value
decreases in order to increase the impact of the rationalisation of the
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status quo, or the prefiguration of future relations among segments (Fa-
bietti 2002: 62-78).
In spite of all the possible hindrances, we can outline and point out
some of the characteristics of the complex social organisation of Ara-
bia. To begin with, society is structured in distinct, self-ruling groups
of varying size, despite any common origins or real or fictitious com-
mon ancestors. Secondly, the key factor is the personal and not the ter-
ritorial element, the former shaping even urban settlements, like the
Quraish in Mecca or the different groups of Yathrib, the future Medina
(Lammens 1924b: 296). Finally, all the members of the group share
the same religion,11 as in the case of the Quraish running the sacral
functions of the Kacbah, the Jews of Yathrib and the Christians of the
north like the Lakhmids (Nestorians) and the Ghassanids
(Monophysites).
1.2 Inclusion by kinship, clientage or slavery
In pre-Islamic Arabia the individual was considered a member of a
group by means of kinship, clientage or slavery. Some of these means
were particularly effective in the political and legal context of a society
characterised by diffuse power, and the emergence of a centralised
power has therefore reduced their effectiveness, while others have
lasted, even if some distinctions have faded.
Kinship
‘Kinship’ is the main bond for the Arab kin group. Membership in the
group is determined by descent from a real or fictitious common an-
cestor, and the group itself is known as banu¯ Fula¯n, ‘the sons of Tom’.
The first and original member is identified as a sarı¯h (free, pure), in
order to tell him apart from the client or the slave. As a general rule, it
is by patrilineal descent that membership is established. Applying the
principle extensively, every child born to a member of the group is con-
sidered a member, even if the mother conceived him in a previous
union.12 In a similar manner, all the children of a widow who are still
minor become members of the group of the new husband, but when
they come of age they are allowed to be reintegrated into their original
group (Robertson Smith 1885: 142). However, if the mother belongs to
a group higher in the social ranks, matrilineal descent prevails and the
mother’s offspring belong to the mother’s group.
Only the child born of Arab parents of the same kin group is a full
member. Here, too, the term sarı¯h is employed, even if in a second,
narrower sense (Tyan 1954: 19). The child of an Arab man and a for-
eign woman (acjamı¯yah) is a hajı¯n (ignoble), kept out of the father’s
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succession and with half the blood money due for the sarı¯h. Inferior to
the sarı¯h is also every child born of parents who do not belong to the
same kin group, and every child born of a mother who is a slave or
was abducted in a ghazw, the latter being held in an even lesser regard
and enjoying even fewer rights. Hence the recurrence in Arab poetry
of the boast of being born of a free mother (hurrah) or a mother mar-
ried under payment of a dower (mahı¯rah).
The establishment of artificial descent – adoption (tabannı¯) – also de-
termines membership in a kin group. Largely practiced, adoption could
concern either a free minor whose father had died and whose mother
had returned into her group or a slave who was freed upon adoption.
Adoption had the same legal effects as biological descent with respect
to the name of the dacı¯y (adopted, bastard), marriage bars, inheritance
rules and help-and-assistance duties (al-Mubarrad, al-Ka¯mil: II, 16).
Acknowledging a child born of a slave mother rehabilitates the child,
who would otherwise follow the mother’s condition. The acknowledge-
ment is up to the father, who decides to give his name (the nasab) to
his slave’s child. This is illustrated in the story of cAntarah, the hero
that embodies the values of Arab chivalry (furu¯sı¯yah); for cAntarah’s
merits and courage, cAntara’s father Shadda¯d acknowledges him (yac-
tarif bi-l-walad), making him cAntarah ibn Shadda¯d (al-Isfaha¯nı¯,
al-Agha¯nı¯: VIII, 237).
The wife’s condition deserves a little consideration as well. Arabs
have quite a distinctive preference for endogamy (marriage within the
kin group), and for the marriage of a man to his parallel cousin (the
daughter of his father’s brother) in particular.13 In the case of endoga-
mic marriage, therefore, no question arises on which group the woman
belongs to, while in the case of exogamic marriage the wife generally
becomes a member of the husband’s group; the woman moves in with
her husband (virilocal marriage), and their children become members
of the husband’s group (according to patrilineal descent). The blood
bond between the woman and her group, however, still exists albeit
quiescently; in case of divorce, the bond is revived and the woman re-
turns to her group.
Affinity (musa¯harah), on the contrary, does not interfere with the in-
ner structure of the group, even if it is commonly used to foster social
and political connections among different groups.
Clientage
The institution of ‘clientage’ (wala¯’) emerged to meet with the funda-
mental need of protection of the individual in the absence of a centra-
lised power (al-Miqda¯r 1980: 23-72). In the society of the Arabian
Peninsula, characterised by such diffuse power, the individual was not
entitled rights; only his membership in a group ensured him a certain
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protection. Outside the group, the individual became a mere outcast
who, without anybody to protect him, was at the mercy of any aggres-
sor. Membership in a group was thus a necessary condition (Tyan
1954: 23). All those who were no longer members of any group were in
earnest need of finding a patron and becoming clients. Lack of mem-
bership was the condition of freed slaves, those who voluntarily re-
scinded their bond of membership or were excluded from it according
to custom, and foreigners who decided to dwell among the Arabs.
The wala¯’ occurred between the future client (mawla`) and a man of
the group. The client was then designated the ‘mawla` of the man’, even
if the wala¯’ was used to bind the whole group to the protection of the
mawla`. Apart from the clientage that resulted from the manumission
of the slave (mawla` cita¯qah), ‘ordinary’ wala¯’ was a contract that created
reciprocal rights and duties, and the client was indicated as caqı¯d or
mawla` ciqd (from the root c.q.d of ‘contract’). Technically no payment
was required, but chronicles relate cases in which the mawla`s offered
compensations to win the group’s support, even if it was a reprobate
practice. The ways to contract wala¯’ varied according to local traditions,
but all of them included some sort of solemnity14 and were followed by
a reciprocal oath, the hilf. The term hilf comes from the root h.l.f, as do
the verb taha¯lafa, used to indicate the conclusion of the contract of
wala¯’, and the noun halı¯f, a synonym of mawla` and caqı¯d.
In pre-Islamic Arabia, there was almost no distinction between a
mawla` and a member of the group by kinship. Not so in the Islamic
era. Some Arab proverbs confirm the pre-Islamic egalitarian treatment
of mawla`s, and Islamic tradition attributes these proverbs to Muham-
mad: ‘The client of the kin group is one of their own (mawa¯lı¯ al-qawm
minhum)’15 and ‘clientage is kinship like kinship by blood (al-wala¯’ luh-
mah ka-luhmat al-nasab)’.16 Fulfilling the duty of protecting the mawla`’s
physical safety and property was a point of honour for the group and
was celebrated in the literary genre of vainglorious poetry (fakhr).
These principles, however, were at times coupled with different prac-
tices of discrimination between client and full member according to lo-
cal customs.
Slavery
‘Slavery’ actually did not entail a true form of membership in the kin
group, since the slave was considered the mere property of the master.
As a master’s property, however, the slave enjoyed the protection of the
group, and upon manumission slaves represented the largest source of
clients. The slave was such by being born of a slave mother even if the
father was a freeman (unless he acknowledged the child) or by being
reduced to slavery after a clash among groups or after a case of indivi-
dual aggression.
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1.3 Severance from the group
If membership in a group was a necessary bond, it was not unbreak-
able. The bond could be severed at the individual’s will (if he intended
to become a member of another group) or against his will. The group’s
prevailing interest could require the estrangement of a member if he
caused internal disturbances, if the group’s responsibility for his ac-
tions jeopardised their relations with another group or if protecting
him meant the endangering of the group’s own existence.17 In these
circumstances, kinsmen could inflict the penalty of expulsion (tard or
khalc) on the member without prejudicing their rights of tha’r (ven-
geance) on the offender. The kinsmen’s decision was publicised by a
muna¯dı¯ (announcer), and as a consequence the blood of the khalı¯c (dis-
missed) could be shed with impunity (hadar). The khalı¯c could not but
seek protection from another group as a mawla` or temporary refuge in
the Meccan sanctuary, thus becoming a ca¯’idh bi-l-bayt, secure against
any attack.
1.4 Customary law
In the Arabian Peninsula the legal system consisted exclusively of cus-
tomary rules. Whether common or limited to a certain area or group,
these customs ruled all the spheres of human life, regulating all social,
political and religious expressions. By their very nature, customary
rules resist every individual attempt at modification; they are within
the province neither of the chieftain nor the assembly of notables.
There are records that attribute the determination of a rule to a spe-
cific personality. These records need to be considered with caution;
such records are often not genuine, and even when the innovation was
introduced by a specific person, this person was certainly not acting as
a ‘legislator’ or a ‘reformer’. The new solution had to gain a hold in so-
ciety to be deemed binding, and here the general esteem enjoyed by
the person and his moral authority may have very easily played a part.
A case in point is the fixation of the blood money (diyah) for murder at
one hundred camel heads. Ibn Sacd relates that cAbd al-muttalib, Mu-
hammad’s grandfather, was the one who raised the diyah for murder
from ten to one hundred camel heads (Tabaqa¯t: I, 53-70), but ibn Qu-
taybah says it was Sayya¯rah al-cAdwa¯nı¯, openly criticising ibn Sacd’s
narrative (Kita¯b al-maca¯rif: 240).
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1.5 Private justice and arbitration
For lack of a judicial system in pre-Islamic Arabia – a natural outcome
of the lack of a centralised power – all the controversies were resolved
by vengeance (tha’r) or arbitration (tahkı¯m).
Resorting to private justice was the general rule in the Peninsula,
since no public authority could assure justice. Vengeance (tha’r) gov-
erned all matters, from murder to injuries, all the way down to torts.
Satisfaction was exacted among members of different groups or mem-
bers of the same group; in the former case vengeance was more com-
mon, since the offence roused feelings of the group’s solidarity and
honour, while in the latter case the dispute tended to be settled without
avenging.
Tha’r is not an act of objective justice but rather tends to satisfy a
broader moral and physical need,18 and its exercise is viewed as the ful-
filment of an ethical and religious duty.19 The lawful avenger of blood,
the mawtu¯r or walı¯ al-dam, solemnly undertakes to abstain from plea-
sures until he takes revenge, and until then these pleasures become
forbidden (hara¯m) to him. In the Arab mentality the victim’s soul re-
mains in a condition of pain until the murder is avenged; the soul is
wrapped in darkness until tha’r lights up the tomb. Shame is brought
on the mawtu¯r negligent of his duties, and when the lawful avenger of
blood does not accomplish his task, other members have to intervene
in order to safeguard the group’s reputation; poets stigmatise the re-
miss mawtu¯r or the mawtu¯r who renounces vengeance for settlement
or arbitration.
Only a direct supernatural intervention could discharge the avenger
from the religious duty of vengeance. This results in a clever man-
oeuvre to free the mawtu¯r and the group from the obligation: the tac-
qı¯yah or sahm al-ictidha¯r. Prominent personalities from the group form
a sizeable delegation that asks the lawful avengers of blood to desist
from tha’r and accept customary blood money (diyah). The offer is re-
jected if the avengers are determined to take revenge; otherwise, they
accept the diyah on condition that the deities prove favourable. An ar-
row (sahm) is shot in the sky; if it returns to the ground soaked in
blood, the compensation cannot be accepted. This solution, however,
did not prevent the poets from voicing their sarcasm.
Vengeance does not follow a rigid procedure, yet a certain degree of
ritualisation is present. Firstly, the mawtu¯r has to give public notice of
the evidence for vengeance in order to ground his claim and avoid
further violence; at this stage the mawtu¯r might swear to abstain from
worldly pleasures. When actually carrying out the vengeance, the maw-
tu¯r utters a sacral formula before the coup de graˆce. Once accomplished,
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tha’r is publicised to substantiate the termination of the duty and the
release from the promise of abstention.
Arbitration (tahkı¯m) developed from the practice of negotiating to fix
the amount of composition for murder or injuries (Tyan 1960: 33ff).
Thus the resolution of controversies over property, water, commerce or
inheritance was subtracted from the province of vengeance, together
with the settling of moral disputes like those that originated or were
solved in poetry contests (muna¯farah, or mufa¯kharah).
The parties freely choose the arbitrator (hakam), who must be an
outstanding man of ‘honour, uprightness, loyalty, prestige, seniority,
glory and divination’ (al-Yacqu¯bı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh: 299). In the sources there is
no evidence that the hakam and the chieftain coincided (not even in
Mecca, Lammens 1924a: 158ff); the choice was rather influenced by
the religious status, as in the case of the Christian bishops of Najra¯n
(Cheikho 1890-1891: 369), the Jewish habrs (Wolfensohn 1927: 21) and
the pagan ka¯hins (Lammens 1921: 44). The habit of testing the arbitra-
tor’s supernatural faculties increased the identification of the hakam
with the ka¯hin, the ‘diviner’ who proved his skills with oracles, sacred
arrows or invocations for rain (istisqa¯’).
The very first step to reaching arbitration was the agreement to remit
the solution of the controversy to an arbitrator; the parties were often
advised to do so, and members of the parties’ groups were present
throughout the proceedings. Secondly, the object of the controversy
was fixed, then an arbitrator was selected; the arbitrator could refuse
the task, or accept and impose as a condition the performance of the
arbitral decision, and the deliverance of pledges to secure it. Once the
arbitrator accepted the task, the parties verified the hakam’s faculties in
some way – by asking him to find an object that they had previously
hidden, for instance (al-Nuwayrı¯, Niha¯yat al-arab: III, 127f). Additional
hostages (ruhu¯n) could be then handed over to a guarantor (damı¯n),
but it is not clear what was to be their destiny in case of non-compli-
ance with the arbitrator’s decision. Tyan supposes that the hostages
could even be handed to the winner and enslaved (Tyan 1960: 56f).
Pleadings were conducted in sajc, a rhymed prose used also by the ha-
kam for the decision, where it was not uncommon to find references to
the supernatural or invocations of the deity.
1.6 The chieftain and the assembly
The lack of a centralised power does not necessarily imply the lack of
any form of political and institutional organisation. Actually, such
forms of organisation are more ‘at ease’ when there are no other struc-
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tures competing with them, and therefore reveal their innermost char-
acter. Being intrinsically dynamic, there is no need for inflexible classi-
fications or a rigid terminology, which can turn out to be quite mislead-
ing. This is true also for pre-Islamic Arabia, for which a delineation of
some of the basic governing principles is sufficient at this point.20
The authority of a chieftain is believed to have emerged through the
institutionalisation of the leader chosen at times by the group to face a
specific threat. Within the broad spectrum of human actions, individu-
ating the leader, or leaders, could range from a mere tacit assent to
more explicit choices. Two remarkable cases of clear choices are related
in the sources. In the first, ibn Qutaybah says that the Hawa¯zin be-
stowed (tacahhadu¯, from the root c.h.d) on Durayd ibn al-Simmah the
headship that belonged to his brother cAbd alla¯h after the latter died in
an incursion (al-Shicr wa-l-shucara¯’: 472). In the second, the banu¯ Hanı¯-
fah appointed (tawallu¯, from the root w.l.y, form II) Ha¯rith ibn cAbba¯d
after he excelled in the war of Basu¯s (Cheikho 1890-1891: 271).
When the threat disappeared, the need for a chief disappeared as
well. However, the person who led the threatened group was likely to
retain a certain prestige among his peers, particularly if the group had
been successful. Sources do not provide sufficient data to enable a pre-
cise delineation of the path taken by an individual to chieftainship, but
their silence, occasionally broken by presumably legendary anecdotes,
confirms that by nature it was a process by trial and error. Likewise,
there is no record of any conferment of powers, which rather were con-
centrated in the hands of the leader and were later reabsorbed by the
group. This apparently was the delicate phase of transition from emer-
gency to stability.
The chieftain was usually called sayyid or ra’ı¯s, but the essence of his
functions (su’dud or ri’a¯sah) did not reach the level of political authority
(mulk); he enjoyed a mere primacy that did not allow him to impose
his decisions (ibn Khaldu¯n, al-Muqaddimah: II, §16). The sayyid could
express his opinion (ra’y) but was accompanied by delegations (wafds)
to carry out any negotiations with other groups, even if he was person-
ally liable for the payment of blood money.21 In time of war, the chief-
tain’s powers were considerably increased, and the title of qa¯’id (com-
mander) was then preferred to the one of sayyid.22 The chieftain was
generally a man of age (hence the occurrence of the title of shaykh as
well),23 temperance (hilm),24 generosity, courage and military talent.
Regular gatherings of notables are widely recorded, but no detail is
given on the composition, entitlements or powers of such assemblies.
Belonging to one of these ‘assemblies’ (variably designated as na¯dı¯,
nadwah, or mala’) was considered an honour, worth celebrating in the
encomiastic poetry of madı¯h. On these grounds only prominent per-
sonalities were deemed worthy to sit in the assembly.25 As for entitle-
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ments and powers, the assembly had no decision making power; mat-
ters of general interest were discussed and members offered their
counsel or advice (shu¯ra`). These assemblies were consultative and non-
binding in nature. Their existence, however, attests to the need for
communal discussion and sharing of questions that affect the whole
group.
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2 Membership in the religious community
The social and political milieu of pre-Islamic Arabia considerably af-
fected the spread of monotheistic religions, which assumed the social
order as a vehicle for their diffusion, but soon endeavoured to replace
the traditional forms of membership with the sole bond of common
faith.
Before the rise of Islam, Judaism was professed by Jews of the dia-
spora and by Arab converts, and its main centres were located in the
coastal region of Hejaz and in Yemen. These communities are thought
to have been established after the destruction of Jerusalem in the 2nd
century AD, but these are still clouded chapters of Arab history.
An even greater role was played by Christianity, which penetrated
Arabia from the north as a result of the missionary efforts of Syriac
dissidents, and from the south thanks to the political involvement of
Coptic Abyssinia (Rabbath 1980). Known in its Monophysite and Nes-
torian variants, Christianity evoked interest among the Arabs, as at-
tested in ancient poetry. According to available sources, Monophysites
systematically devoted their efforts to preaching to the Bedouins and
appointed a bishop for every large camp, thus allowing nomads to re-
tain their customs. Nestorians, by contrast, established an episcopate
in Hira (Mesopotamia), where Christians formed a community of cIba¯d
(‘servants’ of God) that transcended the kin order, abolishing descent-
based distinctions; this is the first known case of an ideologically de-
fined Arab group that combined tribal organisation with the functions
of a religious community.
2.1 The formation of the Islamic community
With Muhammad’s public preaching of the revelation, the process to-
wards the formation of a religious community and the creation of a
centralised political power in Arabia was set in motion. At its culmina-
tion, the Islamic community embraced all those who shared the same
faith in Islam, but in the intermediate stages the connection was less
rigid and exclusive, and the new political authority correspondingly ex-
tended over an area not strictly delimited by religious affiliation.
The process was gradual, though not incremental. Progression was
frequently followed by sudden regression, and remarkable policy or
strategy shifts were often recorded. The dynamic confrontation be-
tween the new creed and the traditional social order, the attempts to
bring about a power independent of personal charisma, and the ups
and downs of the relations with the other ‘heavenly religions’ all pro-
vide evidence of this course of action.
In the formative period of the Islamic community, we can distin-
guish three main phases along with the conventional distinction in a
Meccan and a Medinan stage; the first phase and the Meccan stage ba-
sically overlap, while a second and a third phase can be identified in
the Medinan stage, since the early coexistence of Muslims, Jews and
pagans in Medina rapidly faded and dramatically ended with the purge
of the last Jewish tribe, leaving the field to a holistic community.
In the first phase (from 610 to 622), the background consisted of Mu-
hammad’s preaching and his fellow tribesmen’s refusal of the message.
The new ideas were proclaimed at first in a climate of general indiffer-
ence. However, as soon as they turned into open criticism and firm
condemnation of the moral and social order of Mecca, they generated
opposition among the Quraish (al-Maqrı¯zı¯, Imta¯c: I, 18). The Islamic
tradition tends to emphasise the ‘persecutions’ that neophytes had to
endure at the hands of the Meccans; in the beginning Muhammad’s
opponents only verbally criticised the former’s teachings and prophet-
hood, and the sole form of active hostility seems to have been a boycott
(Montgomery Watt 1953: 123). The call to submit to God’s will – hence
the etymological meaning of Islam – met with tepid reception, and
thus Muhammad and his proselytes started leading a life secluded
from the rest of the Meccans (some followers even took shelter in the
Aksumite Empire, in the so-called ‘Hegira to Abyssinia’) and took up
preaching to other kin groups.
In 619, Muhammad’s uncle abu¯ Ta¯lib died, leaving him without pro-
tection. In the system of kin group relations, enjoying someone’s pro-
tection was a vital issue, and the Prophet of Islam had to replace abu¯
Ta¯lib with someone else. He therefore applied to abu¯ Lahab, who
turned him down on the grounds of Muhammad’s belief that their
common ancestor cAbd al-muttalib was doomed. Since no Quraish was
willing to protect him, Muhammad turned to other kin groups in want
of protection; at this point, as has been suggested (Montgomery Watt
1953: 138), the horizons of the prophetic mission – originally limited to
Mecca and its inhabitants – expanded to reach a larger audience.
Muhammad expected to find support in Ta’if among the banu¯ Ma¯lik
as a consequence of their rivalry with the Quraish-allied Ahla¯f, but the
plan failed and the Prophet of Islam had to leave the city under a volley
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of stones. Because of abu¯ Lahab’s refusal, Muhammad could not even
return to Mecca and had to obtain a jiwa¯r, a ‘pact of protection’ (ibn Hi-
sha¯m, Sı¯rah: 251, and al-Tabarı¯, Mukhtasar: I, 1203), at first denied by
some tribal chiefs and eventually granted by the sayyid of the banu¯
Nawfal (Me´lame`de 1934: 17-58).
Nomadic groups did not provide better treatment, but Yathrib pre-
sented more promising conditions. Yathrib – the future Madı¯nat al-nabı¯
(the City of the Prophet), or Medina (the City by antonomasia) – was a
divided settlement: on the one hand, the two main kin groups (the
cAws and the Khazraj, both stemming from the banu¯ Qaylah) had been
at strife ever since the 6th century, and on the other hand there was a
sizeable presence of Jewish tribes (the banu¯ Qurayzah, the banu¯ Qay-
nuqa¯c, and the banu¯ ’l-Nadı¯r).
The first contact with a small delegation of six Khazraj in Mecca for
the pilgrimage was made in 620. The following year (621), five of the
six pilgrims of the previous year returned to Mecca with another seven
people, including two cAws. In cAqabah they committed themselves to
avoid some vices and follow the new religion: such is the content of
the so-called ‘Oath of Women’ (baycat al-nisa¯’). With the joining of non-
Quraish, Islam crossed the traditional kin boundaries, even if the oath
entailed nothing but a religious obligation. After the first baycah of cA-
qabah, Muhammad sent to Yathrib Muscab ibn cUmayr, who won to Is-
lam many converts from almost all the kin groups of the settlement.
In 622, a larger group of 75 people from Yathrib returned to cAqa-
bah, where they made the stricter commitment to fight for the Prophet
of Islam; the new oath is thus remembered as the ‘Oath of War’ (baycat
al-harb). One of Muhammad’s uncles, al-cAbba¯s, is believed to have
overseen the operation in order to ascertain if the cAws and Khazraj
had properly assumed the obligation of protecting Muhammad. The
second oath of cAqabah (the Great baycah) produced a qualitative leap
in the formation of the community; the mere submission to some mor-
al and religious teachings turned into undertaking to fight under the
leadership of Muhammad, also against the kin order. In sharp contrast
with the conciliatory attitude earlier recommended, the political ele-
ment was later confirmed and secured by new revelations, which were
believed to authorise war or even prescribe it (ibn Hisha¯m, Sı¯rah: II, 51
and 62ff, and al-Tabarı¯, Ta’rı¯kh: II, 87ff). The wording implies that
armed action is justified only in case of attack, but the attitude of the
Quraish was taken as an ‘attack’ (Q. 22:39, and 2:191).
After having received the second oath of cAqabah, Muhammad en-
couraged his Meccan followers to migrate to Yathrib, and in the sum-
mer of 622 some groups started making the Hegira (hijrah). According
to Muslim sources, Muhammad remained in Mecca until rumours of a
murder plot forced him to leave the city with abu¯ Bakr (Q. 9:40).
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When they reached Yathrib the Hegira was fully accomplished. Mec-
cans who migrated, known as muha¯jiru¯n, severed their kin ties, hence
renouncing the protection and the other benefits of membership in the
kin group. After the Hegira, embracing Muhammad’s prophetic mes-
sage assumed a distinctively political flavour, and even the spirit of
Koranic revelations significantly changed – so much so that Islamic tra-
dition distinguishes between Meccan and Medinan parts of the Qur’a¯n.
Hegira itself was perceived as such a turning point in Islamic history
that its date of occurrence was soon adopted to mark the beginning of
the Islamic era (AH).
The severance of kin ties involved in the Hegira, though, should not
be overestimated, but rather understood in the context of a network of
group relations whose boundaries are determined by the presence of
the group. Firstly, the matter concerned only the Meccans who mi-
grated, since the Medinans kept leading their lives within the kin or-
der; as a consequence, a polarisation between muha¯jiru¯n (Meccans) and
ansa¯r (Medinans) came about because of this difference in status. Sec-
ondly, the second oath of cAqabah did not provide a suitable organisa-
tion for the muha¯jiru¯n, whose protection and integration therefore had
to be achieved through alternative forms of membership other than the
traditional ones.
An attempt to engender higher social cohesion was the mu’a¯kha¯, a
fictitious brotherhood conceived to couple two muha¯jiru¯ns, or a muha¯-
jiru¯n and an ansa¯r, with mutual rights of inheritance (Tyan 1954: 131).
The mu’a¯kha¯’s main aim, though, seems to have been military, since
the coupled men had to stand side-by-side in battle and thus refrain
from disorderly reactions when facing the enemy (Montgomery Watt
1956: 301). Very little is known about the mu’a¯kha¯, which is said to
have been abandoned after the Battle of Badr (624), even if the
mu’a¯kha¯ between al-cAbba¯s and his nephew Nawfal ibn al-Ha¯rith was
undoubtedly instituted later. A lingering echo of the fictitious brother-
hood can still be heard at the time of Muca¯wiyah, who was coupled
with al-Huta¯t ibn Yazı¯d when Muhammad marched on Mecca in 630
(ibn Hisha¯m, Sı¯rah: III, 374ff).
With the Hegira the community entered a new phase of its formation,
during which the political dimension started shaping up while retain-
ing – in the first Medinan period – a composite makeup. Shortly after
the Hegira, Muhammad organised Yathrib’s population along legal and
political lines in what is known as the Sahı¯fah, or ‘Charter of Medina’.
Besides controversies over the authenticity of the document,1 the orga-
nisation portrayed is consistent with evidence from other sources; the
kin bond was somehow marginalised, but the idea of the bond of the
common faith in Islam as the sole basis for the new community had
44 CITIZENSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD
yet to come. The ‘community’ mirrored in the Charter – transmitted by
ibn Isha¯q and included by ibn Hisha¯m in his narrative of Muham-
mad’s life, the Sı¯rat rasu¯l alla¯h2 – included: (1) Muslims who migrated
from Mecca (the muha¯jiru¯ns) and converts from Yathrib (the ansa¯rs),
(2) Jews who guarded their religion but had to contribute to the ex-
penses of Muslims in case of war, and (3) pagans who were no longer
allowed to apply to non-Muslim Meccans the traditional means of pro-
tection for people and goods (jiwa¯r or hilf). The political and military
chief was Muhammad, recognised as the Prophet (nabı¯) and Messen-
ger (rasu¯l) of God; the Charter is said to be derived from Muhammad
(art. 1), and any matter of dispute had to be referred to God or to him
(art. 23).3 Such unilaterality is backed by the fact that Muhammad is
thought to have been received in Yathrib as an arbiter for tribal dis-
putes and to ensure internal peace (Caetani 1911-1914: III, 27-36).
The organisation provided for in the Charter turned out to be quite
unstable, and paralleled the fate of relations with Judaism. The Jews
had been initially considered potential allies and converts, but their re-
jection of Muhammad’s preaching exacerbated feelings of hostility. The
Arab character of the message was consequently stressed, and Jews
were declared falsifiers, corrupters of their own Scriptures and forgers
of the pure monotheism that the common father Abraham had intro-
duced in Arabia and that Muhammad was re-establishing and bringing
to completion. Changing the direction of prayer (qiblah) from Jerusa-
lem to Mecca in 624 was the first hint of the new attitude, shortly fol-
lowed by the expulsion of the banu¯ Qaynuqa¯c after the Battle of Badr.
In 625 the Muslims’ defeat in the Battle of Uhud was followed by the
siege of the banu¯ ’l-Nadı¯r, who were eventually forced to leave Medina.
The last Jewish tribe in town, the banu¯ Qurayzah, suffered the worst
fate; after the Battle of the Trench in 627 all the men were killed, the
property was divided and the women and children were taken captive.
The purge of the Jews paved the way for a religiously homogeneous so-
ciety, and in the third phase (from 627 on) the community (ummah)4
acquired its distinctive and ultimate characters.
In the Qur’a¯n the word ‘ummah’ had been used throughout the sec-
ond phase to indicate a ‘group of people’; Jews and Christians were
‘communities’ (Q. 23:52), and even Arabs were considered an ummah
(Q. 13:30) like all those who are righteous (Q. 7:168), or the groups of
Jews ‘who guide and do justice in the light of truth’ and of Christians
‘who enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong’ (Q. 7:159 and 3:113-
114). When friction with the Jewish tribes of Yathrib unveiled the hin-
drances preventing the inclusion of non-Muslims in one religious com-
munity, the Qur’a¯n prohibited alliances with Jews and Christians (Q.
5:51) and started referring to a distinct, superior community including
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only Muslims (Q. 3:104 and 110, and 2:143), while all other com-
munities had to be fought against until they paid the tax, ‘being
brought low’ (Q. 9:29). This marks the beginning of the idea that non-
Muslims – even if excluded from the Islamic community and orga-
nised in separate groups – can be connected to the ummah by a bond
of submission.5
In the Medinan period closer ties among Muslims were forged and
the basis was laid for the organisation of the Islamic community and
its legal provisions. In the meantime, a turning point in the ongoing
conflict with Mecca was Muhammad’s decision in 628 to march with a
group of Muslims to his birthplace to perform the cumrah (the ‘minor
pilgrimage’ that can be undertaken at any time of the year). The Qura-
ish were determined not to allow the Muslims to perform the pilgrim-
age and intercepted them outside the city’s holy territory, in Huday-
bı¯yah, where the parties signed an agreement providing for the Mus-
lims’ immediate retreat and the Meccans’ consent to allow the
Muslims to come on pilgrimage the following year.
According to the Islamic tradition, the Treaty of Hudaybı¯yah in-
cluded clauses calling for a ten-year truce between parties, the return-
ing of any Quraish who had left Mecca without his guardian’s permis-
sion (with no reciprocity of Muslim deserters) and the freedom to es-
tablish alliances with other tribes. Such clauses seem to contrast with
the growing success of Muhammad, and he had to face widespread dis-
content among his followers. The truce was initially respected, and in
629 some Medinans performed the hajj to Mecca, but the pact was
soon denounced on the basis of an attack on a tribe allied with Mu-
hammad. Ready to wage war, Muslims headed for Mecca, but the city
surrendered peacefully. Muhammad then circled the Kacbah seven
times and solemnly proclaimed that ‘every claim of privilege, whether
of blood or property’, was abolished (Montgomery Watt 1956: 261-302),
while all the idols in the sanctuary were broken and the stone gods
destroyed.
The spread of Islam strategically accelerated in the second Medinan
phase, especially after the successful political and military achieve-
ments against Mecca. Many tribes that had maintained a neutral stance
up to that point deemed it necessary to side with the stronger, and – ac-
cording to Arab custom – sent delegations (wufu¯d) to Muhammad in
order to settle their adherence to Islam and to pay the ensuing tribu-
tary duties. The clear political reason behind such conversions to Islam
surfaced at Muhammad’s death, when some tribes across the Peninsu-
la refused to keep paying their tributes, thus forsaking Islam. Abu¯
Bakr, the first caliph or political successor of Muhammad, had to tackle
the issue of dissident tribes, arms in hand, in what became known as
the ‘Riddah (apostasy or rebellion) Wars’.
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To sum up, after the preaching in Mecca, where the first proselytes (all
Quraish) certainly found in the revelation a common and distinctive
element that did not, however, disconnect them from their kin rela-
tions (610-622), the Hegira led to a short-lived experience in Yathrib of
coexistence among Muslims (both Quraish and non-Quraish), Jews
and pagans (622-625). The increasing conversions of pagans and the
elimination of the Jewish tribes resulted in the formation of a reli-
giously homogeneous community. The Islamic community has main-
tained such a holistic character ever since, notwithstanding its broad
diffusion; nonetheless, it has had to deal with the deep-rooted mental-
ity and rivalry among kin groups (from 625 on).
2.2 Forms of membership in the Islamic community
The full political and religious unity of the Islamic community (al-um-
mah al-isla¯mı¯yah) was but an ephemeral event in history. Even so, it
has kept the hearts of Muslims beating for centuries (Gardet 1967:
274). At Muhammad’s death, the ancient tribal particularism that only
Muhammad’s personal charisma managed to temporarily subdue vehe-
mently re-emerged, and even the great impetus of the conquests was
soon followed by centrifugal forces that gradually tore apart the cali-
phal empire. Muslims’ consciousness of belonging to the same com-
munity, however, passed the test of time despite the several internal
schisms and the countless political and dynastic upheavals.
Classical Islamic law finally fixed the forms of membership in the Is-
lamic community as well as the status of non-Muslims living under Is-
lamic authority, and the position of those professing heretical doctrines
or committing apostasy (individually or collectively).
2.2.1 Muslims
A Muslim is a Muslim by birth or by conversion. Islam presents itself
as the natural religion of mankind,6 and some Koranic verses support
such a view (Q. 30:30-32),7 underpinned by traditions (hadı¯th) relating
Muhammad’s words, ‘No child is born but upon the “natural religion
(fitrah)”. It is his parents who make him a Jew or a Christian or a poly-
theist’.8 Such a natural inclination to worship the one God is an inher-
ent disposition that leads men to a pure monotheism (hanı¯fı¯yah) epito-
mised by Islam.
Every child of a Muslim man is a Muslim according to Islamic law;
here a well-established rule is borrowed from Jewish law, which, how-
ever, applies it to the woman with its typical Biblical insight. The com-
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bination of the Jewish and the Islamic rule may give rise to a positive
conflict of laws; in the case of the offspring of a Muslim man and a
Jewish woman, indeed, the child is a Muslim under Islamic law and a
Jew under Jewish law. A Muslim woman is obliged to marry a Muslim
man and therefore can only give birth to a Muslim child. Thus a Mus-
lim can only generate a Muslim; the man by virtue of a general rule,
and the woman by virtue of an impediment to marriage.
At the child’s birth, the Muslim father whispers into the newborn’s
right ear the call to prayer (adha¯n): ‘God is great (four times), there is
no god but God (twice), Muhammad is the messenger of God (twice),
come to prayer (twice)’. On the seventh day, the child is given a name
(tasmiyah), a sacrifice is offered (caqı¯qah, consisting of two pieces of
small livestock for a boy and one for a girl), and alms are distributed.9
Such birth rites, as well as later rituals like circumcision (khita¯n),
though, do not affect the child’s religion; he/she is a Muslim because a
Muslim begot him/her.
A non-Muslim can convert to Islam by pronouncing the shaha¯dah in
Arabic (la¯ ila¯h illa¯ alla¯h wa-Muhammad rasu¯l alla¯h) – there is no god
but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God – in front of two
male adult Muslim witnesses. The shaha¯dah represents the basic tenets
of Islamic creed, and Islamic theology (kala¯m) is considered a deriva-
tion of the shaha¯dah itself. The shaha¯dah is the Muslim declaration of
belief in the oneness of God (la¯ ila¯h illa¯ alla¯h – there is no god but
God) and in Muhammad’s prophethood (wa-Muhammad rasu¯l alla¯h –
and Muhammad is the messenger of God). Shia Muslims add a third
item on cAlı¯’s status (wa-cAlı¯ walı¯ alla¯h – and cAlı¯ is the friend of God),
but such an addition is generally regarded as a mere recommendation
(mustahabb, and not wa¯jib, obligatory) and is commonly omitted in the
calls to prayer (adha¯n and iqa¯mah).
Just like any freed slave, a non-Arab convert to Islam needed an Arab
patron. Here analogy with pre-Islamic practices of clientage is striking.
In the Age of the Conquest, this rule created two classes of Muslims:
Arabs and non-Arabs. Since the former had a well-established tribal
system, only conversion was needed to embrace Islam, while for the
latter clientage was a requirement to become Muslims and be attached
to an Arab kin group. The inferiority engendered by the non-Arab Mus-
lim’s status of client (mawla`) led to anti-Arab political and literary
movements, like the Shucu¯bı¯yah.
Under Islamic law, the father’s conversion results in the conversion
of his minor and his mentally weak children. The majority of scholars
believe that the mother’s conversion produces the same effect, but not
Maliki jurists. Children who have not attained puberty can neither va-
lidly convert to Islam nor abandon it (al-Zuhaylı¯ 1997: vi, 184). Some
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Hanafi and Hanbali scholars, however, on account of both the minor’s
and the public interest (maslahah), admit that the discerning minor
(mumayyiz) can convert to Islam but cannot abandon it.
2.2.2 Non-Muslims
In Muhammad’s early days, a fairly liberal attitude towards religion
dominated among the Hejazi kin groups, each having its own idol in
the sanctuary of the Kacbah. Besides polytheists there were two com-
munities for which the religious bond somehow exceeded the kin
bond: a larger Jewish and a smaller Christian community. With the rise
of Islam a new community took shape (Q. 3:103-104) and was soon de-
clared ‘the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is
right, forbidding what is wrong and believing in God’(Q. 3:110).
The emergence of the Islamic community overturned previous
peaceful relations among religions, imposing a system of ranked reli-
gious groups. A tradition (hadı¯th) relates that Muhammad instructed
on his deathbed not to leave two religions in Arabia (ibn Sacd, Tabaqa¯t:
II, 44), but an earlier account ascribes this instruction to cUmar ibn
al-Khatta¯b, the second caliph (Caetani 1911-1914: IV, 351). Despite dis-
putes on the authenticity of the narrative, Jews and Christians in the
Arabian peninsula were soon almost entirely uprooted. A case in point
is the deportation of the entire Christian population of Najra¯n in a new
settlement in Iraq (al-Najra¯nı¯yah; Shahid 1971).
Islam establishes a hierarchy among other religions. At the top of
the ladder are the People of the Book (ahl al-kita¯b): those who received
scriptures revealed by God before the time of Muhammad. Among
these ‘true believers’ worthy of tolerance are the followers of mono-
theistic Abrahamic religions: Jews, Christians and Sabians (Q. 2:62,
and 5:69). A later verse mentions also Zoroastrians and lists them
ahead of polytheists (Q. 22:17). An initial tolerant attitude towards the
ahl al-kita¯b (Q. 2:136-137, and 22:17) was later replaced by a more adver-
sarial relationship (Q. 9:29), which prevails over the former verses as a
result of the application of the theory of abrogation (naskh). Neverthe-
less, the latter verse allowed the extension of the provisions regarding
the ahl al-kita¯b to non-Arab polytheists, thus avoiding the alternative of
conversion to Islam or the sword.
Like membership in the Islamic community, membership in non-Is-
lamic communities is determined in accordance with the Islamic view
by birth or by conversion, but conversion from Islam to another reli-
gion is unacceptable. For Judaism, the child of a Jewish mother is a
member of the People of the Covenant (berı¯th), while conversion is a
far more intricate matter. Conversely, there is no membership in the
Christian community by birth. The child of a Christian parent is not a
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Christian until the christening (the practice of infant baptism started
spreading by the end of the 2nd century; Aland 1961: 22ff). Islamic
law, however, applies the same Judeo-Islamic perspective of member-
ship by descent to the Christian communities of the Near East, and
does not employ the theory of fitrah (Islam as the natural religion of
man). If it did, anyone receiving baptism after puberty would be con-
sidered an apostate.
2.3 Partition from the Islamic community
Drawing a line between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in Islam is no easy
task. It is also highly doubtful whether ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heterodoxy’ are
categories that can fruitfully be applied to Islam, since there is no over-
seeing religious authority in the largest denomination of Islam in the
Arab world, Sunni Islam. Sunni Muslims are the ‘People of the Sun-
nah and the Community’ (ahl al-sunnah wa-l-jama¯cah), implying that
religious authority is not concentrated in clergy but rather diffused in
the Qur’a¯n and the Sunnah and their communitarian interpretation de-
veloped by generations of scholars (culama¯’) and lawyers (fuqaha¯’).
Scholarly views on the slender divide between acceptable dissenting
opinions and heretical doctrines differ considerably. Openly abandon-
ing Islam to embrace another religion is a much easier controversy to
unravel. Rules on collective or individual apostasy apply, and such rules
are the only way of severing the bond of membership in the Islamic
community.
2.3.1 Muslim sects
‘And my community will split into 73 sects’.10 On the basis of this well-
known hadı¯th attributed to Muhammad, Muslim scholars made great
efforts to identify all the sects, since 72 of them were doomed to burn
in the fire and only one was destined to be saved (al-firqah al-na¯jiyah).
Regardless of the authenticity of the tradition and the pious scholarly
efforts, schisms with profound and long-lasting effects occurred shortly
after the death of Muhammad. Four decades had not elapsed when the
first split (al-fitnah al-kubra`) marked the end of the early unity of the Is-
lamic community. What began as a political confrontation over the
right to the caliphate turned into the principal religious rift in Islamic
history: on the one side were the supporters of Muca¯wiyah, the gover-
nor of Syria and future founder of the Umayyad caliphate (Sunni Mus-
lims), and on the other were the partisans of cAlı¯ asserting the right to
the caliphate of Muhammad’s household, the ahl al-bayt (Shia Mus-
lims). Some of cAlı¯’s partisans, however, did not agree on subjecting
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cAlı¯’s legitimate authority to arbitration and mutinied (Kharijite
Muslims).
One of the most influential Muslim theologians, the Ash‘arite poly-
math al-Ghazza¯lı¯ (d. 1111), dealt with the question of orthodoxy and
heresy at the end of his al-Iqtisa¯d fı¯ ’l-ictina¯q (The Median in Belief).
Al-Ghazza¯lı¯’s starting point was the proper use of the term ka¯fir (infidel,
unbeliever) – broadly the person who denies Muhammad’s prophet-
hood or declares Muhammad a liar.11 He then defined different degrees
of kufr (infidelity, unbelief). Included among kuffa¯r (plural of ka¯fir)
were certainly the Jews and the Christians, and in a lower position
were also polytheists and followers of other religions that denied pro-
phethood, like Brahmans or atheists. Even Muslim philosophers whose
theories clashed with the Qur’a¯n or only formally admitted Muham-
mad’s prophethood had to be considered infidels. Not so for other Isla-
mic sects or theological schools that truly accepted the tenet of Mu-
hammad’s prophethood (like Muslim anthropomorphists or Mu‘tazi-
lis); in such cases suspension of judgement was recommended. A
Muslim claiming an Islamic religious precept to be nonbinding is not
a ka¯fir only if the precept is a minor precept, as in the case of the Mus-
lim who rejects dogma not grounded in the Qur’a¯n or the Sunnah but
simply inferred and non-controversial (by ijma¯c, consensus). Al-Ghazza¯-
lı¯ acknowledged an exception to this rule in the case of a Muslim main-
taining that God could send other prophets, even if this dogma is
grounded on a Koranic verse (Q. 33:40) and a tradition.12 The Ash‘arite
theologian deemed that the two passages can be interpreted
metaphorically.
The Ash‘arite-Ghazzalian doctrine, still prevalent in Arab Islam, was
contested by the ‘dogmatic integralism’ of ibn Taymı¯yah (d. 1328),
whose legacy was later recovered by Wahhabism in the 18th century.
According to ibn Taymı¯yah, dangerous errors and aberrations under-
mining the true faith permeated the Islamic community and had to be
uprooted by resorting to the Hanbali middle path: uncompromising on
the principles of divine revelation but tolerant of minor differences. ‘As
the Prophet said – wrote ibn Taymı¯yah –: “The Muslim is brother of
the Muslim”.13 How then can it be permitted to the community of Mu-
hammad to divide itself into such diverse opinions that a man can join
one group and hate another one simply on the basis of presumptions
or personal caprices, without any proof coming from God? [..] Unity is
a sign of divine clemency; discord is a punishment of God’.14 On the
other hand, however, members of deviant Islamic sects should be trea-
ted as collective apostates. In a fatwa` on cAlawis (or al-nusayrı¯yah), for
example, ibn Taymı¯yah affirmed, ‘They are greater disbelievers than
Jews and Christians. Nay, they are greater disbelievers than most of the
mushrikı¯n (polytheists), and their harm to the ummah of Muhammad
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(PBUH) is greater than the harm of the disbelievers who are at war
with Muslims’. Ibn Taymı¯yah had a similar opinion on the Druzes
(duru¯z), and stated that both groups were so far beyond the confines of
Islam that even the food they prepared was forbidden to Muslims and
it was unlawful to have intercourse with their women or to accept their
repentance. In other words, the only way to treat them was physical an-
nihilation, which is something that the Mamluks, through ibn Tay-
mı¯yah’s prodding, tried to do during his lifetime.
2.3.2 Collective apostasy
The narrow line of demarcation between Muslim sects and apostate
groups has hardly ever been drawn out of sheer dogmatic considera-
tions. Political reasons have often motivated the decision to declare that
a Muslim sect had forsaken Islam and thus to apply the rules of collec-
tive apostasy. At an early stage, collective deviations were dealt with in
a practical way, while a definite theory on collective apostasy was devel-
oped by later scholars. Nevertheless, collective apostasy has always been
declared on a case-by-case basis.
The first splinter groups appeared on the Islamic scene at an early
date. Shortly after Muhammad’s death, some factions refused to recog-
nise Muhammad’s political successors, claiming that they had sub-
mitted only to Muhammad and that with his death their allegiance had
duly ended (Caetani 1911-1914: III, 346ff). These factions withheld
their financial contribution (the Islamic alms tax or zaka¯h), but they
did not otherwise challenge Islam, even if some leaders asserted their
prophethood. Abu¯ Bakr, the first caliph, contended that they had not
merely submitted to Muhammad but had joined the Islamic religious
community, and defying the caliphate meant breaking from the com-
munity, thus committing apostasy (riddah). He declared war on the re-
bels. The Islamic tradition labelled these campaigns the ‘Wars of Apos-
tasy’ (huru¯b al-riddah), and later scholars depicted them as the first ji-
ha¯d against the infidelity of Arabs (Sachedina 1988: 53-90).
The three major hotbeds of the rebellion were al-Yama¯mah, northern
Hejaz and the city of al-Sanca¯’ in Yemen, and the main dissidents were
Musaylimah of the banu¯ Hanı¯fah in al-Yama¯mah, Saja¯h of the banu¯
Tamı¯m in northern Hejaz, and al-Aswad al-cAnası¯ in Yemen. Musayli-
mah proclaimed himself prophet, and therefore Muslim authors re-
member him as the ‘Liar’ (al-kadhdha¯b). His memory was yet alive in
1862 when William Palgrave visited Nejd. The English scholar reported
that Musaylimah was still remembered as a prophet and some of his
‘burlesque imitations’ of the Qur’a¯n were still recited (Palgrave 1865: I,
382). After two unsuccessful expeditions, he was defeated by Kha¯lid
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ibn al-Walı¯d in the conclusive combat of the ‘Garden of Death’ (hadı¯qat
al-mawt) in 633.
Islamic law later developed a set of rules pertaining to the treatment
of factions that were considered to have collectively abandoned Islam.
The territories inhabited by collective renegades were to be declared
da¯r riddah (home of apostasy) and thus subjected to even harsher regu-
lations than the ones prescribed for the da¯r al-harb (home of war, i.e.
non-Muslim governed territories). According to the 8th-century Hanafi
jurist al-Shayba¯nı¯ and the 11th-century Shafi‘i jurist al-Ma¯wardı¯, no
truce can be concluded with them, nor can money be accepted from
their hands for allowing them to live in their land, and they cannot
even be taken captives. On this last point, however, al-Ma¯wardı¯ men-
tions al-Sha¯ficı¯’s stricter position and abu¯ Hanı¯fah’s soothing exemp-
tion for the women who took refuge in the da¯r al-harb.
Under the Abbasids (750-1258) some converts who were reckoned
still to be followers of Manichaeism were accused of being zindı¯q, zan-
daqah being the condition of those who formally embraced Islam but
covertly guarded their previous beliefs, thus representing a serious
threat to Islam. Zandaqah was included in the category of apostasy,
and the third Abbasid caliph, al-Mahdı¯ (ruled 775-785) ordered the
death of all the suspect crypto-Manichaeans. In time, blunt accusations
of apostasy were addressed to many Sufis. One of them, the Persian
mystic Mansu¯r-e Halla¯j (d. 922), was first called a zindı¯q for his Mani-
chaean-related theory on the mystic union, and later executed for deny-
ing the obligation to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) for those
who meet God in their hearts. A century later, however, many Copts
forced to convert under the Fatimid caliph al-Ha¯kim (d. 1021) were la-
ter allowed to revert to Christianity without being punished for
apostasy.
Intolerance of and discrimination against deviant factions is not
merely a set of historical rules and past practices. Two present-day
cases in point are the Ahmadis and the Ba¯bı¯-Baha¯’ı¯s, which are both
movements that arose in the 19th century in non-Arab Muslim lands.
On the other hand, however, some groups managed to maintain their
inner atypical beliefs while being outwardly mainstream Muslims. An
interesting case is that of the Donmeh (from the Turkish word for con-
vert, do¨nme), or Sabbatean crypto-Jews. The Donmeh follow the path of
the self-proclaimed Jewish messiah Shabbatai Zevi (d. 1676), a Jew
who converted to Islam in the 17th century but covertly continued prac-
ticing Jewish rituals. Notwithstanding the closely knit social network
sustained by the rigorous practice of intermarriage, the Donmeh fully
integrated into Turkish society and are thought to have made a consid-
erable contribution to the rise of the Young Turks.
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Ahmadis are the followers of Mı¯rza` Ghula¯m Ahmad (d. 1908), a reli-
gious figure from Qadian, Punjab. Mı¯rza` Ghula¯m Ahmad’s claims of
being the mujaddid (the reformer) and later also the Messiah and the
Mahdı¯ (the guided one) sparked great controversy among Muslims,
and he and his followers were branded as heretics. Nevertheless, Ah-
madis consider themselves Muslims, and Mı¯rza` Ghula¯m Ahmad
named his movement the Ahmadi Muslim Community (Jama¯cat-i Ah-
madı¯yah Muslimah). The community split into two branches soon after
the death of Mı¯rza` Ghula¯m Ahmad. The Jama¯cat-i Ahmadı¯yah Musli-
mah and the Ahmadiyah Anjuman Isha¯cat-i Isla¯m vary in their interpre-
tations of Ahmad’s teachings and claims (especially on the return of Je-
sus, the status of Mı¯rza` Ghula¯m Ahmad, the finality of Muhammad’s
prophethood, the caliphate and the jiha¯d), but members of both
branches are labelled as collective apostates. In 1922 in British India,
the Madras High Court ruled that anyone who accepted the prophet-
hood of Muhammad and the supreme authority of the Qur’a¯n would
be treated as a Muslim in the eyes of the law.15 Hence, a Muslim be-
coming an Ahmadi was not an apostate. The situation changed after
the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In 1974 the Pa-
kistani Parliament introduced in the Constitution the definition of the
term ‘Muslim’ and a list of groups that are, legally speaking, non-Mus-
lim. The amendment thus explicitly deprived Ahmadis of their identity
as Muslims.16 A decade later, Ordinance XX of 1984 was issued to
further restrict the activities of Ahmadis. In particular, the Ordinance
added two sections to the Pakistani Penal Code of 1860, punishing the
Ahmadis for misusing Islamic epithets, descriptions or titles (PPC 298
(b)), or for calling themselves Muslims, preaching or propagating their
faith, outraging the religious feelings of Muslims or posing as Muslims
(PPC 298(c)). Act III of 1986 (also known as the ‘Blasphemy Law’)
raised the penalty for remarks disrespectful of Muhammad from fine
or imprisonment to death (PPC 295(c)); Ahmadis’ beliefs in the pro-
phethood of Mı¯rza` Ghula¯m Ahmad are per se considered defilements
of Muhammad’s name. The Muslim World League had already classi-
fied Ahmadis as a sect of apostates in 197417 and recommended severe
measures against them.18
Similarly, the Muslim World League condemned the Baha¯’ı¯s in
1988. Baha¯’ı¯s, however, do not consider themselves Muslims, but
rather believe in different ‘manifestations of God’ and in the idea of
progressive revelation. The Baha¯’ı¯ faith developed in 19th-century Per-
sia, growing out of Shaykhı¯ doctrines rooted in Shia Islam. In 1844 a
25-year-old Shirazi, Sayyid cAlı¯ Muhammad, declared that he was the
forerunner of the Mahdı¯, or his ‘door’ or Ba¯b. The Ba¯b and his fol-
lowers were persecuted by the Muslim hierarchy and the Ba¯b was even-
tually executed because his teachings contradicted the finality of Mu-
54 CITIZENSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD
hammad’s prophethood, a central point of Islamic faith. In 1852 one of
the Ba¯b’s persecuted followers, Mı¯rza` Husayn cAlı¯ Nu¯rı¯, claimed to be
the fulfilment of the Ba¯b’s eschatological prophecy and assumed the
name of Baha¯’ulla¯h, the Glory of God. The Baha¯’ı¯ doctrine is highly
syncretistic, and its core tenets are the ‘three onenesses’: the oneness
of God, the oneness of religion and the oneness of humankind. Baha¯’ı¯s
propagated out of Persia and are currently one of the world’s most
widespread religions. Since the Islamic revolution in Iran, Baha¯’ı¯s have
been virulently persecuted, allegedly on grounds of belonging to an ‘or-
ganisation-enemy’ of the Islamic Republic. The Baha¯’ı¯s’ relations with
Israel, where their World Centre is located, are often cited as evidence
of their disloyalty. In the Arab world and in a Sunni context, Baha¯’ı¯s
are not treated in a more conciliatory manner. In 2003 the Islamic Re-
search Academy of al-Azhar confirmed its previous orientation, declar-
ing the Baha¯’ı¯ faith ‘a form of intellectual epidemic’ (min nawcı¯ya¯t
al-awbi’ah al-fikrı¯yah). In Egypt, Baha¯’ı¯ places of worship are still
banned (Law 263 of 1960),19 and the opportunity of seeing their own
religious affiliation (al-baha¯’ı¯yah) indicated on official documents
sparked great excitement in the Baha¯’ı¯ community, but the Supreme
Administrative Court in December 2006 overruled the decision of a
lower court.20
2.3.3 Individual apostasy
Joining Islam is fairly easy, but abandoning it has severe consequences.
The Qur’a¯n asserts that God despises apostates (murtadd), and a harsh
punishment for apostasy (riddah or irtida¯d) is envisioned for the after-
life (Q. 2:217-218). The idea is reasserted in other passages (Q. 3:85-91
and 137, 4:115, and 16:106), but by no means does the text prescribe
worldly punishment for turning from Islam.
All Islamic legal schools, however, agree on the point that apostasy
needs to be punished, even if they hold different views on how it
should be punished. Maliki, Hanbali and Ja‘fari jurists list apostasy as
a hadd crime, i.e. a capital offence punishable by a pre-established pun-
ishment found in the Qur’a¯n. Hanafi and Shafi‘i jurists do not regard
apostasy as a hadd crime, but nevertheless share the common view that
it should be punished by death.21 Capital punishment is based upon
two hadı¯ths. According to the first, Muhammad said, ‘Whoever changes
his religion, kill him’,22 and according to the second, the blood of a
Muslim can be shed only in three cases: ‘(1) in retaliation for murder,
(2) for having committed adultery (3) or for having reverted from Islam
and left the community’.23
According to Islamic law, apostasy is not limited to the abandonment
of Islam for the sake of joining another religious community, but can
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also be perpetrated by committing a sacrilegious act or professing a
non-mainstream belief. Scholars listed examples of sayings or acts that
are regarded as implications of unbelief, but general rules providing es-
tablished criteria have not been constructed (Peters-De Vries 1976:
3).24 Different examples can be grouped into categories of offences
against monotheism (e.g. asserting that there are other gods besides
God, or worshipping an idol), Muhammad’s prophethood (e.g. reject-
ing Muhammad’s claim to be a prophet, or proclaiming him/herself a
prophet) or other beliefs (e.g. denying the obligatory status of ritual
prayer, or contemptuously disposing of a copy of the Qur’a¯n). The acts
entailing apostasy must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses (a
generic accusation is not sufficient) or by confession.
In order to perform a legal act of apostasy, the Muslim must be adult
(ba¯ligh), in full possession of mental faculties (ca¯qil) and acting out of
free will (mukhta¯r). If the Muslim was not born a Muslim, Maliki jur-
ists require an unambiguous and explicit conversion (husn al-isla¯m
clause, viz. under no constraint, when sober, with witnesses and the
parents’ assent if the person is not of age). As far as age is concerned,
the consensus (ijma¯c) is that minors can apostatise only after having
reached the age of discernment. According to Shafi‘i doctors, minors
cannot apostatise until they come of age, while jurists of other schools
hold that discerning minors (mumayyiz) can commit apostasy, even if
their coming of age must be awaited in order to invite them to repent
and, in case of persistence in their apostasy, to execute them. Apostasy
must be deliberate. The individual is not held responsible in the case
of constraint, delirium, mental illness or misinterpretation of sacred
law (namely, believing that something prohibited is permissible).
When apostasy has been legally established, the apostate is exhorted
to re-embrace Islam (istita¯bah) before sentencing; exhorting the apos-
tate is obligatory (wa¯jib) for all schools, except for Hanafis who deem it
merely recommended (mandu¯b). The apostates are given three days to
reflect. The possibility of revocation and repentance (tawbah) is ac-
knowledged by Sunni scholars, whereas Shia Ja‘faris accept repentance
only of an apostate born an unbeliever (murtadd millı¯) and not if born a
Muslim (murtadd fitrı¯). Magicians (sa¯hir), heretics (zindı¯q) and recidi-
vists are excluded from istita¯bah; their apostasy is legally irrevocable,
since there can be no reasonable certainty that they earnestly returned
to Islam.
Apostasy entails the death penalty. A closer consideration of the dif-
ferent treatments afforded to male and female apostates, together with
a cross comparison of Islamic and Jewish prescriptions on the punish-
ment (and to whom it should apply), helps cast light on the proportion
of capital punishment for apostasy in Islamic law, notwithstanding the
absence of a clear Koranic basis for it.
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Hanafi and Ja‘fari scholars rule out the killing of the female apos-
tate. She should be imprisoned until she returns to Islam, and during
imprisonment she should be beaten at prayer time every day (Ja‘faris)
or every three days (Hanafis). The milder treatment is explained with
reference to the woman’s weakness, which renders her unable to pose
a serious threat to the Islamic state (al-Jazı¯rı¯ 1988: IV, 426). A hadı¯th is
often quoted to prove Muhammad’s disapproving of the killing of a wo-
man: ‘She was not fighting those who are fighting’.25
The apostate must be executed by the sword. Scholars reached such
a conclusion without any explicit indication in the sources. Earlier, a
tradition reports that ibn cAbba¯s rebuked cAlı¯ for having burnt a group
of apostates,26 reminding him of Muhammad’s words, ‘Do not punish
anybody with God’s punishment’.27 cAlı¯’s act would have been re-
garded by Jews as fully compliant with the prescriptions of Deu. 13:13-
19 (NJB) on collective apostasy, but apparently it hurt Muslim sensibil-
ity. Another hadı¯th, narrated by cA¯’ishah, relates that Muhammad pre-
scribed that the Muslim ‘who comes up and fights against God and
His messenger must be killed, crucified or expelled from the terri-
tory’.28 This hadı¯th is a variant of the aforementioned tradition con-
cerning the three cases in which the shedding of a Muslim’s blood is
permitted. Here, however, other options are given, such as crucifying
or exiling the man, and it is clearer that the sanctioned conduct is re-
volting and fighting against God and His messenger, not just abandon-
ing Islam.
The execution by the sword, in the absence of any textual evidence
in the Islamic tradition, gains special meaning if compared with paral-
lel Jewish rules. The Torah does not impose a punishment for apostasy,
but the Deuteronomic code provides for the killing of those who entice
a Jew to forsake Judaism and serve foreign gods. It is incumbent upon
close relatives to denounce the enticers and stone them to death (Deu.
13:7-12, NJB).29 What is condemned is the enticement to deviate ‘from
the way’ or ‘from God’, expressed by the causative form (hiphcıˆl) of the
root n.d.h (deviate).30 In the case of a whole city having decided to serve
foreign gods, its men and cattle must be smitten with the edge of the
sword (le-phıˆ ha¯rebh), their city laid under the curse of destruction
(hahare¯m) and its loot burnt with fire (Deu. 13:13-19, NJB). Some ana-
logy can be drawn here with cAlı¯’s action and ibn cAbba¯s’s reproach,
since the Biblical ‘herem’ of the city was the consecration to the Deity
of persons and things to be utterly destroyed. Further on, the Deutero-
nomic code prescribes the stoning to death of the man or the woman
‘who does what is wrong in the eyes of Yahweh your God by violating
his covenant, who goes and serves other gods and worships them’
(Deu. 17:2-3, NJB).31 Disobeying the priest (hak-ko¯he¯n) or the judge
(hash-sho¯phe¯t) is equally punishable with death (Deu. 17:12, NJB), as is
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rebelling against the orders of the political authority, according to the
oath of the Reubenites, the Gadites and the half tribe of Manasseh on
behalf of the people about to enter the Promised Land (Jos. 1:16-18,
NJB). According to the Talmud, the death sentence can be imposed
only by a Biblical authority (Sanhedrıˆn 82b),32 but the ruler can put a
rebel to the sword (Sanhedrıˆn 49a).
On the one hand, the Islamic rules on the execution of the apostate
by the sword match the Jewish rules on the punishment of the rebel
by the political authority, while on the other hand the notions of apos-
tasy sensibly vary in the two traditions. Judaism punished the entice-
ment of deviant conduct and the service to foreign gods, whereas Islam
initially punished every individual forsaking it and posing a threat to
the Islamic state. Later on, Muslim scholars agreed that apostatising in-
cluded even just professing heretical doctrines, which per se menaced
the Islamic state and therefore needed to be sanctioned by death.
Besides its penal features, apostasy has relevant civil consequences,
too. The rights of apostates to dispose of their patrimony are held in
abeyance pending their repentance. If they do not repent, all their acts
are null and void. The apostate lacks the capacity to inherit, and the
marriage contract is immediately nullified (faskh). Unlike the father’s
conversion, the father’s apostasy does not have any effect on his minor
children, who remain Muslims. The legal status of the apostate has
been sagaciously described as a situation of ‘civil and social death’
(Gibb-Kramers 1974).
2.4 Characters of the confessional system
2.4.1 Personality of Islamic law
Islam shaped a confessional legal system based on personality, i.e. Isla-
mic law applies to Muslims (exclusively), wherever they are. This gen-
eral rule is coupled with the pre-eminence of Islamic law over all other
sacred or positive laws. Territoriality thus reclaims some terrain, since
sharı¯cah rules apply even if only one of the parties is a Muslim. More-
over, jurisdiction and applicable law overlap: only an Islamic judge can
apply Islamic law, while controversies between members of the same
religious community are left to the authority of confessional courts,
which apply their religious law (also called sharı¯cah). Even non-Mus-
lims temporarily residing within Muslim territories (known as mus-
ta’mins) bring suits regarding their personal status to the courts of the
religious community to which they are associated, and the court ap-
plies its confessional law even if the non-Muslim does not abide by
such a law at home. The Islamic judge, however, tends to extend his
jurisdiction well over the paramount principle of personality of confes-
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sional laws. For instance, he will adjudicate among non-Muslims if
they do not all belong to the same denomination (ta¯’ifah or millah),
and will apply Islamic law with some noteworthy exceptions (e.g. he
will not dissolve the marriage if one party is Catholic). One can there-
fore envisage what might be called a ‘general jurisdiction’ of the Isla-
mic judge that stops just short of the internal matters of other non-
Muslim communities.33
2.4.2 Jurisdiction of the Islamic judge
Confessional jurisdictions concerned with personal status matters of
members of the same religious community is a rule supported by solid
textual evidence in Q. 5:42-48. According to Muslim commentators of
the Qur’a¯n, the situation that occasioned the revelation of these verses
was a case of adultery between two Jews of Khaybar that Muhammad
was called upon to solve. He ordered their stoning to death in compli-
ance with the Biblical prescription (Deu. 22:22-29, NJB). The Koranic
passage requires Jews to be judged by the Torah (Q. 5:43-45), Christians
by the Gospel (Q. 5:46-47), and Muslims by the Qur’a¯n (Q. 5:48), and
ends with the admonition: ‘To each among you have we prescribed a
law and an open way. If Allah had so willed, He would have made you
a single people, but (His plan is) to test you in what He hath given
you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all is to Allah;
it is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which ye dispute’
(Q. 5:48).
No matter where Muslims are, they must be judged according to Is-
lamic law by an Islamic judge (Cardahi 1937: 603). Eluding this consti-
tutes apostasy.34 The absence of territorial limits to the application of
Islamic law is considered a consequence of Islam’s universalism (Khad-
duri 1966: 6), but its implementation is hindered by the fact that Mus-
lims do not hold the power throughout the world. For this reason,
Muslim scholars developed the theory of the world division in two
main blocks: the da¯r al-isla¯m (home of Islam) and the da¯r al-harb
(home of war). In the former the ruler is a Muslim (even if the major-
ity of the population is non-Muslim), while non-Muslims rule the lat-
ter. Relations between the two blocs are regulated under the law of ji-
ha¯d or war (qa¯nu¯n al-jiha¯d aw al-harb) or the broader Islamic jus gen-
tium (al-qa¯nu¯n al-isla¯mı¯ li-l-umam), temporarily devised to govern
international relations with non-Muslim political entities on more than
war terms alone (Rechid 1937: 371ff; Armanazi 1929 and 1930).35
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2.4.3 Status of non-Muslims in the da¯r al-isla¯m
Non-Muslims can live on Islamic territories (da¯r al-isla¯m) according to
two different legal statuses: the dhimmah or the ama¯n. These are only
made available to non-Muslims who belong to the People of the Book
(ahl al-kita¯b, a denomination originally including mainly just Jews and
Christians but later extended to other categories like Zoroastrians,
Mandeans and Sikhs). Polytheists and renegades, however, are still ex-
cluded (ibn Qayyim al-Jawzı¯yah, Ahka¯m ahl al-dhimmah).
Dhimmı¯s are free non-Muslim subjects permanently living in a Mus-
lim-ruled land on the basis of a covenant (cahd) or a perpetual safe-con-
duct (ama¯n mu’abbad), under the protection of God and His messenger
(bi-dhimmati a˘lla¯hi wa-rasu¯lih). By virtue of such a protection, the dhim-
mah, Muslims say that non-Muslims have the same rights and duties
of Muslims.36 The protection of dhimmı¯s from Muslims, foreigners
(harbı¯s) and other dhimmı¯s rests with the caliph or imam. cAlı¯ is re-
membered to have said, ‘They paid the tax (jizyah) for their blood to be
like our blood, and for their belongings to be like our belongings’
(shams al-dı¯n ibn Quda¯mah, al-Sharh al-kabı¯r cala` matn al-Muqnic).
There are four ways a non-Muslim belonging to the ahl al-kita¯b can be-
come a dhimmı¯. The first is by entering a protection covenant (cahd
al-dhimmah).37 The covenant should be established between the caliph
(or his deputy) and the leaders of non-Muslim communities, in consid-
eration of the general interest (al-maslahah al-ca¯mmah) of Muslims,
with provisions for the payment of the jizyah, and is non-expiring. The
second way is by acquiring land that is khara¯jı¯yah, i.e. land on which
khara¯j is levied, khara¯j being the land tax imposed on lots belonging to
non-Muslims of the da¯r al-isla¯m. In the third, a non-Muslim foreign
woman (either harbı¯yah or musta’minah) can become a dhimmı¯yah by
marrying a Muslim or a dhimmı¯. And lastly, the minor children and
the women related to the dhimmı¯ become dhimmı¯s themselves on the
basis of the family ties.
Musta’mins, on the other hand, are non-Muslim foreigners (harbı¯s)
who only temporarily reside in the da¯r al-isla¯m thanks to a short-term
safe-conduct (ama¯n mu’aqqat). The short-term safe-conduct can be per-
sonal or general. The personal ama¯n (kha¯ss) can be granted by any
adult, mentally sound Muslim to one or a group of harbı¯s (non-Muslim
foreigners), while the general ama¯n (ca¯mm) can be granted only by the
caliph or his deputy to an unspecified number of harbı¯s. The ama¯n al-
lows the musta’min to reside in the da¯r al-isla¯m up to one year, together
with his minor children and all the women related to him. During this
period, the musta’min is afforded the protected status of dhimmı¯s with-
out having to pay the jizyah, which will be imposed if he exceeds the
time limit of one year without returning to the da¯r al-harb.
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From a legal standpoint, dhimmı¯s – unlike musta’mins – are consid-
ered subjects of the da¯r al-isla¯m, even if they enjoy fewer legal and so-
cial rights than Muslims and have to endure many restrictions im-
posed by Islamic law.38 The breach of any of these laws will result in
the loss of the status of dhimmı¯ and of the ensuing residence rights.
When a non-Muslim foreign woman (harbı¯yah) marries a Muslim or a
dhimmı¯, she becomes a member of the ‘people of the home of Islam’
(ahl da¯r al-isla¯m), being a dhimmı¯yah. Likewise, if a musta’min converts
to Islam, his minor children become Muslims and his wife a dhim-
mı¯yah, with no possibility for the latter to go back to the da¯r al-harb,
since her husband’s conversion does not have any effect on the mar-
riage, which is still valid and falls under the new provisions of Islamic
law. The basic underlying principle is that the woman follows her hus-
band’s status upwards, and the minor children their father’s. However,
since Islam sits at the top of the hierarchy, and prevails over all other
confessions (al-isla¯m yaclu¯ wa-la¯ yucla` calayh), if it is the woman who
decides to convert to Islam, her minor children will become Muslims
and the marriage will be dissolved. If both parents apostatise, their
minor children will remain Muslims.
2.5 Islam and the kin group
Islam proudly claims to have obliterated every trace of the ancestral
system of the previous era, depicted as the ‘Age of Ignorance’ (casr
al-Ja¯hilı¯yah). Even so, several features of the pre-Islamic mentality and
kin organisation linger, overtly or covertly, even under Islamic dis-
guise.39 At the origins of different institutions or in the multifaceted
political processes, the observer can detect the deep-rooted and long-
lasting trends – briefly, the ‘legal and political Arab milieu’ – that domi-
nated the scene before the rise of Islam but afterwards had to face
competing forces.40
‘The believers are but a single brotherhood’ (Q. 49:10). The evocative
power of the brotherhood that Islam wants to establish among Mus-
lims cannot be ignored,41 as well as the assertion of the superiority of
the bond of faith over the bond of blood (Q. 9:23). However, the pre-Is-
lamic kin order adamantly persisted. Its weight can be measured to
some extent in the structure of the settlements founded during the ex-
pansion outside the Peninsula (§5.1.) as well as in the regulations per-
taining to the early conversion of non-Arabs (§5.2.), in the rule of wed-
ding adequacy in classic Islamic law (§5.3.) and in the restriction of the
caliphate to Quraish kinsmen (§5.4.).
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2.5.1 Planning newly founded cities
In the planning of cities founded along the routes of the conquest that
followed Muhammad’s death, the permanence of kin distinctions is pa-
tent. Cities like al-Ku¯fah (Mesopotamia), al-Basrah (Shatt al-cArab),
al-Fusta¯t (Egypt) or al-Qayrawa¯n (northern Africa) were all founded as
military camps that soon became stable settlements. The settlement
was partitioned and allotted to different kin groups by the tamsı¯r or
takhtı¯t; at the centre of the plan were the main mosque (al-ja¯mic) and
the palace (da¯r al-ima¯rah), while in the surroundings were arranged
minor units (da¯rs or houses) grouped in cashı¯rahs, each having its own
mosque, and an outer open area for the group’s meetings and burials
(jabba¯nah). Settlements were thus divided into military and administra-
tive units (e.g. five akhma¯s in al-Basrah, seven asba¯c in al-Ku¯fah) under
the command of a person (the ra’s al-khums in al-Basrah, for instance)
who was responsible for the unit at war as well as for keeping order in
peacetime. The ra’s usually belonged to the larger kin group, but smal-
ler groups nonetheless had representatives among the peers (al-ashra¯f).
A large kin group like the Kindah had a dozen mosques in al-Ku¯fah
as well as in al-Fusta¯t, Damascus or Hims. In highly urbanised regions
like Syria, however, the partition plan was much laxer, whereas in new
locations like al-Fusta¯t broad open areas were left between kin lots.
Founded on the site of the ancient Diridotis (Teredon), the city of
al-Basrah was divided into only five kin constituencies and soon hosted
a large number of non-Arab local mawla`s (Caetani 1911-1914: III, 292-
309 and 769-784, and Massignon 1954: 154-174), while al-Ku¯fah had a
much more heterogeneous configuration, being divided into fifteen
streets or minha¯js along which were arranged the lots of eminent no-
madic tribes (the Tamı¯ms, and the Asads), Hejazi kin groups (the Tha-
qı¯fs, the Sulayms, the Juhaynahs, and the Muzaynahs) and a sizeable
Yemeni community (Massignon 1934-1937: III, 337-360). Still much la-
ter, when the Abbasid caliph al-Mansu¯r (ruled 754-775) built the new
capital city of Baghdad on the model of Persian cities, he set up units
and unit leaders like those in the primitive Muslim settlements. In the
cosmopolitan Baghdad, however, units were ethnically or geographi-
cally homogeneous rather than grouped on the mere basis of kin,42
since outside the peninsula the ethnic bond began replacing the kin
bond in the age of the Marwanids during the second Umayyad period
(64-132 AH/684-750 AD).
2.5.2 Status of non-Arab neo-converts (mawla`s)
Well-known to the customary law of pre-Islamic Arabia, clientage
(wala¯’) gained special relevance with the rise of Islam when it became
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the only gate to Islam for non-Arabs and showed the enduring strength
of kin bonds in the Arab social order. Both before and after the advent
of Islam, any non-Arab on Arab territory – whose boundaries dramati-
cally expanded after the conquests of the first century AH (632-750
AD) – had somehow to be brought into the Arab kin system, and one
way to do it was by having recourse to the wala¯’ to form a fictitious
blood relation.
In pre-Islamic times, non-Arab kin groups enjoyed a peculiar status.
They maintained their kin relations while being placed under the pro-
tection of Arab kin groups. No effective membership was involved.
Some Jewish tribes were strong enough to avoid this arrangement, but
many paid tributes to Arab tribes and became their clients.43 As a re-
sult, the kin relations of minor groups grew weaker, but even so they
were not completely disbanded. Similarly, freed slaves became clients
of their former masters but did not become members of their kin
group, in view of the fact that tainting the kin with non-Arabs was a
highly despicable act for the Arabs. Non-Arabs were not even accepted
as confederates; the hilf – a merging alliance – applied only to other
Arabs or to non-Arabs who had a full kin status (Goldziher 1889: I,
105f).
As a result of the Arab-Islamic conquest, Arabs had to cope with
huge masses of non-Arabs in their midst. If non-Muslims could be
treated on the same terms as other clients (maintaining their internal
organisation under Islamic hegemony and paying a tribute), converts
on the other hand needed to be absorbed into the Arab-Islamic society.
‘Having lost their genealogies (ansa¯b), suffered a defeat, or even having
been enslaved’ (al-Bala¯dhurı¯, Futu¯h al-bulda¯n), non-Arab converts were
not suitable confederates (halı¯f). In order to overcome the deadlock, the
notion of an Islamic wala¯’ was developed. Every non-Arab wishing to
become a member of the Arab-Islamic society had to find a patron (a
superior mawla`). Freed slaves had a readily available patron in the per-
son of the former master, unless he refused to undertake the task, leav-
ing them in need of another patron.
Muslim scholars drew heavily on the pre-Islamic tradition to elabo-
rate the doctrine of Islamic clientage, which consisted of different
forms (wala¯’ al-muwa¯la¯h, al-taba¯cah, or al-khidmah) including a novel
‘clientage by conversion’ (wala¯’ al-isla¯m), but it is precisely this original
form of clientage that illustrates the attitude of Islamic law towards the
previous social order and kin or ethnic distinctions. An oft-quoted ha-
dı¯th states: ‘Whoever converts at somebody’s hands, the latter is the pa-
tron of the former’,44 thus providing some textual evidence for the the-
ory. Under wala¯’, an outsider related to a social order conceived in
terms of kin relations. The patron’s main duty was to afford protection
to the client (the inferior mawla`) and pay or receive blood money (caql
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or diyah), but in return he had some rights to the mawla`’s belongings.
The client, on the other hand, did not have to pay or receive the pa-
tron’s diyah and did not inherit from him. Broadly speaking, the Arab
patron provided an access to the new privileged society of the conquer-
ors, while the non-Arab Muslim convert rendered him services, offered
his help and swelled the civilian and military ranks of the patron.
Under the Umayyads, non-Arab converts or mawla`s technically en-
joyed the same status of Arab Muslims,45 even if depending upon their
patrons. However, mawla`s were victims of cultural bias and were con-
sidered on the same footing as slaves. Hypotheses on the reasons for
this have been advanced by scholars based on literary works from that
period. Ibn Tha¯bit (d. 674) and Dhu¯ ’l-Rummah (d. 735) believed that
they were discriminated against for being mainly peasants and not war-
riors, while according to al-Na¯bighah al-Jacdı¯ (d. 670) it was for having
been brutally defeated or for being largely freed after having been en-
slaved during the conquest. Muslim and non-Muslim sources seem to
confirm the latter hypothesis, given the huge number of prisoners cap-
tured in the campaigns (ibn Khayya¯t, Sebeos, Bar Penkaye and Michael
the Syrian). Prisoners were generally enslaved and other slaves had to
be supplied one-off or yearly under the terms of surrender (al-Tabarı¯,
Ta’rı¯kh). War slaves and their offspring came thus to outnumber free-
born clients by far, and the term ‘slave’ was improperly used to address
any mawla`. According to the sources, discrimination was not merely
episodic; rather, severe ill-treatment of mawla`s was the rule. Above all,
a mawla` was barred from any task involving authority, viz. he could not
act as imam, judge or governor (Goldziher 1889: I, 109 and 116), and
his career was therefore in his patron’s retinue. However, the mawla`s’
numbers, higher education and aptitudes soon earned them influential
positions in the new polity. With the exception of government, non-
Arab Muslims rapidly dominated the intellectual scene and played a
major role in the formation of Islam (al-Hasan al-Basrı¯), Islamic law
(abu¯ Hanı¯fah, al-Awza¯cı¯ and Ta¯wu¯s), Koranic studies (abu¯ cUbaydah),
Muhammad’s biography (ibn Isha¯q) and even in the collection of pre-
Islamic Arab poetry (Hamma¯d al-Ra¯wiyah). Arabs realised the mawla`s’
cultural refinement, and by the late Umayyad period mawla`s were
charged with the education of the caliph’s descendants and with judi-
ciary functions.
Yet mawla`s enjoyed a privileged status, especially when compared
with non-Muslims of the countryside. Many of the latter would venture
to abandon their lands, attracted by the lure of joining the ranks of the
Arab conquerors by converting to Islam and enlisting. The conversion
thus consisted in migrating (performing the hijrah) to the garrison
towns. cUmar II took in these converts, but other Umayyad caliphs
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sent them back to their villages or allowed them to stay provided that
they kept up their fiscal duties as non-Muslims.
With the Abbasid revolution (750 AD), Arabs were finally deprived
of the social and political privileges that they still retained. After the de-
cline of ‘Arab privileges’, an Arab patron was no longer required for
the non-Arab who wished to embrace Islam. Freed slaves would re-
main clients of their former masters, but freeborn non-Arab converts
and the offspring of freed slaves were not bound to clientage. On the
other hand, however, Arab superiority and the new political hue of the
wala¯’ maintained a key position under the Abbasids.
Muslim scholars of the classical age framed a comprehensive theory of
clientage under Islam. All schools agree that clientage can stem from
an act of emancipation (hence named wala¯’ al-citq), whereas only Hana-
fis, Ja‘faris and Zaidis allow that it can be established by contract (wala¯’
al-muwa¯la¯h or tadammun bi-l-jarı¯rah). For Hanafis and Ja‘faris the cli-
entage contract is independent of the act of conversion, while Zaidis
hold that clientage is a consequence of conversion and cannot be estab-
lished separately by contract. There is widespread consensus among
jurists that wala¯’ has to be regarded as instituting fictitious kin46 and
therefore cannot be transferred by sale, donation or inheritance, while
such transfers were acceptable under pre-classical law. The transfer of
rights and duties attached to clientage follows special provisions simi-
lar to kin transmission (Brunschvig 1976). But even though Sunni
schools assert that wala¯’ creates kin relations (tacsı¯b), only the patron
inherits from the mawla` (in case of wala¯’ of emancipation, not wala¯’ by
contract), and the mawla` is a mere ‘passive’ member of the patron’s kin
group. In legal terms, wala¯’ is a relation of dependence chiefly
prompted by the individual’s detachment from his own group, even if
it does not lead to the acquisition of the full status of member of the
patron’s group (Crone 1980, 1987 and 1991).
Classical Islamic law generally does not attach any importance to the
servile or non-Arab origins of the individual, but there is a relevant ex-
ception: non-Arabs and freed slaves cannot marry Arab women accord-
ing to Hanafis, Shafi‘is, the majority of Hanbalis and some Zaidis.
Malikis, while claiming that such unions are legal, let the Arab woman
divorce a freed slave if he was believed to be an Arab. Only Ibadis,
Twelvers and Ismailis clearly do not discriminate between Arabs and
non-Arabs, freeborns and emancipated, for marital law purposes. This
leads to some further considerations on the principle of wedding ade-
quacy in Islamic law.
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2.5.3 The principle of wedding adequacy (kafa¯’ah)
The absence of ethnic and social distinctions among Muslims is an
ambitious goal hindered by the inveterate practices of the Arabs and of
the other peoples who embraced Islam.47 Jurists rearranged these tradi-
tional concepts in the discipline of family law, the cornerstone of social
order. In pre-Islamic Arabia, both spouses were required to be on a par
in terms of lineage and social status, while Islam waived the require-
ment for the man, who can marry a woman inferior to him. None of
the Sunni schools ignored the issue of wedding adequacy (kafa¯’ah), but
all addressed it in different ways according to the various theoretical
and legal premises assumed by each legal school (madhhab). On the
one hand, Hanafis presented a wide-ranging list of kafa¯’ah cases,
whereas, on the other hand, Malikis downplayed its significance. Some
scholars argue that differences need to be traced back to the different
Hanafi and Maliki socio-geographic milieus; the former was charac-
terised by sharp social divides between Arabs and non-Arabs in the cos-
mopolitan al-Ku¯fah, while the latter flourished in a much more homo-
geneous Hejazi society (Lynant de Bellefonds 1965: II, 171-181). How-
ever, the similarity of the operational rules of all Sunni schools
suggests caution in assessing the dissimilarities of the scholars’ ornate
theories (Aluffi Beck-Peccoz 1990: 145).
With regard to kin relations, almost all schools require the man’s
adequacy to the woman’s lineage (kafa¯’at al-nasab), thus reinforcing the
practice of endogamy so deep-rooted in Arab customs. Being of Qura-
ish, Arab and non-Arab descent are the three main levels of lineage re-
quirements for kafa¯’ah, with further intermediate kin distinctions.
Stricter doctrines can be found among Druzes, Zaidis and Zahiris, or
in contexts where the presence of noble lineages is highly felt (like in
Somalia, Cerulli 1919).
According to the Hanafi doctrine, the adult woman can contract a va-
lid marriage without the assistance of her tutor (walı¯), but the contract
is revocable (ghayr la¯zim). Both the woman and her walı¯ can ask the
judge to annul the marriage (faskh) for the husband’s lack of kafa¯’ah
until the first signs of pregnancy appear. In the case of the Asa¯dah of
Hadramawt, a group that claims descent from cAlı¯, any member can
contest a marriage on account of me´salliance (Anderson 1954: 23 and
Ziadeh 1957: 515f). In Maliki law, the involvement of the woman’s walı¯
in the marriage is compulsory, and the woman cannot contract it by
herself; consequently, the kafa¯’ah doctrine applies only if the husband
concealed his inferior condition to the woman’s tutor. The walı¯’s control
over the man’s kafa¯’ah – prescribed by Malikis but not necessary for
Hanafis and Shafi‘is – is compensated by the possibility of annulling
the contract. Even if they frame the problem differently, Muslim scho-
66 CITIZENSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD
lars share the same concerns for the protection of nasab and the law
sanctions it, regardless of the clear Koranic condemnation.
2.5.4 Restriction of the caliphate to Quraish kinsmen
Nasab is also the seventh and last condition required for attaining the
caliphate. The caliph must be a member of the Quraish, like Muham-
mad. Shafi‘i jurist al-Ma¯wardı¯ (d. 1058) stated that the point was
backed by an explicit textual ruling (nass) and by general consensus (ij-
ma¯c). Conversely, he openly criticised the theory of the Mu‘tazili doctor
Dira¯r ibn cAmr (d. 815), who maintained that anybody could be caliph,
and that if one had to choose between a Quraish and a black man, the
latter should be preferred, since it would be much easier to remove a
black from office if he contravened divine law.
‘You should listen to and obey your ruler even if he was an Ethiopian
slave whose head looks like a raisin’.48 This hadı¯th is given different in-
terpretations. Mu‘tazilis and Kharijites argue that it prevents the inser-
tion of any restrictive clause based on kin, while mainstream Muslim
scholars contend that the tradition refers to the caliph’s appointees and
not to the caliph himself, since there is little sense in the caliph being
a slave (ibn cA¯bidı¯n, Radd al-mukhta¯r cala` ’l-Durr al-mukhta¯r and ibn
Nujaym, al-Ashba¯h wa-l-naza¯’ir).
Al-Ma¯wardı¯ quoted another tradition to further substantiate his theo-
ry: ‘This matter will remain with the Quraish’.49 Soon after Muham-
mad’s death, Abu¯ Bakr is reported to have cited this hadı¯th at the Saqı¯-
fah meeting when the ansa¯rs were about to elect a Medinan caliph. Ac-
cording to al-Ma¯wardı¯, the ansa¯rs recognised the authenticity of the
tradition and abandoned the idea of having two caliphs, one for the
Medinans and one for the Meccans. Abu¯ Bakr was then elected first ca-
liph by acclamation, and proclaimed: ‘We are the commanders and you
are the ministers’.50
2.6 Islam and Arabness
In a broader perspective than the kin group – but with a very similar
approach – the relations of Islam with its dominant ethnic group are
also quite complex. Islam and Arabness are so closely knit that it is al-
most impossible to disentangle the respective contributions and influ-
ences, both in the past and at present. To explain the complexity of the
relationship, scholars have resorted to different paradigms. The sole
ambition of this section is to draw some attention to the meaning of
membership in an ethno-religious community like the Arab-Islamic
ummah.
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2.6.1 Koranic prescriptions and early Islam
The Qur’a¯n adopts a clear stance on kin relations. ‘Of no profit to you
will be your relatives and your children on the Day of Judgment: He
will judge between you: for Allah sees well all that ye do’51 (Q. 60:3)
was already revealed after the truce of Hudaybı¯yah in 628. But after
the cumrah of 629 it was spelled out that the only possible distinction
to be made among men was on the basis of piety (taqwa`), in stark op-
position to the attitude of the Quraish and the other polytheist Arabs:
‘O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a fe-
male, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each
other (not that ye may despise [each other]). Verily the most honoured
of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you.
And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things)’
(Q. 49:13).52
Most commentators, however, do not infer from the superiority
based on piety or righteousness that belonging to a certain tribe or na-
tion is of no consequence. In the fairly unequivocal Koranic passage,
the majority of Arab Muslim scholars conversely find a divine sanction
of the original differentiation between Arabs divided into tribes (qa-
ba¯’il), and non-Arabs divided into nations (shucu¯b).
As mentioned above, in early Islam the dominance of the Arab tribal
mentality led to imposing the obligation upon non-Arab converts to
seek the protection of members of Arab kin groups, in open contrast
with the brotherhood and equality among Muslims stated in the
Qur’a¯n. Certain mosques were reserved for mawla`s in order not to have
them mix with Arabs, and it is narrated that the cruel al-Hajja¯j used to
wound the hands of the Nabateans to tell them apart from Arabs, and
that he banned non-Arabs from entering al-Ku¯fah. Similarly, it was
possible to have non-Arab Muslim slaves, but enslaving an Arab Mus-
lim was not approved of (al-Sha¯ficı¯, Kita¯b al-Umm).
2.6.2 The first Shucu¯bı¯yah
Opposition to the discrimination against non-Arabs soon emerged, and
non-Arabs demanded the enforcement of the principle of equality
among Muslims regardless of their belonging to shucu¯b or qaba¯’il. The
movement assumed the name of Shucu¯bı¯yah, and since its inception it
was endorsed by schismatic Muslims like the Kharijites (who refuse
the restriction of the caliphate to Quraish kinsmen, asserting that even
a black or a woman could be caliph if fit).
Later on, in the 2nd century Hijri (8th century AD), the term Shucu¯-
bı¯yah came to be used for a movement that not only rejected Arab pri-
vileges (whence the epithet of People of Equality, or ahl al-taswiyah, in
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al-Ja¯hiz’s Kita¯b al-baya¯n wa-l-tabyı¯n), but also advocated non-Arabs’
superiority. Shu‘ubites were chiefly Muslims of Persian origin, but
there are indications of Shu‘ubite literature by Arameans, Copts and
Berbers as well.53 Direct Shu‘ubite sources were lost in time, but some
of their allegations can be recovered from their adversaries’ works
(mainly al-Ja¯hiz and ibn Qutaybah). Different historiographical inter-
pretations are given to the Shucu¯bı¯yah (Gibb 1962, Goitein 1966), but
the core issue was probably the status of Persian officials in the new
Empire. The latter ones were bound by wala¯’ to Arab conquerors, and
their liberty and social mobility were therefore severely hindered. A vi-
vid account of the society of the time is given by al-Ja¯hiz in the epistles
Dhamm akhla¯q al-kutta¯b (Censure of the Conduct of Secretaries) and Fı¯
madh al-tujja¯r wa-dhamm camal al-sulta¯n (In Praise of Merchants and
Dispraise of Officials). The author heats up against the Shucu¯bı¯yah,
which he considered a real menace to Islam (al-Ja¯hiz, al-Hayawa¯n and
Fakhr al-su¯da¯n cala` ’l-bayda¯n).
The decline of the movement at the end of the 3rd century Hijri (9th
century AD) was due – according to Gibb – to three main factors: (1)
the merging of the pre-Islamic, Arab and Islamic traditions into a new,
common ‘culture’ (adab), (2) the rise of the muctazilah with its rigid
monotheism and (3) the foundation of the Bayt al-hikmah, centre for
the translation and diffusion of the works of Greek philosophy, deemed
effective tools against dualist doctrines (Gibb 1962: 69-72). In this con-
text, ibn Qutaybah (d. 889) played a key role in accommodating the
Persian tradition and the Arab-Islamic ideas through his various
works.
2.6.2 Other opposition movements to Arab dominance
If animosity between Arabs and non-Arabs died down in the Muslim
East at the end of the 3rd century Hijri, it built up in the Muslim West
two centuries later. In the al-Andalus of the 5th century Hijri (11th cen-
tury AD), however, Arab dominance was challenged by Berbers and
Slavs. In the case of the Andalusian Shucu¯bı¯yah, the manifesto – ibn
Gharsı¯yah’s epistle – is still extant (Goldziher 1899 and Monroe 1970).
Hanna and Gardner see in the first and second Shucu¯bı¯yahs the
same roots of later movements such as Ottomanism and Westernisa-
tion (19th century), or Internationalism, Regionalism and Socialism
(20th century). All of these endeavoured to defy Arab dominance, in-
stead triggering stronger affirmations of Arab particularism (Hanna &
Gardner 1966). Some serious objections can be raised against this
speculation, although it is enough to consider the theoretical distance
between modern opposition movements and Early Islam Shucu¯bı¯yahs,
or the significant differences of their respective actors and goals. None-
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theless, a map of the movements challenging Arab dominance could
be traced down to present-day Kurdish and Berber claims, and the ex-
perience of the first Shucu¯bı¯yah has proven highly influential through
the centuries. Many Arab-Muslim authors have vigorously condemned
such movements, preaching a return to the unifying force of Islam
(al-Samma¯k 1990).
Among the many anecdotes there is one about Saladin that is worth
mentioning. In 1169, Sala¯h al-dı¯n al-Ayyu¯bı¯ had the caliph’s first black
eunuch beheaded for complicity with crusaders. He then replaced the
black eunuch with a white eunuch, and dismissed all the other black
eunuchs. The black troops in Cairo rose up against the execution of
the man – whom they considered a spokesman and a champion of
their rights – driven by ‘racial solidarity’. The term ibn al-Athı¯r em-
ployed for ‘racial solidarity’ is the neologism jinsı¯yah,54 based on jins
(kind, genus, race). Centuries later and with no apparent relation to
this early anecdote, jinsı¯yah was used to convey a ‘new’ idea of mem-
bership, membership in the nation-state.
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3 Membership in the nation-state
3.1 The emergence of nation-states and nationality
Centuries after the formation of the Islamic community (al-ummah
al-isla¯mı¯yah), a new form of membership (nationality or jinsı¯yah) in a
new form of political organisation (the nation-state or al-dawlah
al-watanı¯yah) took shape in the Arab world. The concepts of nation-
states and nationality ties initially penetrated the vast Arab territories
under Ottoman suzerainty during the decline of the Empire, and
started taking root in the second half of the 19th century. The Sublime
Porte felt urgent need of a secular membership bond to do away with
capitulatory privileges and consolidate its control over the non-Turkish
provinces. It is thus from this point that the search for the origins of
nationality and citizenship in the Arab world must start. The Ottoman
dismemberment and the creation of nation-states sped up the process,
which culminated in the attainment of independence after World War
II.
3.1.1 Ottoman decline
3.1.1.1 Capitulations (imtiya¯za¯t)
The main raison d’eˆtre of capitulations is that non-Muslims must be
granted protection by the Islamic ruler in order to live in the da¯r
al-isla¯m. The practice developed on the one hand from the dhimmah
covenants (cahd al-dhimmah) entered into by the imam and the leaders
of non-Muslim subject communities, and on the other hand from the
general safe-conducts (ama¯n ca¯mm) that offered protection to non-
Muslim foreigners. In both cases the Islamic ruler imposed restrictions
on non-Muslims while dictating specific regulations applying to their
protection, taxation and jurisdiction. These restraints and prescriptions,
however, were later regarded as privileges.
The practice of producing written protection covenants is attested
down to the 12th century, but reached its apex in the Ottoman capitula-
tions (imtiya¯za¯t). Ottoman capitulations included provisions regarding
the security of persons and goods, the exercise of consular jurisdiction
and the exemption from collective responsibility. In line with the
dhimmah procedure, capitulations were contracted between the Sub-
lime Porte and European powers, but the Ottoman chancery followed
the ama¯n model. Ottoman capitulations were adopted by decree
(marsu¯m) and generally had no time limit (Pe´lissie´ du Rausas 1910).
Since the Ottoman capitulations provided the breeding ground for
the development of the concept of citizenship in the Arab world, their
characteristics need to be carefully considered. In granting privileges to
non-Muslim foreigners (harbı¯s), Ottomans endeavoured strictly to com-
ply with the Islamic provisions of fiqh (according to the official Hanafi
madhhab).1 Foreign merchants resident in Ottoman ports and cities
started forming recognised communities (millet), and their representa-
tives obtained patents (bera¯t) from the Sultan, just like the leaders of
dhimmı¯ communities. Ever since the 17th century, European powers
called for full extraterritoriality of their merchants’ communities, but
the Porte continued treating these communities as regular millets. On
personal status matters between members of the same millet, religious
and consular courts have always had full jurisdiction in compliance
with Islamic conflict of laws rules (de Maslatrie 1866), whereas cases
involving Muslims and criminal issues were left to Ottoman courts.
However, provisions regarding judicial guarantees for musta’mins
standing trial in Ottoman courts were progressively included in
capitulations.
Capitulations were abused both by Ottoman subjects wanting to
evade the Porte’s authority and by Europeans trying to escape consular
jurisdiction. Europeans converted to Islam as a means to do forum
shopping, since Ottoman courts had full jurisdiction over foreign Mus-
lims (if not otherwise expressly stipulated).2 However, the major pro-
blem that Ottoman authorities faced was the extension of capitulatory
privileges to Ottoman subjects, and from the 18th century onward the
Topqapı was no longer able to stand up to European claims.3
Capitulatory privileges were much greater than the ones enjoyed by
dhimmı¯s, and many of the latter contrived to enhance their status by as-
suming the function of dragoman. With the remunerated assistance of
complaisant ambassadors and consuls, Ottoman non-Muslim subjects
obtained their appointment by bera¯t, by which the Sultan extended
some diplomatic immunities, commercial and fiscal privileges, as well
as exemption from the poll tax (jizyah) levied on ordinary Ottoman
subjects (raca¯ya¯).4 After a failed attempt to put an end to the practice,
Selı¯m III himself (ruled 1789-1807) decided to grant privileges to his
non-Muslim subjects for 1,500 piastres. The new privileged class
(Awru¯pa¯ tu¨jja¯rı) was soon joined by a class of Muslim merchants
(khayriyye tu¨jja¯rı) upon whom the same franchises were conferred for
1,200 piastres.
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In the 19th century the situation of the capitulatory system grew
even weaker for the Ottoman Empire, and the abolition of capitulations
became a primary goal for the statesmen of the Tanzı¯ma¯t. In 1867 the
Porte issued a firma¯n laying down equal conditions for subjects and
foreigners, reserving the right to unilaterally modify the cuhu¯d-i catı¯qah
(capitulations, but literally the ‘old covenants’). European powers vehe-
mently protested the decision, and cAlı¯ Pa¯sha¯ even envisioned the
adoption of the French Civil Code in order to quell the European dis-
sent (Davison 1963: 252). The capitulations, however, were abolished
only after the dismemberment of the Empire.
To curb the worst capitulatory abuses, in 1869 cAlı¯ Pa¯sha¯ signed the
first Ottoman Nationality Law, intended to determine on whom the
Sultan’s authority could be exercised. Citizenship was thus initially
framed as an issue pertaining to the exercise of political authority, out-
side the realm of Islamic law. cAlı¯ Pa¯sha¯’s legislation ensured that
every change of nationality had to be approved beforehand by the Otto-
man government. In the same year, the Sultan sent the European
powers a memorandum denouncing the illegality of many capitulatory
provisions (viz. the status of the ‘protected’, fiscal exemptions, extrater-
ritoriality of consular jurisdictions, difficulties in successfully prosecut-
ing criminal offences committed by foreigners, etc.), and issued a
further regulation (niza¯mna¯me) on the status of consuls, which was as
vigorously criticised as the memorandum.
3.1.1.2 Tanzı¯ma¯t and Ottoman nationality
At the beginning of the 19th century the Ottoman Empire was a vast
mosaic of nations, communities, and privileges on its way to dismem-
berment. A comprehensive plan of reforms, know as Tanzı¯ma¯t or ‘reor-
ganisation’, was initiated in 1839 to combat the decline of the central
bureaucratic apparatus. The reforms, affecting various sectors of state
bureaucracy (from the military to the economic administration, from
the educational to the fiscal system), kept swinging uneasily between
two models: on the one side, traditional confessional communitarian-
ism (i.e. the millet system), and on the other side, forced denationalisa-
tion and Ottomanisation (cothma¯nlılıq). The measures inspired by the
first model aimed at reorganising from the inside the major religious
communities in order to limit their autocracy and internal corruption,
whereas Ottomanisation intended to advance the equality of Ottoman
subjects regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, rarely obtain-
ing the desired result (Arabs fiercely opposed the policy of Turkification
(tatrı¯k) associated with Ottomanisation).
Thirty years after the khatt-ı sherı¯f of Gu¨lkha¯ne, the first Ottoman
Law on citizenship was enacted in 1869 (Law 19 January 1869), even
before the Fundamental Law (the qa¯nu¯n-i esa¯sı¯) of 1876, and marked a
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historical milestone in the entire reform process. The Ottoman legisla-
tor adopted the principle of paternal jus sanguinis (art. 1). The indivi-
dual born on Ottoman soil by foreign parents could only apply for Ot-
toman nationality three years after having come of age (art. 2). Acquisi-
tion by naturalisation required a continued residence of at least five
years (art. 3), or was granted for individual merits (art. 4). A final provi-
sion dictated that all residents in the Ottoman dominions had to be
considered Ottoman nationals and would be treated as such until their
different nationality was legally established (art. 9); a Ministerial Circu-
lar of 26 March 1869 explained that the Law was non-retroactive
(Young 1905-1906: II, 225), and the Decision of 20 April 1869 of the
Nationality Commission confirmed that those holding another citizen-
ship before 1869 could keep it (Marie Debbas case).
Among the modes of acquisition of Ottoman citizenship, conversion
to Islam was not listed. This was a radical break with the tradition,
which the new Law did not uproot, but had rather laid a secular system
over it. The Council of State and the Council of Ministers, however,
would continue to consider the conversion to Islam as a sufficient rea-
son for the exceptional granting of citizenship of article 4; a significant
innovation was that citizenship by conversion could be demanded but
not imposed, as it was earlier (Salem 1907: 51-52). On the other hand,
the introduction of the concept of secular citizenship proved so disor-
ienting that Ottoman and Persian authorities had to sign a treaty to
clarify that Persian residents of the Empire were to be treated as for-
eigners, even if they were Muslims (Ottoman-Persian Treaty of 14 De-
cember 1873, art. 6). Technically, under the 1869 Law, Ottoman Mus-
lims and Ottoman non-Muslims belonged to the same political com-
munity on equal footing (even if the millet system was still standing),
and the notion of the Islamic unity of the ummah was somehow
shelved.
3.1.1.3 Imperial provinces and indigenous nationality
During the Ottoman decline of the 19th century, some of the Empire’s
dominions became fully independent (like Greece), some came under
European sovereignty (like Algeria) and others gained certain autono-
my under Ottoman political and religious suzerainty. In the latter pro-
vinces, the 1869 Ottoman Nationality Law was applied, but a set of lo-
cal rights and duties was restricted to provincial citizens. Only natives
of the province, for instance, were eligible for local enfranchisement
and enlistment, at the exclusion of other Ottoman citizens. So in addi-
tion to Ottoman nationality, the notion of ‘indigenous nationality’
(al-racawı¯yah al-mahallı¯yah) emerged in the autonomous provinces.5
The institution of an indigenous nationality served not only the
needs of assigning rights and duties to natives but was also used as a
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means to express the yearning for independence. Rights and duties
were even assigned to individuals irrespective of their being Ottoman
nationals. By the turn of the 20th century, Arab lands – where religious
affiliation was the only known form of membership beyond the kin
group – suddenly witnessed the rise of two new forms of secular mem-
bership, an overarching Ottoman nationality and a local indigenous
one. Ottoman and local legislation introduced a secular nationality, but
for the concept of full citizenship to take root in the Arab world an e´vo-
lution psychologique was needed (Ghali 1934: 71). Somehow, the two
World Wars, the establishment of nation-states and the patriots’ com-
mon struggle for independence all contributed to creating modern
forms of solidarity and a sense of belonging to a new political commu-
nity: the nation-state.
3.1.2 Ottoman dismemberment
The 1918 Armistice of Moudros marked the end of Islamic political
unity under Ottoman rule. Some territories, like Persia or Morocco,
had already avoided Ottoman suzerainty, and others had been with-
drawn from the Porte’s control by European colonial aspirations, but
the peace treaties of Se`vres and Lausanne completed the partition of
the Empire – the entity that had come closest to the ideal of the Islamic
unity ever since the Abbasid golden age.
Ottoman nationality ceased to exist, leaving the ground clear for the
new, full-fledged nationalities drawn by the treaties. In the interwar
period, the Turkish Republic abolished all capitulations, adopted the
Swiss Civil Code and enacted a progressive Turkish Nationality Law in
1928 (Law 28 May 1928). While the nationality law in Turkey was only
part of a general reform seeking to establish a secular nation-state for
all its citizens, in the former Arab provinces nationality legislation was
the main effort towards secularism, largely lacking a true citizenship
spirit.
In Ghali’s view, three factors heavily influenced the way the Arab do-
minions of the Ottoman Empire were detached: (1) the Arab Revolt of
1916, (2) the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and (3) the Balfour De-
claration of 1917. The first affected the drawing of the geo-political
map of the area by raising the Arabs’ aspirations for Arab unity and
the creation of Arab nation-states, the second by defining the British
and French spheres of influence and control in the Near East, and the
third by pledging the United Kingdom’s support to the establishment
of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine (Ghali 1934: 83-
94).
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3.1.3 Peace treaties and nationality of detached territories
The nationality clauses of post-war peace treaties were designed to ease
the arrangement of former Ottoman subjects across the newly drawn
political boundaries and to allow for the regrouping of different nation-
alities living in former Ottoman lands. In 1920 the plenipotentiaries
who gathered in Se`vres signed the first peace treaty laying the basis for
a definition of nationalities of the defeated Empire, while solidifying its
partition. The Treaty of Se`vres was not ratified by Turkey for territorial
claims, but the rules on nationality were not contested and were thus
later transposed into the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.
The nationality provisions of the Treaty of Se`vres were organised in
a general section (art. 123-130), and in a special section for Egypt, Su-
dan and Cyprus (art. 102-106, and 117) due to their particular interna-
tional status. The basic principle of the treaty is that Turkish subjects
habitually resident in territories detached from Turkey became ipso fac-
to, in the conditions laid down by the local laws, nationals of the state
to which the territory was transferred (art. 123). Habitual residence was
preferred to the place of birth (the principle previously adopted in inter-
national agreements). In the English version the subjects had to be ‘ha-
bitually resident’, but ‘e´tablis’ in the French one; the discrepancy gave
rise to speculations on the precise meaning of the qualification. The
English ‘habitual residence’ was somehow less exacting than the
French ‘domicile’, defined in article 102 of the Code Napole´on as the
‘lieu du principal e´tablissement’. A clear-cut solution was never found,
and scholars and national legislators followed either interpretation
(Bentwich 1926: 97; Fauchille 1921-1926: I, 865).
The Treaty of Se`vres also granted former Ottoman subjects the right
to opt for Turkish nationality (art. 124) or the nationality of the state
the majority of whose population was of the same race as the person
exercising the right, if the person was over eighteen years of age, was
habitually resident in a territory detached from Turkey and differed in
race from the majority of the population of such a territory (art. 125).
The right of option had to be exercised within one year of the treaty’s
coming into force (art. 125), and the place of residence had to be trans-
ferred within the succeeding twelve months to the state for which the
person had opted (art. 126). The fairly short term to transfer the resi-
dence seems to have seriously undermined the right of option but was
dictated by the desire of implementing in due time the policy of re-
grouping nationalities so dear to Wilson. Moreover, the state for which
the former Ottoman subject opted could not refuse its ‘returning
national’.
A very controversial clause was the one regarding the nationality of
Jews. In the spirit of the Balfour Declaration, article 129 provided that
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Jews of other than Turkish nationality who were habitually resident
within the boundaries of Palestine (as determined by article 95) on the
treaty’s coming into force became ipso facto citizens of Palestine to the
exclusion of any other nationality.
The Se`vres provisions for Ottoman dismemberment were particu-
larly harsh on Turks (especially with regard to the partition of Anato-
lia), and even the former wartime Allies soon proved not to be too keen
on enforcing them (Temperley 1920-1924: VI, 7). Turkish revolution-
aries vigorously rejected the treaty and called for the political unity of
all the Turkish lands in the National Pact (misak-ı milli) of 1920. The
treaty was terminated and the diplomats returned to the negotiating ta-
ble in Lausanne, where the new peace treaty was signed in 1923.
The Conference of Lausanne only had to adapt the Se`vres clauses on
nationality to the new territorial arrangements and to add some minor
tweaks. The section on Egypt was no longer included, since the country
gained independence in 1922, and Hejaz was no longer mentioned
due to the particular international status of the region. Turkey re-
nounced all rights and titles on the Dodecanese islands in Italy’s favour
(art. 15), and recognised the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the
British government (art. 20), while negotiators integrated the Conven-
tion on the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey of
1923 (art. 142).
The Treaty of Lausanne largely reproduced the Se`vres provisions on
nationality (art. 30-36). The term for exercising the right of option was
extended to two years, acknowledging that twelve months was too short
a period for such a momentous decision (art. 31-32). On the other
hand, however, the treaty subjected the right of option for non-Turkish
nationalities to the consent of the receiving state (art. 32). While up-
holding the principle of the ‘habitual residence’, the treaty allowed for
natives of a certain detached territory who were resident abroad at the
time of the treaty’s coming into force to exercise the right of option for
the nationality of the territory they were natives of, with the consent of
the government exercising authority therein (art. 34).
In the region’s troubled post-war years, peace treaty provisions for
setting boundaries and dividing populations were interwoven with im-
plementing the national legislation of the new nation-states. The shap-
ing of nationality laws and the emergence of independent states was
thus a challenge that the Arab world faced fairly late, and resorted to
foreign models in order to meet it.
3.1.4 The French model
In drafting legislation on nationality, Arab legislators largely followed
the French model both before and after reaching full independence.
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The general framework and the specific solutions demonstrate strong
correspondence with the slow but continued development of the
French rules on nationalite´. As is often the case in the circulation of
models, some of the French rules encountered a responsive legal envir-
onment and took root, even surviving the disappearance of the original
model, while others simply could not, due to profound resistance.
In the 20th century, almost all leading Arab jurists studied in Eur-
ope and most of them earned doctoral degrees in France, thus keeping
alive and consolidating the influence of the French legal mentality.
Arab scholarship on nationality in particular draws heavily on French
works and invariably quotes French scholars like Niboyet, Battifol and
Lagarde.
Even the decision to consider nationality as within the domain of in-
ternational private law (conflict of laws) reveals a profound French in-
fluence. Until the revirement of the French Court of Cassation in the
late 1950s, for instance, the Egyptian Council of State followed pre-
vious French orientation in considering it a matter of public law, but
then adapted to the new course of French jurisprudence (al-Wakı¯l
1965: 61). Unlike their French colleagues, however, Arab scholars over-
looked the relation of citizenship to public law.
French citizenship rules were initially included in the Constitutions.
In the wake of the Revolution, every individual born on French soil
was a French citizen, as were those born of a French father outside
France if the father still cherished the desire to return to France (esprit
de retour). The jus soli thus prevailed and was maintained in the revolu-
tionary Constitutions of 1791, 1793 and 1799 (Vanel 1945 and 1946
and Lefebvre-Teillard 1993: 223).
The Code Napole´on (1804) marked a turning point by introducing
provisions on citizenship in the Civil Code and by establishing the
dominance of the jus sanguinis (CodeNap, art. 8). A child of foreign par-
ents could apply for French citizenship after having come of age, if a
resident of France (CodeNap, art. 9). Legislation on naturalisation was
passed in the first half of the 19th century, but only in 1851 was a gen-
eral reform enacted which reinstated the jus soli for a child born in
France of foreign parents who themselves were born in France (double
jus soli). The Law of 1851 served as the main source of inspiration for
the Ottoman Law of 1869, the first nationality law in the region. In
1889 the discipline was reintegrated in the Civil Code and the cases of
attribution were sensibly expanded for national defence reasons.6 The
equality of rights envisioned in the Code Napole´on suggested stricter
citizenship requirements (as the jus sanguinis), while the equality of du-
ties required an enlargement of the citizenry base on which defence
duties were imposed in the late 19th century (Bruschi 1987: 46).
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In the interwar period legislation was passed restricting the rights of
naturalised citizens, but after World War II citizenship was entirely re-
formed and placed in a Nationality Code (Code de la nationalite´), passed
on 19 October 1945 and destined to become ‘une ve´ritable somme du
droit de la nationalite´’, according to Lerebours-Pigeonnie`re (Lagarde
1997: 39). The Code, consisting of 151 articles and scrupulously regulat-
ing the attribution, acquisition and loss of French nationality, inspired
most of the national legislators that attained independence in the post-
war years. In 1973 a reform incorporated the solutions to the issues
that had been raised by the courts in the meanwhile. It removed all the
provisions that came under the domaine re´glementaire under the 1958
Constitution and included adaptations to the major civil law reforms
(i.e. equality of spouses, equality of filiation, attainment of majority
and the new adoption regime).
A ten-year debate over citizenship and migration led to the adoption
of a new law in 1993, which repealed the Code of 1973 and reintro-
duced nationality provisions in the Civil Code, since nationality is ‘un
e´le´ment d’individualisation de la personne, au meˆme titre que son e´tat civil’,
according to the report attached to the bill and presented to the French
National Assembly. The Law of 1993 is also inspired by a liberal vision
based on the elective concept of citizenship – ‘la nation n’existe que par
le consentement de ceux qui la composent’ – a polity open to those who
want to become members of it but requiring some liens objectifs with
the community. It is also characterised by a more conservative perspec-
tive with an ‘obsessive fear’ of fraud against migration laws (Lagarde
1997: 42).
3.1.5 Independent states and nationality legislation
3.1.5.1 Egypt
Nationality has been a key concept for the formation of the modern na-
tion-state in Egypt. Even under Ottoman suzerainty, the set of rules ap-
plying only to Egyptians gave rise to the theory of the ‘indigenous na-
tionality’ and laid the basis for the creation of a strong national identity.
Later on, nationality legislation was the first step towards a secular en-
tity (1926-1929), followed by the abolition of capitulations (1937) and
the institution of general state courts (1955).
By the end of the 19th century, the Egyptian indigenous nationality
was fully shaped. Local legislation usually referred to the ‘Egyptian’ in
order to grant a right or impose a duty, to the exclusion of all other Ot-
toman subjects. Public functions and jurisdictions were reserved for lo-
cal subjects, as was the application of military conscription rules or the
Indigenous Penal Code. Every piece of legislation, however, adopted a
different definition of the person it would apply to, the definition of
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the indigenous being therefore ‘multiple, complex and contradictory’
(Badawi Pacha 1926: 12). Egyptian Syrians, for instance, had to enlist
but were not allowed to vote.
Indigenous nationality only complemented Ottoman nationality, the
latter being conditional to the former (Messina 1928: 161), and the
Egyptian was treated internationally as an Ottoman subject. When
Egypt ceased to be an Ottoman province, the indigenous status turned
into full-fledged nationality, but legislation regulating Egyptian nation-
ality was only adopted in the late 1920s after the country reached full
independence.
Egyptian nationality was first regulated by the Decree-Law (marsu¯m
bi-qa¯nu¯n) of 26 May 1926, the main purpose of which was to sort out
the status of former Ottoman subjects in the country. Ottoman subjects
had long been established in Egypt, contributed greatly to its economic
and cultural growth and were deeply assimilated, but some of them
(chiefly Syrians, Jews and Armenians) found new home countries as a
consequence of the Empire’s partition. The 1926 Decree-Law defined
the Ottoman as the subject of the Porte on the eve of the 1923 Treaty
of Lausanne (art. 1), thus leaving out Tunisians, Albanians and Tripoli-
tanians. Along with the peace treaties, the 1926 Decree-Law referred to
5 November 1914 as the watershed for Egyptian nationality. Diplomats
at the peace conferences had regarded the day the Allies entered into
war with the Ottoman Empire as the day Ottoman suzerainty over
Egypt and Cyprus had ended. Ottoman subjects residing in Egypt on
or after 5 November 1914 and up to the coming into force of the 1926
Decree-Law were to be considered Egyptian nationals de plein droit. On
the one hand, the 1926 legislation recognised the right of option for
other territories but required birth (or birth of a parent) on the territory
opted for and the residence transfer to the country of option within six
months (art. 4), even if allowing for return within the following five
years and the reacquisition of the Egyptian nationality. On the other
hand, former Ottoman subjects, if resident in Egypt on or after 5 No-
vember 1914, could acquire Egyptian nationality (art. 6-7). The Otto-
man subjects who had never taken residence in the country could
transfer their residence to Egypt within a year and acquire its national-
ity after five years (art. 9).
The 1926 legislation severely restricted the provisions of the 1923
Treaty of Lausanne concerning the right of option for other national-
ities by requiring birth on the territory instead of the mere community
of race, reducing the term for the exercise of the right and discoura-
ging the option. At the same time it was sharply criticised by capitula-
tory powers, who claimed their right to veto all Egyptian legislation af-
fecting the status of foreigners through the General Assembly of the
Mixed Court of Appeal.
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Egypt wanted to reassert its sovereign right to regulate the status of
nationals and foreigners, and issued a new Decree-Law on 27 February
1929. The 1929 Decree-Law drew on the 1926 stipulations but re-
dressed some restrictions as to the right of option, especially by allow-
ing former Ottoman subjects who had opted for a foreign nationality to
keep their residence in Egypt, unless ordered otherwise.7 The pre-emi-
nence of jus sanguinis was upheld (art. 5), while a particular case of
double jus soli was introduced for the child born in Egypt of a foreign
father born in Egypt but ethnically belonging to the majority of the po-
pulation of a country whose language was Arabic or whose religion
was Islam (art. 6(4)). Even if it was not an application of jus soli, birth
in Egypt entitled the individual permanently residing in Egypt to claim
Egyptian nationality at the age of majority (art. 7). The 1929 Decree-
Law included provisions on naturalisation (art. 8-11), loss and depriva-
tion of nationality (art. 12-13) and the nationality of married women
(art. 14). An Egyptian woman married to a foreigner was deprived of
her Egyptian nationality provided that her husband’s national law
granted her the husband’s nationality, whereas the foreign woman
marrying an Egyptian had Egyptian nationality imposed upon her
(art. 14(1-2)).
The 1929 legislation granted Egyptian nationality to those who were
already assimilated, or those deemed to be easily assimilable because
of their ethnic or religious origins. At the same time it provided for var-
ious cases of deprivation for those considered unworthy of Egyptian na-
tionality. Unlike the 1928 Turkish Nationality Law, which absorbed all
foreign elements into the national community through the jus soli, the
1929 Egyptian Nationality Decree-Law allowed for the absorption of
foreign elements only if there was a common cultural, linguistic or re-
ligious background (Saba 1931: 100ff).
The 1929 Decree-Law remained in force until it was repealed by Law
160/1950, which made use of earlier legislation but sensibly limited
the access to Egyptian nationality to foreigners by repealing the double
jus soli (al-mı¯la¯d al-muda¯caf). It also abandoned the principle of unity of
nationality within the family by allowing a foreign woman married to
an Egyptian to waive Egyptian nationality (art. 9).
Just after the 1952 Revolution, a new law on Egyptian nationality
(Law 391/1952) was passed. Its purpose was to require a stronger at-
tachment to Egypt (i.e. continued residence from 1 January 1900, re-
gardless of Ottoman nationality) and to secure the protection of the na-
tional community (hima¯yat al-jama¯cah al-watanı¯yah) from disloyal na-
tionals, like Zionists and others convicted for treason (khiya¯nah)
against Egypt (art. 1). Nationality could be withdrawn to protect the se-
curity and integrity of the state (bi-qasd hima¯yat amn al-dawlah wa-sala¯-
matiha¯), and nationals who left the country for six months, with no in-
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tention to return to Egypt, lost their Egyptian nationality (art. 19). The
1952 legislation increased the discretionary powers of the government
with regard to the acquisition and deprivation of nationality.
The short-lived federative experience with Syria under the United
Arab Republic (UAR) demanded a new, common legislation on nation-
ality. The provisional constitution of March 1958 referred to the na-
tional Syrian and Egyptian laws in force at the time (art. 3), but later in
the year the UAR Nationality Law (Law 82/1958) was issued by decree
of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Central to the 1958 Law
was membership in the Arab community (al-ummah al-carabı¯yah). The
expatriate citizen (al-muwa¯tin al-mughtarib), a member of the Arab
community who was neither a resident nor a national of an Arab state,
was assimilated to the UAR as a national and could be naturalised un-
der more lenient provisions. Like in the 1952 Egyptian legislation, dis-
cretionary powers were quite broad, and the government’s consent
(muwa¯faqah) was required for any change of nationality status.
When the federation was terminated on 28 September 1961, Syria
promptly issued a new Legislative Decree in October 1961, while Egypt
did not adopt a new law until 1975. In the meanwhile, the Egyptian
courts ruled that the provisions of the 1958 UAR Nationality Law ap-
plied only to Egyptians after Syria’s breakaway (infisa¯l).
The 1975 Egyptian Nationality Law (Law 26/1975) limited access to
Egyptian nationality by narrowing the scope of jus soli and extending
the residency requirements for naturalisation. The Interior Minister
has to consent to the acquisition, even if cases of loss or deprivation
are reduced and regulated. Under the 1975 Law, Egyptian nationality is
passed on by filiation even outside the country (perpetual nationality).
In 2004 a law extending the rule of jus sanguinis to maternal descent
was passed (Law 154/2004), thus allowing children of Egyptian
mothers and foreign fathers to acquire Egyptian nationality just like
the children of Egyptian fathers.
3.1.5.2 Iraq
Established as a kingdom under British rule (1921), and detached from
Turkey by the peace treaties (1923), Iraq was the first Ottoman domin-
ion to reach independence (1932) and to join the League of Nations
(same year). Iraqi nationality was also the first nationality regulated
after the Treaty of Lausanne went into effect. The Iraqi legislature, un-
like its Egyptian counterpart, was bound under the provisions of the
Lausanne treaty.
The 1924 Iraqi Nationality Law (Law 42/1924) was inspired by the
desire to increase the Iraqi population by favouring the option for Iraqi
nationality and hindering its renunciation. The watershed for the 1924
Iraqi Law – just like the 1928 Transjordanian Law – was 6 August
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1924 (day of the deposit of British ratification instruments for the
Treaty of Lausanne). Ottoman subjects habitually resident in Iraq on
that date were considered Iraqi nationals, habitual residence being pre-
sumed from residence since 23 August 1921 (the day Faysal I was
crowned King of Iraq). For the exercise of the right of option for Turk-
ish nationality – the only option open to Arab Ottoman Iraqis – the
1924 legislation further restricted the Lausanne provisions by requiring
a permit issued by an Iraqi official (established by Royal Decree 80/
1926), and the consent of the Turkish government (art. 4). Conversely,
the 1924 Law adopted a broader notion of ‘native’ to allow all former
Ottoman subjects residing abroad to opt for Iraqi nationality even if
not ethnically belonging to the majority of the Iraqi population (art. 7).
For the attribution of nationality, the 1924 Iraqi Law assigned a promi-
nent role to jus sanguinis (art. 8) and a residual role to jus soli (art. 9).
For acquisition by naturalisation, on the other hand, only a three-year
residency was requested. The Iraqi Nationality Law of 1924 – later
amended several times8– was the first piece of legislation in the Middle
East to promote an ‘open’ concept of nationality.
Three months after the military coup of cAbd al-sala¯m Muhammad
cA¯rif (February 1963), a new Iraqi Nationality Law was enacted (Law
43/1963) but soon amended after the reorientation that followed the in-
ternal November coup (Law 206/1964). The Baathist bloodless coup of
1968 led to new amendments to the 1963 Law in 1968 (Law 147/
1968), in 1970 (Law 60/1970), in 1972 (Law 131/1972) and – in a pan-
Arab spirit – in 1975 (Law 5/1975), while loss of Iraqi nationality was
modified in 1980 shortly after Saddam Hussein’s takeover (Law 207/
1980). Decisions by the Revolutionary Command Council, on the other
hand, dealt with the status of Iraqi Jews (qara¯r 1293/1975), stipulated
new conditions for naturalisation (qara¯r 180/1980; persons of Iranian
origin were expressly excluded by qara¯r 518/1980) and determined the
deprivation of citizenship on account of disloyalty (qara¯r 666/1980).
3.1.5.3 Palestine
Unlike other mandates of the League of Nations, the 1922 Mandate for
Palestine clearly provided for the enactment of a Palestinian Nationality
Law, and special provisions to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian ci-
tizenship by Jews taking up permanent residence in Palestine had to
be included (art. 7). The establishment of a national home for the Jews
in Palestine was a goal of the British Mandate incorporated in the Man-
date preamble but was limited to the territory west of the Jordan River
(art. 25). In the eastern territory, known as Transjordan, the British gov-
ernment set up a separate administration and installed the Hashemite
Emir cAdb alla¯h, elder son of Britain’s wartime Arab ally the sharı¯f Hus-
sein of Mecca.
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The wording of article 7 included both the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘ci-
tizenship’, the former to refer to the relationship between the indivi-
dual and the state, the latter to indicate the membership of the same
individual in the polity regardless of the ‘ethnic-communitarian’ affilia-
tion which the problematic etymon of nationality could suggest. The
underlying assumption was that different nationalities (chiefly Arabs
and Jews; Oppenheim 1927: I, 526) had to coexist within the western
territory included in the Mandate, ‘it being clearly understood that
nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine’ (1917 Balfour
Declaration, faithfully reproduced in the 1922 Palestine Mandate pre-
amble). ‘Or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other
country’, concluded the Declaration (and the Mandate preamble). Zio-
nist authors inferred from the wording of article 7 that a Jewish nation-
ality in Palestine was established for all world Jews (Brickner 1930).
The British government waited for the signing and the enforcement
of the Treaty of Lausanne to regulate Palestinian nationality. Two years
later, on 24 July 1925, King George V gave his assent to the Palestine
Citizenship Order-in-Council. The Order-in-Council chose as a wa-
tershed for Palestinian nationality 1 August 1925, the day of its coming
into force, but the choice was inconsistent with the entry into force of
the treaty on 1 August 1924, thus generating problems of coordination
(sect. 1). For instance, all former Ottoman subjects who left Palestine
before 1 August 1925 and did not possess a provisional citizenship cer-
tificate issued in 1922 for the elections to the Legislative Council be-
came stateless. They had lost their Turkish nationality due to the Treaty
of Lausanne (art. 30), and could not be attributed Palestinian citizen-
ship (Ghali 1934: 215). The situation was addressed and solved by a
1931 Order-in-Council.
The provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne on the right of option could
not be applied to Palestinian nationality. Arabs could not claim to differ
by race from the majority of the population of other detached terri-
tories, while Jews could not claim to belong by race to the majority of
the population of Palestine (art. 32). The 1925 Order-in-Council, how-
ever, omitted the latter condition for the former Ottoman subjects re-
siding abroad and wishing to opt for Palestinian citizenship (art. 34),
but required birth in the territory as well as a preliminary six-month re-
sidency in Palestine (sect. 2).
The rules on the attribution of Palestinian nationality were inspired
by the 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, except for the
jus soli, which was relegated to a minor role. Even if closely related, a
positive conflict of nationalities between the 1914 Act and the 1925 Or-
der-in-Council could arise; for example, an individual born in the Uni-
ted Kingdom of a Palestinian father born in Palestine was a British citi-
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zen under the 1914 Act and a Palestinian national under the 1925 Or-
der-in-Council. Moreover, British citizens taking up Palestinian citizen-
ship did not have to renounce their British citizenship, since in British
legal mentality dual citizenship was permissible.
The controversial clause of the Treaty of Se`vres granting immediate
and inescapable nationality to Jews habitually resident in Palestine on
the entry into force of the treaty (art. 129) was left out of the Treaty of
Lausanne. The conditions for naturalisation in the 1925 Order-in-Coun-
cil included: (1) a two-year residency in Palestine during the three years
before the application, (2) good behaviour and knowledge of any of the
three official languages (Arabic, English or Hebrew) and (3) the inten-
tion to take up permanent residence in Palestine after acquiring Pales-
tinian nationality (sect. 7). In the eyes of newly immigrated Jews the
two-year residency requirement was nonsense, but the Order-in-Coun-
cil provided for no distinction between the Palestinian-born and the
naturalised Palestinian citizen (sect. 8).
After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Gaza Strip (Qita¯c Ghazzah) fell
under Egyptian rule while the West Bank (al-Diffah al-gharbı¯yah) was
annexed in 1950 by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. From that mo-
ment on, legal pluralism has been the distinctive feature of the Palesti-
nian system. Elements of Ottoman law, British Mandate legislation,
Egyptian and Jordanian law were all applied in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, as well as Israeli law after the military occupation that fol-
lowed the 1967 Six-Day War.
After the foundation of Israel in 1948, Palestinian citizenship en-
tered its ‘hyphenated phase’ (Kassim 2000: 204ff). Due to their differ-
ent status, different citizenship rules apply to (1) Palestinians from the
West Bank, (2) Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, (3) Palestinians living
in Israel, (4) Palestinian refugees
9
who took shelter in the West Bank
or in other Arab countries or (5) Palestinians of the diaspora.
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), recognised by the
Arab League in the 1974 Rabat summit as the sole legitimate represen-
tative of the Palestinian people, negotiated with the Israeli government
in 1993 the Oslo Accords that established the Palestinian National
Authority (PNA). The PLO’s definition of the Palestinian national was
enshrined in the 1964 Palestinian National Charter (al-Mı¯tha¯q al-qawmı¯
al-filastı¯nı¯), adopted by the first Palestinian Conference: ‘Palestinians
are Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine re-
gardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Any-
one born after that date of a Palestinian father – whether inside Pales-
tine or outside it – is also a Palestinian’ (art. 5). In the mid-1990s, a
draft Palestinian Nationality Law was circulated but never voted in. The
Basic Law (al-qa¯nu¯n al-asa¯sı¯) passed by the Legislative Council in 1997
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and promulgated by the PNA president in 2002 only stipulated that
Palestinian nationality has to be regulated by law (art. 7).
As for non-Jewish Palestinians of Israel, the 1952 Israeli Nationality
Law required a demanding proof of residence that caused many of
them to be considered stateless residents. Later amendments (1968,
1971 and 1980), however, eliminated major cases of statelessness. The
1952 Israeli Nationality Law completed the 1950 Law of Return, which
grants Israeli nationality to every returning Jew, and the 1950 Absen-
tees’ Property Law.
At present, the situation seems to be evolving towards the establish-
ment of two states in Palestine: Israel and the territories under the
PNA control (Israel disengaged from the Gaza Strip in 2005 but keeps
a military presence in the West Bank). This means the existence of Is-
raeli citizenship on the one hand and an in fieri Palestinian citizenship
on the other.
3.1.5.4 Jordan
The Emirate of Transjordan was an autonomous political division of
the Mandate for Palestine, and the British government limited its over-
sight to financial, military and foreign policy matters. Under the 1928
Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty and the Organic Law for Transjordan, ad-
ministrative and legislative powers were vested in the Emir (OLT,
art. 16), assisted by an elective Legislative Council (OLT, art. 25).
The 1928 Organic Law required Transjordanian nationality to be
regulated by law (art. 4), and a Tranjordanian Nationality Law was ap-
proved on 23 April 1928. The 1928 legislation defined the uncertain
status of Transjordanians between 1925 and 1928. After the coming
into force of the Treaty of Lausanne they could no longer be considered
Ottoman subjects, while the Mandate provisions on Palestinian nation-
ality (namely, art. 7) and the 1925 Palestinian Citizenship Order-in-
Council did not apply to the territory east of the Jordan River. For the
establishment of Transjordanian nationality, the same watershed of the
1924 Iraqi Law was adopted (6 August 1926, the day of the deposit of
British ratification instruments for the Treaty of Lausanne), and ‘habi-
tually resident’ were those Ottoman subjects who had their usual place
of residence in Transjordan during the twelve months preceding the
same date (art. 1). The 1928 Law regulated the right of option in full
compliance with the Lausanne provisions (art. 2-4) and facilitated the
option of former Ottoman subjects living abroad just like the 1925 Pa-
lestinian Citizenship Order-in-Council (art. 5). The attribution of Trans-
jordanian nationality was based on jus sanguinis, but could be also
based on double jus soli, unlike Palestinian nationality (art. 6). The
1928 Law was amended twice in 1944 by laws 18/1944 and 24/1944.
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During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, King cAbd alla¯h seized the West
Bank. This triggered a large Palestinian migration to the territory
across the river, which became in April 1949 the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan. An additional law of the Transjordanian Law of 1928 was
passed in December 1949 (qa¯nu¯n ida¯fı¯ li-qa¯nu¯n al-jinsı¯yah 56/1949),
declaring all the residents of Transjordan and the West Bank – which
was annexed in 1950 – Jordanian nationals. In 1988 King Hussein of
Jordan declared the full legal and administrative disengagement from
the West Bank (fakk al-irtiba¯t), and consequently transferred all respon-
sibility for ‘liberating the occupied Palestinian lands’ to the PLO (King
Hussein’s Speech of 31 July 1988). The implementation of the fakk al-ir-
tiba¯t was regulated by a Declaration of the Jordanian Prime Minister
Ziya¯d al-Rifa¯cı¯ (20 August 1988), where he spelled out that West Bank
residents had to be considered Palestinian, not Jordanian, nationals
(art. 2), i.e. stateless.
A new Jordanian Nationality Law was passed in 1954 (Law 6/1954).
Provisions for naturalisation were later amended in 1956 (Law 21/
1956), as well as those for acquisition in 1963 (Law 7/1963), those for
loss of nationality in 1958 (Law 50/1958) and those for dual nationality
in 1987 (Law 22/1987).
3.1.5.5 Lebanon
In the territories under French Mandate, the establishment of Lebanese
and Syrian nationalities was accomplished in two stages. Two decisions
of the French High Commissioner dealt with the right of option in the
first stage, while in the second other two decisions rescinded the 1869
Ottoman Nationality Law and regulated the Lebanese and Syrian na-
tionalities, taking into account local particularism, the high birth and
migration rates.
The French High Commissioner issued the first two decisions (arreˆte´
in French, or qara¯r in Arabic) on 3 August 1924 (2825 and 2825-bis).
These acknowledged the pre-existence of a Lebanese and Syrian nation-
ality (nationalite´, or ta¯bicı¯yah), interpreted the ‘e´tablissement’ clause as
the ‘domicile’ of the Code Napole´on and assumed as a watershed 30
August 1925 (day of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lausanne for
the territories under French Mandate).
Two other decisions (15/S and 16/S), adopted on 19 January 1925,
correspondingly regulated the Lebanese and Syrian nationalities on the
basis of the jus sanguinis, but unlike other legislation in the region they
attempted to keep all possible residents and expatriates attached (Tran-
sitional Clauses, art. 10). Longer residency was required for naturalisa-
tion, but language knowledge was not compulsory. Compared with the
domestic French nationality rules, the 1925 Decisions 15/S and 16/S
proved to be more ‘open’.
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Decision 15/S of 1925 is still the fundamental text on Lebanese na-
tionality, even if repeatedly amended. Provisions on naturalisation were
modified by act of law on 27 May 1939 (rescinded by the Legislative
Decree 48/1940 on 31 May 1940), while the former clauses on naturali-
sation (Decision 15/S, art. 3) were repealed by Decision 122/LR of 19
June 1939. Naturalised Lebanese nationals were disqualified from pub-
lic office for ten years by the Law of 7 June 1937, whereas the loss of
Lebanese nationality was regulated by the Law of 31 January 1946. Is-
sues related to nationality and marriage were addressed by the Law of
11 January 1960, which amended Decision 15/S, art. 4-7. All efforts ex-
erted during the civil war and the 1990s to pass a new, organic Leba-
nese nationality law proved unsuccessful.
3.1.5.6 Syria
Unlike Lebanon, in independent Syria the French Mandate legislation
on nationality (Decision 16/S) was repealed and replaced with Law 98/
1951, Legislative Decree (marsu¯m tashrı¯cı¯) 21/1953, Law 82/1958 (during
the UAR experience), Legislative Decree (marsu¯m tashrı¯cı¯) 27/1961 and
finally Legislative Decree (marsu¯m tashrı¯cı¯) 276/1969 of 24 November
1969. The 1969 Decree was issued after the takeover by radical neo-
Baathists and the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution of May
1969. However, the enacting regulations were issued in 1976 (Interior
Minister’s Decision 92/1976) when Ha¯fiz al-Asad’s corrective move-
ment had already shed the party’s extremists. The 1969 Legislative De-
cree affords a distinctive preferential treatment to Arabs who wish to
acquire Syrian nationality. For Syrian legislation the world is thus di-
vided into three categories: Syrian nationals, Arabs and foreigners
(aja¯nib).
3.1.5.7 Saudi Arabia
In November 1916, Hussein, the sharı¯f of Mecca, proclaimed himself
King of Hejaz with British support and led the development of a state
structure in that western region of the Arabian peninsula. The Hashe-
mite army was defeated in Jeddah in 1925, and in early 1926 cAbd
al-cazı¯z ibn Sacu¯d, the Sultan of Nejd, declared himself King of Hejaz.
Hejaz was much more advanced than Nejd, and the nationality legisla-
tion enacted by cAbd al-cazı¯z in September 1926 applied only to the
former.
The 1926 Hejazi Nationality Regulations were inspired by the tradi-
tional forms of religious affiliation: open to Muslims (art. 4) and rigidly
based on jus sanguinis (art. 2). A Hejazi national was a resident of He-
jaz ever since the downfall of the Ottoman Empire in the Great War
(art. 1). No clear watershed was assumed by the 1926 legislation, but it
did consider as Hejazi nationals all those residing in Hejaz or border-
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ing regions ‘in close proximity to’ its date of enactment (24 September
1926), provided they did not carry any other passport (art. 10). Thanks
to an odd application of the jus soli (art. 3), Hejazi nationality was
granted to the child of foreign parents born on Hejazi soil only during
the child’s stay in Hejaz (art. 9).
In 1930 a new piece of legislation, fairly close to that of 1926, was is-
sued to regulate the nationality (ta¯bicı¯yah) of both Hejaz and Nejd. In
1932 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was formed, but it was not until
1954 that Saudi nationality was regulated by the niza¯m al-jinsı¯yah al-car-
abı¯yah al-sacu¯dı¯yah issued with the ira¯dah malakı¯yah 8/20/5604 of 22
Safar 1374 AH. Under the 1954 regulations, a Saudi national is (a) a
former Ottoman subject (in 1914) resident in the Kingdom at its for-
mation (1926), (b) a former Ottoman subject born on Saudi soil who
resided in it from 1914 to 1926 and (c) every individual who resided in
the Kingdom from 1914 to 1926 and had no other nationality (art. 3).
Regular attribution of Saudi nationality is based on jus sanguinis (art. 7),
and the principle of unity of nationality within the family is implemen-
ted (art. 12-14). Religious affiliation was never explicitly mentioned in
the text, but all jurists agree on considering it a ‘tacit condition’ of Sau-
di nationality (al-Qa¯sim 1977: 76).
Firstly amended in 1961, naturalisation rules (art. 9) were signifi-
cantly amended in 2004 by Royal Decree 54/M of 29 Shawwa¯l 1425
AH. Under the new provisions, Saudi nationality can be granted to for-
eigners resident in the Kingdom for more than ten years (art. 9, and
12). The Enacting Regulations issued by Ministerial Decree 74/WZ of
9 Rabı¯c al-awwal 1426 AH (18 April 2005) provided for a point score
system for naturalisation (art. 8). Other 2004 amendments affected
the nationality of a foreign woman marrying a Saudi national (art. 16)
and the nationality of a Saudi woman marrying a foreign national
(art. 17).
3.1.5.8 Gulf states
Despite firm British determination to regroup all emirates of the Tru-
cial Coast into one political entity, territorial and dynastic disputes
blocked the project. Different states thus individually declared
independence.
Kuwait was the first Gulf Emirate to proclaim its independence in
1961. From 1948, however, Kuwait had defined the ‘original Kuwaiti’
as: (a) every member of the ruling family, (b) every resident of Kuwait
since 1899, (c) every child of a Kuwaiti father and (d) every child born
on Kuwaiti soil of an Arab or Muslim father. These provisions stood
out among other regional legislation for the unique role played by jus
soli in the determination of de facto Kuwaiti nationality.10 In 1959 an
Emiri Decree (marsu¯m amı¯rı¯ 15/1959 of 5 December 1959) established
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Kuwaiti nationality and regulated its attribution, acquisition and loss.
The 1959 Decree assumed 1920 as a watershed for Kuwaiti nationality,
since in that year the citizenry gathered to resist the attack of cAbd
al-cazı¯z ibn Sacu¯d’s troops in the battle of Jabrah, a turning point in the
shaping of Kuwaiti national identity. In 1960 Emiri Decree 5/1960 on
the determination (tahqı¯q) of Kuwaiti nationality was issued, whereas
the basic rules were repeatedly amended in a restrictive sense around
the beginning of the 1970s (laws 70/1966, 30/1970 and 41/1972). In
particular, the political rights of naturalised citizens were postponed
from ten to twenty years after the naturalisation decree in 1966 (Law
70/1966) and then to 30 years in 1986 (Decree-Law 130/1986). A great
many amendments were introduced in 1980 (Decree-Law 100/1980)
and later in 1982 (Law 1/1982), 1987 (Decree-Law 40/1987, which was
rejected by the National Assembly, however, on 4 July 1995), 1994
(Law 44/1994), 1998 (Law 11/1998) and 2000 (Law 21/2000). An
amendment to attribute Kuwaiti nationality to the children of Kuwaiti
mothers and foreign fathers was proposed in January 2006 by Islamist
parliamentarians,11 but parliament was soon dissolved and new elec-
tions were held in the summer.
The British decision to disengage from the Gulf by the end of 1971
hastened the independence of the other emirates. Since the 1960s Bah-
rain and Qatar have had basic nationality legislation, while the United
Arab Emirates drafted regulations on federal citizenship a year after in-
dependence. The 1963 Bahraini Nationality Law (Law 8/1963)12 was
amended only in 1981 (Decree-Law 10/1981 on the nationality of a for-
eign woman married to a Bahraini national) and 1989 (Decree-Law 12/
1989 on the attribution and acquisition by naturalisation of the hus-
band or the father), whereas the 1961 Qatari Nationality Law (Law 2/
1961) was modified in 1963 (Law 19/1963 on restoration and on the
nationality of a foreign woman married to a Qatari national), 1966 and
1969 (Decree-Laws 17/1966 and 3/1969 on naturalisation). In 2005
Qatari Law 38/2005 repealed Law 2/1961 and laid down stricter rules
for Qatari nationality. The original provisions of the 1972 Federal UAE
Nationality Law (Federal Law 17/1972) were sensibly tightened after the
oil crisis in 1975 (Federal Law 10/1975).
The British withdrawal from the Gulf also affected Oman, even if
the country had never technically been a British protectorate. The 1972
Omani Nationality Law (Law 1/1972) was already enacted after the
bloodless coup of Sultan Qa¯bu¯s but was later repealed by the Sultani
Decree (marsu¯m sulta¯nı¯) 3/1983. The 1983 legislation was extensively
amended in 1986 (Sultani Decree 5/1986) and slightly in 1994 (Sultani
Decree 95/1994) and 1999 (Sultani Decree 72/1999).
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3.1.5.9 Yemen
North Yemen was the first dominion of the Ottoman Empire to be-
come independent in 1918, whereas South Yemen was kept under Brit-
ish control. In 1962 a coup turned North Yemen (then the Mutawakki-
lite Kingdom of Yemen) into the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and
marked the beginning of a civil war in which regional and interna-
tional forces were actively engaged.
In late 1967 South Yemen became independent as the People’s Re-
public of South Yemen (PRSY), and in 1968 the first PRSY Nationality
legislation was enacted (Law 4/1968) and later amended in 1970 (Law
10/1970) and 1971 (Law 5/1971). North Yemen, on the other hand,
passed a YAR Nationality Law only in 1975 (Law 2/1975). Both the
southern and northern legislation, nonetheless, referred to a sole ‘Ye-
meni nationality’ (al-jinsı¯yah al-yamanı¯yah) with no further distinctions.
In 1990, after the country’s reunification and the adoption by popu-
lar referendum of a new Constitution for the Republic of Yemen, a law
on Yemeni nationality was approved (Law 6/1990). The 1990 Yemeni
Nationality Law was amended in 2003 to allow a Yemeni woman mar-
ried to a foreigner to regain her Yemeni nationality in case of divorce
(tala¯q) or the absence, death or subsequent mental incapacity of the
husband (Law 24/2003).
3.1.5.10 Sudan
Under Anglo-Egyptian rule, a piece of legislation defining who was to
be considered Sudanese was enacted in 1948 (qa¯nu¯n tacrı¯f ‘al-suda¯nı¯’).
The 1948 Law assumed 31 December 1897, when Sudan was almost
entirely under British control, as the watershed for nationality, thus
leaving out entire bordering regions (like Da¯r Fu¯r) and kin groups (like
the banu¯ cA¯mir and the banu¯ Swirara¯t), which would be subdued later.
Once independence was attained in 1956, the Khartoum Parliament
passed a Sudanese Nationality Law in 1957 (Law 22/1957), amended
after cAbbu¯d’s coup (laws 66/1959 and 40/1963 on loss of nationality),
while the rules regarding naturalisation were modified after Numayrı¯’s
coup (laws 55/1970 and 26/1977).
3.1.5.11 Libya
The four Libyan provinces were officially annexed by Italy in 1939 by
means of the Royal Decree-Law 70/1939. For Muslim Libyans the De-
cree established a ‘special Italian citizenship’ that did not require relin-
quishing Islamic personal status and inheritance law (art. 4). Granted
by the Italian Governor General, the ‘special’ citizenship afforded more
civil, political and military rights than the ones enjoyed by ‘ordinary’
Libyans (art. 6). Moreover, article 37 of the 1939 Decree repealed the
provisions of Royal Decree-Law 2012/1934, which offered ordinary Ita-
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lian citizenship but entailed loss of Muslim personal and inheritance
status (art. 8).
Libya attained independence in 1952 as a kingdom under Idrı¯s al-Sa-
nu¯sı¯, who signed the Libyan Nationality Law (Law 17/1954) in 1954,
amended after the revolution in 1974 (Law 47/1974), 1976 (Law 48/
1976) and 1979 (Law 3/1979, instituting the change of name to Great
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jama¯hı¯rı¯yah).
A singular Law on Arab Citizenship was passed in 1980 (Law 18/
1980) combining principles of pan-Arabism and Islam. Arab citizen-
ship is the citizenship of the ‘citizen’ (muwa¯tin) of the Jama¯hı¯rı¯yah
(art. 1) and of every Arab who enters (yadkhul) Libyan territory showing
the desire of acquiring it (art. 2). The latter provision drew on the 1950
Israeli Law of Return but did not apply to Palestinian Arabs as a form
of support for the ‘anti-Zionist cause’ (art. 3). No naturalisation was
available to non-Arabs, whereas apostasy from Islam offered a valid le-
gal basis for the deprivation of citizenship (art. 10(8)). Enforced in a
context of need for a foreign workforce, the 1980 Arab Citizenship Law
did not alter the effectiveness of the 1954 Libyan Nationality Law and
was later suspended on grounds of only being a way to obtain travel
documents.
3.1.5.12 Morocco
Moroccan territories did not recognise Ottoman suzerainty, but Moroc-
can nationality developed nonetheless in a context of capitulatory privi-
leges and foreign presence. Foreign naturalisation violated the princi-
ple of perpetual allegiance, already deeply felt in the Sultanate and in-
cluded in the Convention of Madrid of 1880 upon Moroccan request
(art. 15). A turning point in the establishment of Moroccan nationality
was the affaire Abdel-Hakim. In 1903 Tunisian-born counsellor of the
Moroccan Court cAbd al-hakı¯m appeared before a French court to ap-
peal the decision of the French plenipotentiary in Tangier banning him
from re-entering Morocco. The appellant claimed that there was but
one Islamic citizenship, and that residence in a territory had the legal
value of French domicile. The court, however, ruled that Muslims under
French protection (like Tunisians) could not escape French jurisdiction
by the sheer change of residence and by resorting to the concept of ‘Is-
lamic citizenship’, because Islamic citizenship no longer existed and
many nationalities had been formed in the fold of Islam.13
Under the Protectorate, nationality regulations varied according to
the zone of influence. In the Spanish zone, nationality was attributed
according to local customs, and Spanish tribunals in Morocco would
decide on the law applicable to dual nationals. As a general rule, Mor-
occan nationality was ‘transmitted’ by virtue of paternal jus sanguinis
and no naturalisation was allowed. In the Tangier free zone, capitula-
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tions were abolished in 1923 by the Convention of Paris (art. 13), and
the principle of perpetual allegiance of the 1880 Convention of Madrid
was applied. In the French zone, the existence of a Moroccan national-
ity was never questioned but was never regulated either. It had been a
matter of jurisprudence to delineate the rules of Moroccan nationality,
which was attributed by jus sanguinis and jus soli, whereas French nat-
uralisation was facilitated by the adoption of le´gislations paralle`les (the
Moroccan Zahı¯r and the French De´cret of 8 November 1921). A positive
conflict of nationalities would arise in the not infrequent case of mixed
marriage. The child of a French mother and a Moroccan father would
be considered a French national by the 1945 French Code, and a Mor-
occan by Moroccan law. In 1948 the issue was addressed by stipulating
that children of Moroccan fathers and French mothers could not take
advantage of their French nationality in Morocco without the Sultan’s
consent.
After attaining independence in 1956, a Moroccan Nationality Code
(qa¯nu¯n al-jinsı¯yah al-maghribı¯yah) modelled on the 1945 French Code de
la nationalite´ was drafted by an ad-hoc commission that included sev-
eral French jurists, like Decroux. The commission completed its work
in two years, and the results were enshrined in the Zahı¯r sharı¯f 250-58-
1 of 6 September 1958, which drew also on the nationality legislation
of other Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries. Perpetual allegiance is
upheld, while Moroccan courts keep filling the gaps in the 1958 Royal
Decree and reaffirming the pre-eminence of Moroccan nationality over
every other nationality. The 1958 Moroccan Nationality Code was
amended in 2007 (Zahı¯r sharı¯f 80-07-1 of 23 March 2007) to allow for
the attribution of Moroccan nationality by maternal jus sanguinis (art. 6)
and the acquisition by operation of law of Moroccan nationality by a
child born abroad of unknown parents who is in the custody (kafa¯lah)
of a Moroccan national (art. 9). The 2007 Decree also withheld natura-
lisation from persons who committed terrorist acts (art. 11(1)(4)) and
prescribed the revocation of Moroccan nationality if the terrorist acts
were committed after naturalisation (art. 22).
3.1.5.13 Tunisia
Following the establishment of the French Protectorate, many Eur-
opeans settled in Tunisia. In a move to abolish foreign capitulations,
France adopted in Tunisia the same system of the le´gislations paralle`les
as for Morocco. On 8 November 1921 the French President issued a
De´cret granting French nationality to every child born in Tunisia of a
father who was himself born in Tunisia and was under French jurisdic-
tion, while simultaneously the Bey of Tunis issued a marsu¯m imposing
Tunisian nationality on every child born in Tunisia of a father who was
himself born in Tunisia. French Tunisians were judged by French
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courts according to metropolitan law. They were thus considered apos-
tates, and state authorities had to build special graveyards for them.
Shortly before independence, the Tunisian Nationality Law of 1956
(Order 2/1956) regulated only the cases where French nationality was
not involved (art. 10-12). After the promulgation of the Republican
Constitution of 1959, rules on Tunisian nationality were laid down by
Decree-Law 6/1963. This would later be converted into Law 7/1963,
known as the Tunisian Nationality Code (majallat al-jinsı¯yah al-tu¯ni-
sı¯yah). The 1963 Code was amended to make loss of nationality effec-
tive only after foreign naturalisation (Law 79/1975) or for public or
military foreign service (Law 81/1984). Provisions regarding maternal
jus sanguinis were modified in 1993 to allow the child born abroad of a
Tunisian mother to acquire Tunisian nationality by operation of law
when coming of age or upon joint request of the parents (Law 62/
1993), and amended again in 2002 to stipulate that the mother’s re-
quest is sufficient in case of death, absence or legal incapacity of the
father (Law 4/2002).
3.1.5.14 Algeria
Algeria had a unique colonial status that influenced the development
of Algerian nationality (Mahiou 2005). Since the passing of the 1848
French Constitution, Algeria had been a French territory (art. 109), but
Algerians were not French nationals. The Senatus Consultum of 14 July
1865 stipulated that the Muslim (art. 1) and Jewish (art. 2) Algerian na-
tives were French citizens subject to their own religious laws. Algerian
natives were not full-fledged citizens and were governed by a special
Code de l’Indige´nat applied by administrative, not judicial, authorities.
Nationality and citizenship were thus divided. On the one hand,
French people living in Algeria who were French nationals and citizens
(nationaux et citoyens franc¸ais), while on the other hand Algerian na-
tives who were French nationals but subjects (nationaux et sujets fran-
c¸ais) without civil and political rights if not naturalised. Algerian Jews
were collectively granted French citizenship by the De´cret Cre´mieux of
24 October 1870, which subjected them to metropolitan law, not Mo-
saic law. Algerian Muslims had to wait until the interbellum to see the
Loi Jonnart of 4 February 1919 open the way to naturalisation, espe-
cially for veterans and elites. Naturalisation, however, involved the loss
of Muslim personal status, an act that entailed apostasy according to
the famous 1937 fatwa` of sheikh Ben Badis, leader of the Association
of Muslim Algerian Ulema.14
After the Second World War, equality of rights and duties was pro-
claimed by the Ordonnance of 7 March 1944 and later confirmed by the
Loi Lamine Gue`ye of 7 May 1946 (which granted French citizenship to
all the subjects of France’s territories and overseas departments) and
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the 1946 Constitution. The Law of 20 September 1946 granted French
citizenship to all Algerian subjects, who were not required, however, to
renounce their Muslim personal status. Equality did not affect the elec-
toral legislation, though, which continued to provide for a separate and
unequal system of representation both to the Algerian Assembly and
to the French Parliament for Pieds-noirs (population of European des-
cent of Algeria) and ‘Muslim French’ (those who were first indige`nes,
then sujets franc¸ais, were eventually identified as musulmans franc¸ais).
Only with the Algerian War and the coming of the French Fifth Re-
public were full equality and the ‘integration policy’ laid out under the
Law of 4 October 1958. During the Algerian War of Independence,
Pieds-noirs were invited to choose Algerian nationality and forsake
French citizenship, or otherwise be considered as foreigners. The Evian
agreements that ended the Algerian War allowed for the option for
either of the two nationalities, and the right of option had to be exer-
cised within three years by 1965. In 1962 most Pieds-noirs and a large
number of Harkis (Muslim Algerians serving as auxiliaries with the
French Army) left Algeria for France.
After independence, an Algerian Nationality Code was passed on 27
March 1963. After a sharp confrontation, the solution adopted by the
Code was the attribution of Algerian nationality by filiation of an Alger-
ian father, who had to have at least two ascendants in the paternal line
born in Algeria and subject to Islamic law (art. 34). As a result, all
Pieds-noirs (both those of European descent and the Jews) were de-
prived of Algerian nationality.
In 1970 the 1963 Code was repealed and substituted by Order (amr)
86/1970. The 1970 Algerian Nationality Code maintained the pre-emi-
nence of (paternal) jus sanguinis, the requirement of strong assimilation
for naturalisation and strict control to avoid cases of dual nationality.
In 2005 the Code was amended by the Order 1/2005 to allow for the
attribution of Algerian nationality by maternal jus sanguinis and the ac-
quisition of Algerian nationality by marriage.
3.2 Nationality (jinsı¯yah) in the Arab world
In the Arab world, nationality (jinsı¯yah) is not considered a matter of
public law but rather of private international law (conflict of laws), as it
is in France. Some Arab scholars, however, have recently started to un-
derline its constitutional relevance. Among these is al-Busta¯nı¯, who la-
tely published a comparative study of Arab nationality laws for which
he adopted general categories meant to overpass national definitory dis-
crepancies and embrace the different local expressions (al-Busta¯nı¯
2003). The study contains heavy ideological overtones, however, that
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colour the exposition and need to be taken into account, even if its
comparative value should not be underestimated. Arab works are quite
modestly comparative by and large, as they take on a predominant
model or opt for regional comparisons (the Gulf, the Arab East or the
Arab West). Shaped according to the French model, and at the same
time attentive to national lexical peculiarities, al-Busta¯nı¯’s categories
are adopted here as a framework for a systematic comparison of Arab
legislation on nationality; a synopsis of the rules of attribution, acquisi-
tion, loss and reintegration of nationality in the Arab world. This
choice is also motivated by the desire to present the non-Arab reader
with the point of view of Arab scholars by means of their own systema-
tisation of nationality regulations.
In this section, references to national legislation are given in the ab-
breviated form of the main piece of legislation regulating nationality in
each country. Egypt’s Nationality Law 26/1975 is thus indicated as
(1975 EgNL), Iraq’s Nationality Law 43/1963 as (1963 IqNL), Jordan’s
Nationality Law 6/1954 as (1954 JoNL), Lebanon’s Nationality Decision
15/S of 1925 as (1925 LbND), Syria’s Nationality Legislative Decree
276/1969 as (1969 SyNLD), Saudi Arabia’s Nationality Regulations of
19 October 1954 as (1954 SaNR), Kuwait’s Nationality Emiri Decree 15/
1959 as (1959 KwNED), Bahrain’s Nationality Law 8/1963 (1963
BhNL), Qatar’s Nationality Law 38/2005 as (2005 QaNL), the United
Arab Emirates’ Federal Nationality Law 17/1972 as (1972 AeFNL),
Oman’s Nationality Sultani Decree 3/1983 as (1983 OmNSD), Yemen’s
Nationality Law 6/1990 as (1990 YeNL), Sudan’s Nationality Law 22/
1957 as (1957 SdNL), Libya’s Nationality Law 17/1954 as (1954 LyNL),
Morocco’s Nationality Code of 6 September 1958 as (1958 MaNC), Tu-
nisia’s Nationality Code of 22 April 1963 as (1963 TnNC) and Algeria’s
Nationality Code of 15 December 1970 as (1970 DzNC). Amendments
are indicated in parentheses after the abbreviated law, e.g. art. 1 of the
Egyptian Nationality Law 26/1975 as amended by Law 154/2004 to al-
low for the attribution of Egyptian nationality by maternal jus sanguinis
will be shortened as: ‘1975 EgNL(2004), art. 1’.
3.2.1 Acquisition of nationality
(Ahka¯m iktisa¯b al-jinsı¯yah)
A brief introduction to Arab studies on nationality is invariably devoted
to ‘Islamic nationality’, or rather the ‘Islamic concept of nationality’
(al-mafhu¯m al-isla¯mı¯ li-l-jinsı¯yah). Arab scholars argue that Islamic na-
tionality dominated until the end of the 19th century and was later re-
placed by a host of local nationalities as a result of the Treaty of Lau-
sanne of 1923.
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In the historic development of local nationalities, then, a line is
drawn between the ‘founding nationality’ (jinsı¯yat al-ta’sı¯s), derived
from the Ottoman dismemberment, and the ‘populating nationality’
(jinsı¯yat al-tacmı¯r), created by national legislation after independence.
The latter is commonly referred to simply as ‘nationality’ (jinsı¯yah).
In the discussion of how nationality is acquired, national legislation
and legal literature both make a distinction between ‘original national-
ity’ (al-jinsı¯yah al-aslı¯yah or jinsı¯yat al-asl) and ‘acquired nationality’
(al-jinsı¯yah al-muktasabah), the former being attributed at birth and the
second acquired after it.
Original nationality is acquired at birth and from birth and is there-
fore identified also as ‘nationality of birth’ (jinsı¯yat al-mı¯la¯d). Other
scholars, by contrast, emphasise the role of the state and label this na-
tionality as ‘granted nationality’ (al-jinsı¯yah al-mamnu¯hah) or ‘imposed
nationality’ (al-jinsı¯yah al-mafru¯dah). Birth is technically the key event
in the acquisition of original nationality, so much so that if original na-
tionality is established after birth, it is applied back from the moment
of birth.
Acquired nationality is the other major access gate to nationality. It
is obtained through an event taking place after birth and gains effect
only from the moment of that event. A wide lexicon is used to account
for the differences between acquired and original nationality, the for-
mer being ‘subsequent’ (la¯hiqah) while the latter attributed at birth,
‘foreign’ (ta¯ri’ah) or ‘secondary’ (tha¯nawı¯yah) instead of the ‘normal’ or
‘first’ nationality attributed to the person or – lastly – ‘elective’ (mukh-
ta¯rah) to mark the person’s role in the process of acquisition.
3.2.1.1 Attribution of nationality of origin (Iktisa¯b al-jinsı¯yah al-aslı¯yah)
In the nationality legislation of Arab countries, the basic principle for
the establishment (thubu¯t) or acquisition (iktisa¯b, but also kasb) of the
nationality of origin is jus sanguinis (haqq al-dam), while jus soli (haqq
al-iqlı¯m) is relegated to a secondary, or exceptional role (istithna¯’ı¯). A
particular combination of jus sanguinis and jus soli, usually known as
double jus soli, is seen by Arab jurists as ‘jus sanguinis strengthened by
jus soli’ (haqq al-dam mucazzaz bi-haqq al-iqlı¯m).
3.2.1.1.1 Jus sanguinis (Asa¯s haqq al-dam wahdah)
Jus sanguinis (haqq al-dam) is based on legitimate filiation (al-bunu¯wah
al-sharcı¯yah), i.e. birth within wedlock, and entails ‘entering the nation-
ality of the state to which the father belongs’ (yadkhul fı¯ jinsı¯yat al-daw-
lah al-latı¯ yantamı¯ ilayha¯ abu¯h) by virtue of mere birth. Nationality at-
tributed by jus sanguinis is then labelled as ‘nationality by descent’ (jin-
sı¯yat al-nasab), since it descends from a national source (intisa¯b ila` asl
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watanı¯). ‘Filiation’ and ‘descent’ share here the same root n.s.b. Paternal
jus sanguinis (haqq al-dam al-abawı¯) – bond (irtiba¯t) or descent by pater-
nal filiation (inhida¯r bi-l-nasab min al-ab) – is the main way nationality
is attributed by Arab legislation, even if there are minor differences.
Maternal jus sanguinis (haqq al-dam al-umu¯mı¯ or al-ummı¯), on the
contrary, comes into play only in exceptional (istithna¯’ı¯) cases (Bakhı¯t
2001; Kha¯lid 2006), as when the child is born out of wedlock (al-walad
ghayr al-sharcı¯, or illegitimate filiation) or the father is of unknown na-
tionality (majhu¯l al-jinsı¯yah) or stateless (al-ab cadı¯m al-jinsı¯yah). Mater-
nal descent is therefore a secondary form of jus sanguinis (al-su¯rah
al-tha¯nawı¯yah li-haqq al-dam), preventive (haqq al-dam al-wiqa¯’ı¯) or pre-
cautionary (al-ihtiya¯tı¯), and Arab nationality laws impose other require-
ments to attribute the mother’s nationality to the child.
Some Arab countries recently amended their legislation to conform
to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women (CEDAW, art. 9(2)) by guaranteeing gender equal-
ity in the attribution of nationality to children. Ever since 1963, the Tu-
nisian Nationality Code has attributed the mother’s Tunisian national-
ity to the child born in Tunisia, but in 1993 an amendment allowed
also for the acquisition of Tunisian nationality by operation of law to
the child of a Tunisian mother born out of the country (Law 62/1993).
Attribution by maternal jus sanguinis, by contrast, was introduced in
Egypt by Law 154/2004 (1975 EgNL(2004), art. 2(1)(1)), in Algeria by
Order 1/2005 (1970 DzNC(2005), art. 6), and in Morocco by Decree
80/2007 (1958 MaNC(2007), art. 6). A broad campaign, known as
‘Claiming Equal Citizenship: The Campaign for Arab Women’s Right
to Nationality’, vigorously calls for amending the other Arab laws, and
the issue is under discussion in Lebanon, Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait.
Some legislation stipulates that nationality is attributed to the child of
a national father born within or out of the boundaries of the state
(1963 IqNL, art. 4(1)(1); 1969 SyNLD, art. 3(1)(a); 1954 SaNR, art. 7;
1959 KwNED, art. 2; 1963 BhNL(1989), art. 4(1)(a); 2005 QaNL, art. 1
(1)(4); 1972 AeFNL(1975), art. 2(1)(b); 1983 OmNSD(1986), art. 1(1)),
whereas the place of birth is not even mentioned in other texts (1975
EgNL, art. 2(1)(1); 1954 JoNL(1963), art. 3(1)(3); 1925 LbND, art. 1(1)(1);
1990 YeNL, art. 3(1)(a); 1957 SdNL, art. 5(2);15 1958 MaNC(2007), art. 6
(1)(1); 1963 TnNC, art. 6(1)(1); 1970 DzNC(2005), art. 6(1)). Cases of
dual nationality can arise if the child is given another nationality by
maternal jus sanguinis or by jus soli.
Nationality is attributed by birth if the father is a national at the
child’s birth. If the father loses his nationality before the child is born,
his nationality will not be attributed to the child. Conversely, if the
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father acquires nationality before the child’s birth, his nationality will
be attributed to the child.
In order to be attributed nationality, the child has to be born within
wedlock. Religion is not explicitly named, but religious rules on legiti-
mate filiation implicitly apply, and as far as Islamic sharı¯cah is involved,
adoption and legal recognition of the child are key issues that affect na-
tionality regulations. Adoption (tabannı¯) and child custody (kafa¯lah), for
instance, may lead to the acquisition of nationality by operation of law
in Tunisia and Morocco respectively.
Maternal jus sanguinis plays a role only if the nationality of the father
is unknown (jaha¯lat al-jinsı¯yah) or he is stateless (incida¯m al-jinsı¯yah)16
for most Arab legislation. Gulf laws also include the case of unknown
paternity or illegitimate filiation (the child majhu¯l al-ab aw lam tuthab-
bit nisbatuhu li-abı¯hi qa¯nu¯nan; 1959 KwNED(1980), art. 3(1); 1963 BhNL
(1989), art. 4(1)(b); 1972 AeFNL(1975), art. 2(c-d); 1983 OmNSD(1994),
art. 1(2)).
3.2.1.1.2 Jus sanguinis strengthened by jus soli
(Haqq al-dam mucazzaz bi-haqq al-iqlı¯m)
What Arab scholars call ‘jus sanguinis strengthened by jus soli’ (haqq
al-dam mucazzaz bi-haqq al-iqlı¯m) concerns two different cases. Namely,
when birth on the territory is required to reinforce the weak maternal
jus sanguinis, and when birth of the father or the grandfather on the
territory is required to the child born abroad.
On the one hand, when nationality cannot be attributed by paternal
descent, maternal descent is taken into account, even if its weakness
needs to be supported by birth on the territory of the state (1975 EgNL,
art. 2(1); 1963 IqNL, art. 4(1)(2); 1954 JoNL(1963), art. 3(1)(4); 1969
SyNLD, art. 3(1)(b); 1954 SaNR (1985), art. 8;17 1990 YeNL, art. 3(1)(b-
c); 1963 TnNC, art. 6(1)(3)).
On the other hand, the attribution of the father’s nationality to the
child born out of the territory only if the father or the grandfather was
born within the boundaries of the state was a controversial provision of
the 1963 Bahraini Nationality Law later repealed by Decree-Law 12/
1989 (al-Busta¯nı¯ 2003: 137ff). The Bahraini solution, however, had the
positive effect of limiting the ‘transmission’ of Bahraini nationality
through generations that no longer had any attachment to the country.
By repealing the original provision, Bahrain joined the ranks of other
Arab countries claiming perpetual nationality of their offspring.
3.2.1.1.3 Jus soli (Asa¯s haqq al-iqlı¯m aw maka¯n al-wila¯dah)
With the exception of Lebanon, Syria and Libya, the attribution of na-
tionality by jus soli (haqq al-iqlı¯m) is quite limited in the Arab world,
and even in these three countries jus soli is thought of as a means to re-
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duce cases of statelessness. According to Lebanese, Syrian and Libyan
laws, nationality can be attributed by virtue of birth on the country’s
soil only if it is not possible to attribute any other nationality to the per-
son (1925 LbND, art. 1(1)(2); 1969 SyNLD, art. 3(1)(d);18 1954 LyNL
(1976), art. 4(1)(a)).
Elsewhere, nationality can be attributed by jus soli only if both par-
ents are unknown (majhu¯layn) or of unknown nationality (majhu¯lay
’l-jinsı¯yah) (1975 EgNL, art. 2(1)(4); 1963 IqNL, art. 4(1)(3); 1954 JoNL
(1963), art. 3(1)(5); 1954 SaNR(1960), art. 8; 1959 KwNED, art. 3(2);
1963 BhNL(1989), art. 5; 1972 AeFNL(1975), art. 2(e); 1983 OmNSD
(1986), art. 1(3); 1990 YeNL, art. 3(1)(d); 1957 SdNL, art. 6; 1958 MaNC
(2007), art. 7(1)(2); 1963 TnNC, art. 9-10; 1970 DzNC(2005), art. 7(1)
(1)). The 2005 Qatari Nationality Law is the only piece of Arab legisla-
tion that allows only for the acquisition of ‘naturalisation nationality’ to
the foundling (2005 QaNL, art. 2(2)).
Double jus soli (haqq al-iqlı¯m muda¯cafan) – i.e. the attribution of na-
tionality to the child born in the country to an alien father, or grand-
father, born himself within the boundaries of the state – is a recessive
model on the whole at present. Introduced in France in 1851, it was la-
ter adopted by the 1869 Ottoman Nationality Law and by some Arab
legislation. An example is the Egyptian Decree-Law 29/1929, which re-
quired the father to be either an Arabic speaker or a Muslim (art. 6).
Currently double jus soli, or ‘double birth’ (al-mı¯la¯d al-muda¯caf) or ‘re-
curring birth’ (al-wila¯dah al-mutakarrirah), leads to acquisition by opera-
tion of law of nationality in just a few pieces of legislation (1963 IqNL
(1964), art. 6; 1958 MaNC(2007), art. 9(1)(1)).
For the attribution of nationality by jus soli, further requirements
than mere birth on the territory are usually set out. Besides the child’s
birth (shart al-wila¯dah bi-l-nisbah li-l-tifl), the parents need to be habi-
tually resident in the country (iqa¯mah li-darajat al-tawattun bi-l-nisbah
li-l-wa¯lidayn), and both or either one of them needs to be stateless (inci-
da¯m jinsı¯yatihima¯ aw jinsı¯yat ahadihima¯).
3.2.1.2 Acquisition of foreign nationality
(Iktisa¯b al-jinsı¯yah al-ta¯ri’ah – al-jinsı¯yah al-muktasabah)
Acquisition of nationality has special features in the Arab world, where
an intermediate category between the national and the foreigner is
commonly outlined: the Arab. Some scholars even set apart rules of ac-
quisition that apply to Arabs and foreigners alike (shuru¯t mushtarakah),
and those ‘added or extended’ (shuru¯t munfasilah, ayy al-latı¯ tata¯l) im-
posed on foreigners alone. Among shared requirements are (1) legal ca-
pacity, (2) absence of illnesses or other health conditions prohibiting
work, (3) good behaviour and (4) absence of criminal conviction for an
infamous crime, whereas further conditions for foreigners are (5) pro-
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longed residency, (6) knowledge of Arabic, (7) qualification and compe-
tence and (8) residence at the submission of the application form
(al-Busta¯nı¯ 2003: 152ff).
Even if being Arab (and Muslim) may play a major role in the acqui-
sition process in the Arab world – sometimes on and sometimes off
the record – there is no legal reason to explain the rules of acquisition
in two different sections (one for Arabs and one for non-Arabs). Most
Arab scholars organise them in a single section.
The traditional distinction between acquisition by operation of law
and by decision of the authority seems to be fading, since acquisition
by operation of law is ordinarily subject to administrative discretionary
power. The Arab West, more susceptible to French influence, main-
tains sections dedicated to acquisition par le bienfait de la loi (iktisa¯b
bi-fadl al-qa¯nu¯n or bi-hukm al-qa¯nu¯n) for cases of combination of jus
sanguinis and jus soli (1958 MaNC(2007), art. 9(1)(1); 1963 TnNC, art. 12;
1970 DzNC, art. 9), marriage (1958 MaNC(2007), art. 10; 1963 TnNC,
art. 13-14; 1970 DzNC(2005), art. 9-bis) and adoption (tabannı¯; 1963
TnNC, art. 18) or child custody (kafa¯lah; 1958 MaNC(2007), art. 9(1)
(2)).
3.2.1.2.1 Naturalisation (al-Tajannus)
Naturalisation (tajannus) is by far the main form of acquisition of a for-
eign nationality in the Arab world, even if it arouses evident legislative
hostility. Not uniquely, naturalisation is generally subject to conditions
pertaining to the person’s assimilation in the political community. In
this context, Arab legislation clearly favours the acquisition of national-
ity by other Arabs, who belong to the same socio-political entity that
transcends national borders.
Requirements for ordinary naturalisation (Shuru¯t al-tajannus al-ca¯dı¯)
Among the conditions commonly set for ordinary naturalisation by
Arab legislation are legal capacity (or full capacity: kama¯l al-ahlı¯yah), ab-
sence of health conditions that hinder any ability to work (khilwuhu
min al-amra¯d al-sa¯rı¯yah wa-l-ca¯ha¯t wa-l-cilal al-latı¯ tumnacuhu min muza¯-
walat ayy camal), good behaviour (husn al-sulu¯k wa-l-sı¯rah al-mahmu¯dah)
and absence of criminal conviction for infamous crimes (cadam
al-hukm calayhi bi-cuqu¯bah jina¯’ı¯yah aw bi-cuqu¯bah muqayyidat al-hur-
rı¯yah fı¯ jarı¯mah sha¯’inah). The indetermination of these conditions sa-
gaciously extends the scope of discretionary powers.
Residency is assumed as the main indicator of the attachment to the
state of the alien applying for naturalisation. Long or prolonged resi-
dency (al-iqa¯mah al-tawı¯lah, or al-madı¯dah) is required by all nationality
laws, even if there are considerable differences in the determination of
the length. Gulf legislation is undoubtedly the strictest, demanding le-
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gal and uninterrupted residence of twenty years (1959 KwNED(1980),
art. 4(1)(1); 1983 OmNSD(1986), art. 2(3)) twenty-five years (1963
BhNL, art. 6(1); 2005 QaNL, art. 2(1)(1)), or thirty years (1972 AeFNL,
art. 8). Other national laws vary from fifteen years (1963 IqNL(1964),
art. 8(4)(a)) to ten years (1975 EgNL, art. 4(5); 1954 SaNR(2004), art. 9
(1)(a); 1957 SdNL(1970), art. 8(1)(b)), seven years (1970 DzNC, art. 10
(1)(1)), five years (1925 LbND, art. 3(1)(1); 1969 SyNLD, art. 4(1)(b);
1958 MaNC(2007), art. 11(1)(1); 1963 TnNC, art. 20), or four years
(1954 JoNL, art. 12(1)(1)). Libya and Yemen have special provisions. In
the former only Arabs can apply for ordinary naturalisation, after hav-
ing fulfilled residency requirements of five years (1954 LyNL(1979),
art. 5(1)(b)), or four if married to a Libyan woman (1954 LyNL(1979),
art. 5(1)(a)), while in the latter only Muslims can apply after ten years
of residence (1990 YeNL, art. 5(1)(2)). In order to favour the naturalisa-
tion of Arabs, Syria eliminated the residency requirement (ilgha¯’
al-muddah; 1969 SyNLD, art. 6(1)),19 whereas Iraq and other Gulf
countries shortened its length (takhfı¯f al-muddah), in Iraq from fifteen
to ten years (1963 IqNL(1964), art. 8(1)(c)), in Kuwait from twenty to
fifteen years (1959 KwNED(1980), art. 4(1)(1)), in Bahrain from 25 to
fifteen years (1963 BhNL, art. 6(1)) and in the UAE from 30 to seven
(1972 AeFNL(1975), art. 6).20 The determination of who is to be con-
sidered an ‘Arab’, however, is not unambiguous. The Syrian Legislative
Decree 276/1969 attempted an a contrario definition of the ‘Arab’ by
identifying the ‘foreigner’ (ajnabı¯) as the person who possesses neither
Syrian nationality nor the nationality of any other Arab country (kull
man la¯ yatamattac bi-jinsı¯yat al-jumhu¯rı¯yah al-carabı¯yah al-su¯rı¯yah aw
jinsı¯yat ayy balad carabı¯ ’a¯khar, 1969 SyNLD, art. (1)(c)). Nothing is
said, though, of the Arab ‘by origin or descent’ (carabı¯ al-asl).
With the exception of Lebanon and Algeria,21 all other Arab coun-
tries require a certain degree of knowledge of Arabic in order to be nat-
uralised. A few nationality laws demand that one be knowledgeable of
the language, with good speaking, reading and writing abilities (an yu-
jayyid al-lughah al-carabı¯yah tahadduthan wa-qira¯’atan wa-kita¯batan; 1954
SaNR(2004), art. 9(1)(6); 1954 JoNL(1963), art. 12(1)(4)), most sheer
knowledge (ilma¯m bi-l-lughah; 1975 EgNL, art. 4(4-5); 1969 SyNLD,
art. 4(1)(f); 1972 AeFNL, art. 7-8; 1983 OmNSD, art. 2(1); 1990 YeNL,
art. 5(1)(5); 1957 SdNL, art. 8(1)(c)22), and others require only sufficient
knowledge (macrifah ka¯fı¯ah; 1959 KwNED(1980), art. 4(1)(3)23; 1963
BhNL, art. 6(1)(c); 2005 QaNL, art. 2(1)(4); 1958 MaNC(2007), art. 11(1)
(5); 1963 TnNC, art. 23(1)(2)24).
The person applying for naturalisation must prove to be in good
‘economic condition’ (al-ha¯lah al-ma¯ddı¯yah; 1975 EgNL, art. 4(4)(4);
1963 IqNL(1964), art. 8(1)(e) and (4)(d); 1954 JoNL(1963), art. 12(1)(7);
1969 SyNLD, art. 4(e); 1954 SaNR(2004), art. 9(1)(e); 1959 KwNED
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(1980), art. 4(1)(2); 2005 QaNL, art. 2(1)(2); 1972 AeFNL, art. 8; 1983
OmNSD, art. 2(4); 1990 YeNL, art. 5(1)(4); 1954 LyNL(1979), art. 5(2)
(e); 1958 MaNC(2007), art. 11(1)(6); 1970 DzNC, art. 10(1)(5)). Note-
worthy exceptions are Lebanon, Sudan and Tunisia, whereas the Bah-
raini Nationality Law stipulates that candidates need to have real prop-
erty in the country registered in their name (1963 BhNL, art. 6(1)(d)),
and the Syrian Legislative Decree lifts the requirement for the Arab
(1969 SyNLD, art. 6).
Being a Muslim is an explicit requirement under Kuwaiti and Yeme-
ni nationality laws, whereas it is implicitly so in Saudi Arabia. In Ku-
wait, a special piece of legislation (Law 1/1982) was passed to bar nat-
uralisation to non-Muslims. If the candidate is not a Muslim, conver-
sion to Islam must take place five years before applying for Kuwaiti
nationality, and if, once naturalised, the convert commits apostasy, the
naturalisation decree shall be declared null and void (1959 KwNED
(1982), art. 4(1)(5)). Yemeni nationality is open only to Muslims, but no
prior time limit is set for conversion to Islam (1990 YeNL, art. 5). In
Saudi Arabia, on the contrary, being a Muslim has not been openly re-
quired by law since the regulations on Hejazi and Nejdi nationality of
1930 (art. 6-7) were introduced, but legal scholars agree that it is an
implicit clause (shart al-isla¯m, al-Munı¯fı¯ 1974: 120, al-Qa¯sim 1977: 76
and cAshshu¯sh 1991: 194f). The executive regulations of Royal Decree
54/M of 2004 demand that good behaviour, stipulated by 1954 SaNR
(2004), art. 9(1)(c), be proved by a certificate signed by the imam of
the mosque of the neighbourhood where the candidate lives (Minister-
ial Decree 74/WZ of 2005, art. 14(1)(1)).
Good behaviour generally consists of lack of criminal conviction for
infamous crimes or crimes against state security, but is framed differ-
ently in every piece of legislation (1975 EgNL, art. 4(4)(2); 1963 IqNL
(1964), art. 8(1)(d) and (4)(c); 1954 JoNL, art. 12(1)(5); 1969 SyNLD,
art. 4(d); 1954 SaNR(2004), art. 9(1)(c); 1959 KwNED(1980), art. 4(1)
(2); 1963 BhNL, art. 6(1)(b); 2005 QaNL, art. 2(1)(3); 1972 AeFNL, art. 8;
1983 OmNSD, art. 2(3); 1990 YeNL, art. 5(1)(3); 1957 SdNL, art. 8(1)(d);
1954 LyNL(1979), art. 5(2)(b); 1958 MaNC(2007), art. 11(1)(4); 1963
TnNC, art. 23(1)(5); 1970 DzNC, art. 10(1)(4)). In 2007, Morocco intro-
duced terrorist crimes (jarı¯mah irha¯bı¯yah), along with other breaches of
criminal law, as a legitimate reason to deny naturalisation (1958 MaNC
(2007), art. 11(1)(4)).
Some legislation subordinates naturalisation to the loss of the pre-
vious nationality, in order to avoid cases of dual nationality. In Jordan,
authorities do not deliver certificates of naturalisation unless the loss
of the previous nationality is proved (1954 JoNL, art. 13(3)), while in the
Gulf a term after naturalisation is assigned for relinquishing previous
nationality (1954 SaNR(2004), art. 9(2); 1959 KwNED(1980), art. 11-bis;
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1972 AeFNL, art. 11; 1983 OmNSD, art. 2(5)). Dual nationality (jamc
bayna jinsı¯yatayn) of Arab nationals was regulated by the Convention of
the Arab League of 5 April 1954. Under this regulation, the Arab na-
tional of a signatory state (Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon,
and Yemen) would lose his nationality when being granted the nation-
ality of another signatory state upon consent (bi-muwa¯faqah) of the for-
mer (art. 6), but the Convention never came into force for lack of
ratifications.
Requirements for extraordinary naturalisation (Shuru¯t al-tajannus al-kha¯ss)
Besides ordinary naturalisation, Arab nationality laws lay down rules
for extraordinary, or exceptional naturalisation (al-tajannus al-kha¯ss or
al-istithna¯’ı¯), in order to grant nationality to the alien who has offered
special service to the country.
Foreign nationals can be awarded nationality (muka¯fa’at al-jinsı¯yah)
for meritorious service. Service can be qualified as ‘important’ (khidma¯t
dha¯t sha’n; 1925 LbND, art. 3(1)(3)), ‘exceptional’ (khidma¯t istithna¯’ı¯yah;
1958 MaNC(2007), art. 12) or ‘outstanding’ (khidma¯t jalı¯lah; 1975 EgNL,
art. 5; 1954 SaNR, art. 29; 1959 KwNED(1980), art. 5(1); 1963 BhNL,
art. 6(2); 2005 QaNL, art. 6; 1972 AeFNL, art. 9), and usually needs to
have been rendered to the country, but in Syria it can also be provided
to the ummah, i.e. the Arab nation in the jargon of the Syrian National-
ity legislation (1969 SyNLD, art. 6(1)(b))25. Other legislation confers
full discretionary authority to state departments to legally bestow na-
tionality (1954 JoNL(1956), art. 13(2); 1963 BhNL, art. 6(2); 1983
OmNSD, art. 3).
Extraordinary naturalisation can also be granted to Levantine na-
tionals who left their country. The Lebanese and Jordanian laws use a
‘local’ definition of expatriate (al-mughtarib al-watanı¯), namely a Leba-
nese or Jordanian expatriate (LbLaw 31 January 1946, art. 2;26 1954
JoNL, art. 2(d)27), whereas the Syrian legislation refers to a wider con-
cept of ‘national’ expatriate (al-mughtarib al-qawmı¯), viz. the individual
of Arab origin who possesses a non-Arab nationality (1969 SyNLD,
art. 1(6))28.
Effects of naturalisation (’A¯tha¯r al-tajannus)
Naturalisation has individual and familial effects. Arab nationality laws,
however, sensibly differ on the magnitude and significance of such
effects.
With regard to the ‘individual’ or ‘special’ effects of naturalisation
(al-’a¯tha¯r al-fardı¯yah or al-kha¯ssah), nationality legislation generally re-
quires a certain amount of time (from five to ten years) after naturali-
sation before bestowing equal rights and duties on the naturalised. Re-
strictions to the civil and political rights of the naturalised may be set
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out either in nationality laws or in laws regulating other sectors, such
as electoral or civil service legislation. On one end of the spectrum is
the perpetual exclusion (hirma¯n mutbiq mu’abbad) of political rights in
Qatar and the UAE (2005 QaNL, art. 16(2); 1972 AeFNL, art. 1329),30
which have even established a policy of hereditary naturalisation status
(tajannus bi-l-wira¯thah). An extended exclusion (hirma¯n muwaqqat ma-
dı¯d) is set down by legislation in other Gulf states like Kuwait (30 years
for political rights; 1959 KwNED(1986), art. 6), whereas most laws sti-
pulate a short exclusion period (hirma¯n muwaqqat qası¯r), such as fifteen
years for the non-Arab Muslim naturalised in Yemen (1990 YeNL,
art. 23), ten years in Lebanon, Bahrain and Qatar for being employed
in the civil service (al-waza¯’if al-ca¯mmah; Law 7 June 1937, art. 1; 1963
BhNL, art. 6(3);31 2005 QaNL, art. 16(1)) and five years in Egypt, Jor-
dan, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria (1975 EgNL, art. 9; 1954 JoNL
(1987), art. 14; 1958 MaNC, art. 17; 1963 TnNC, art. 26; 1970 DzNC,
art. 16).
In the Arab West aliens are allowed to change their names upon nat-
uralisation (taghyı¯r al-ism). The French model and the Islamic tradition
of acquiring an Islamic name upon conversion intertwine in the laws
of the Maghreb (1958 MaNC, art. 13(2); 1970 DzNC(2005), art. 12(2)).
‘General’ or ‘familial’ effects of naturalisation (al-’a¯tha¯r al-ca¯mmah or
al-ca¯’ilı¯yah) are commonly imposed on minor children and on wives of
the naturalised. In some cases the father’s naturalisation can result in
the naturalisation of children who have already come of age.32 Like
wives, adult children have to express their intention to acquire Leba-
nese nationality in the father’s application for naturalisation, even if
they are not resident in Lebanon (1925 LbND, art. 4). Syrian legisla-
tion, however, requires a short residency of two years (1969 SyNLD,
art. 7).
The father’s naturalisation entails the naturalisation of his minor
children, with no further requirement (du¯n shuru¯t; 1954 JoNL, art. 9;
1925 LbND, art. 4; 1959 KwNED, (1980), art. 7; 1963 BhNL(1989),
art. 6(4); 1972 AeFNL, art. 10; 1983 OmNSD(1986), art. 4; 1957 SdNL,
art. 8(4); 1958 MaNC(2007), art. 18; 1963 TnNC, art. 25; 1970 DzNC
(2005), art. 17(1)),33 upon express request in the father’s application as
exemplified in Libya (1954 LyNL, art. 6) or under condition of resi-
dency (shart iqa¯mah mawsu¯fah; 1975 EgNL, art. 6(2); 1969 SyNLD
(1972), art. 8(2); 1954 SaNR(2004), art. 14(1)(b); 2005 QaNL, art. 4;
1990 YeNL, art. 9). Most legislation, however, allows the minor chil-
dren of the naturalised to opt back to their previous nationality when
they come of age (1975 EgNL, art. 6(2); 1925 LbND, art. 4; 1969
SyNLD, art. 8(3); 1954 SaNR(2004), art. 14(1)(b); 1959 KwNED(1980),
art. 7; 1963 BhNL(1989), art. 6(4); 2005 QaNL, art. 4; 1972 AeFNL,
MEMBERSHIP IN THE NATION-STATE 105
art. 10; 1983 OmNSD(1986), art. 4; 1990 YeNL, art. 9; 1954 LyNL,
art. 6; 1958 MaNC(2007), art. 18(3);34 1970 DzNC(2005), art. 17(2)).
The principle of unity of nationality within the family (mabda’ wah-
dat al-jinsı¯yah fı¯ ’l-ca¯’ilah) is broadly applied in Arab nationality laws,
and thus the naturalisation of the husband generally results in the nat-
uralisation of the wife or wives.
3.2.1.2.2 Acquisition by marriage – mixed marriages
(Iktisa¯b bi-ficl al-zawa¯j – al-Zawa¯j al-mukhtalit)
Acquisition of nationality by marriage must be distinguished from the
wife’s acquisition of nationality due to her husband’s naturalisation,
even if both are applications of the principle of unity of nationality
within the family. In the former case, the wife ‘follows’ the husband’s
nationality status by acquiring his nationality, whereas in the latter
case, the wife ‘follows’ the husband’s change of nationality status.
However, restrictions are often imposed on mixed marriages in the
Arab world.
In only a few Arab countries does a foreign husband acquire domes-
tic nationality by marriage. Nationality is granted at once upon resi-
dence in Tunisia (1963 TnNC, art. 21(2)), after one year of residence in
Lebanon (1925 LbND, art. 3), two in Algeria (1970 DzNC(2005), art. 9-
bis)35 and ten in Oman (1983 OmNSD(1986), art. 2(2)).
Most legislation, however, rules that only the foreign wife can ac-
quire the domestic nationality of the husband, even if with notable dif-
ferences (cAbd al-rahma¯n 1991; al-Ba¯z 2001). The drastic imposition of
the husband’s nationality was progressively abandoned, especially after
the UN Convention on the Nationality of Married Women came into
force on 29 January 1957. A vestige of the previous orientation is the
Tunisian provision that confers nationality to the foreign wife deprived
of her original nationality by her national law because of her marriage
to a foreigner (1963 TnNC, art. 13).
In order to respect the wife’s will, Arab nationality laws demand an
application for the acquisition of the husband’s nationality. Other than
that, some dispose the acquisition by operation of law (bina¯’an cala` talab
al-zawjah wa-bi-quwwat al-qa¯nu¯n), while others subject the grant of na-
tionality to the state’s consent (bina¯’an cala` talab al-zawjah wa-muwa¯fa-
qat al-dawlah). But in both cases further requirements (such as resi-
dency, lasting marriage, etc.) are generally set down. Acquisition by op-
eration of the law is clearly set down only in the UAE Law (1972
AeFNL, art. 3), because other legislation allows the intervention of state
authorities to bar the conferment of nationality (bi-hirma¯n al-zawjah
min haqq al-dukhu¯l fı¯ ’l-jinsı¯yah; 1975 EgNL, art. 7; 1959 KwNED(1980),
art. 8; 1963 BhNL(1981), art. 7; 2005 QaNL, art. 8; 1990 YeNL, art. 11).
On the other hand, state consent is explicitly required by other Arab
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nationality laws (1963 IqNL, art. 12(1)(a); 1954 JoNL(1987), art. 8; 1925
LbND(1960), art. 5; 1969 SyNLD, art. 8, 9, and 19; 1954 SaNR(2004),
art. 16; 1983 OmNSD(1986), art. 5; 1957 SdNL(1970 and 1977), art. 9;
1954 LyNL, art. 7; 1958 MaNC(2007), art. 10; 1963 TnNC, art. 14; 1970
DzNC(2005), art. 9-bis).
For some Arab nationality laws the wife’s acquisition of the hus-
band’s nationality depends on continued familial life. If the marriage
ends and the wife remarries or acquires another nationality, she is
stripped of her former husband’s nationality (1969 SyNLD(1972),
art. 13; 1954 SaNR(2004), art. 16; 1963 BhNL, art. 7(2); 2005 QaNL,
art. 9; 1972 AeFNL, art. 4; 1954 LyNL, art. 7(2)).
On the other hand, the national woman who marries a foreigner is
usually allowed to keep her nationality, if her husband’s national law al-
lows her to do so (1975 EgNL, art. 12; 1963 IqNL, art. 12(2); 1954 JoNL
(1987), art. 8(2); 1925 LbND(1960), art. 6; 1969 SyNLD, art. 12; 1954
SaNR(2004), art. 17; 1959 KwNED(1980), art. 10; 1963 BhNL(1981),
art. 7(1); 2005 QaNL, art. 10; 1972 AeFNL(1975), art. 14; 1983 OmNSD
(1986), art. 11; 1990 YeNL, art. 10; 1957 SdNL, art. 12(1)(a); 1954 LyNL,
art. 8). In the Maghreb the issue is framed in terms of allowing the wo-
man to relinquish her previous nationality when marrying a foreigner
(1958 MaNC(2007), art. 19(1)(3); 1963 TnNC, art. 30; 1970 DzNC
(2005), art. 18(3))
The issue of the effects of the acquisition of the husband’s national-
ity on the wife’s earlier children is not addressed by Arab legislation
and literature. The lack of interest is grounded more on sociological
than legal reasons, and only Lebanese scholars debate the possible ex-
tension of the provision of 1925 LbND, art. 4, to this case (al-Busta¯nı¯
2003: 271ff).
3.2.2 Loss of nationality and its restoration
(Faqd al-jinsı¯yah wa-istirda¯duha¯)
Legal literature uses a broad variety of terms to identify nationality’s
various states of pathology, such as extinction (zawa¯l al-jinsı¯yah), loss
(khasa¯rat al-jinsı¯yah), deprivation (isqa¯t al-jinsı¯yah) and renunciation
(al-takhallı¯ can al-jinsı¯yah). But legislation commonly resorts to the all-
embracing faqd (or fiqda¯n) al-jinsı¯yah, loss and sudden withdrawal, and
then distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary loss. Scholars
also employ different concepts with regard to the restoration of nation-
ality according to the distinct systematisation adopted in the nationality
laws. Some cover restoration before loss as a form of facilitated natura-
lisation (cAbbu¯d 1986: 83ff; cAbd al-ca¯l 2001: 201ff), whereas others
after loss and in connection with the causes of the loss (al-Ra¯wı¯ 1984;
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Riya¯d 1988; cAshshu¯sh & Ba¯khashab 1990; Dı¯b 1999; Sa¯diq & al-Had-
da¯d 2001).
3.2.2.1 Loss due to change (al-Faqd bi-l-taghyı¯r)
Freedom to change nationality and perpetual allegiance36 are compet-
ing principles on which Arab legislation has variously drawn. If the
freedom to change nationality prevails, foreign naturalisation automati-
cally entails loss of nationality, whereas if perpetual allegiance proves
stronger, loss of nationality for foreign naturalisation is subject to state
consent, in the absence of which the national who acquires a foreign
nationality will still be considered a national. Some laws infer from for-
eign naturalisation a lack of loyalty to the country and thus strip those
who became naturalised of their nationality as a form of punishment
(ciqa¯bı¯ deprivation), while other laws refuse to consider the national as
a foreigner and surreptitiously allow for dual nationality. The latter ap-
proach is typical of countries with high migration figures that want to
keep their nationals linked to the home country by hook or by crook.
Requiring permission to relinquish present nationality and acquire
foreign nationality seems to serve the double purpose of ensuring that
nationals forsaking their nationality have fully complied with all their
duties, and somehow of discouraging them. Authorisation (tarkhı¯s) or
permission (idhn) are issued by decree of the head of state, the council
of ministers or a single minister, according to the different provisions,
but all agree that without such decree the foreign naturalised must be
treated as a national (1975 EgNL, art. 10; 1954 JoNL(1987), art. 15, and
17(a); 1925 LbND, art. 8(1)(1), and Law of 31 December 1946, art. 1;
1969 SyNLD, art. 10; 1954 SaNR, art. 11; 1990 YeNL, art. 22; 1958
MaNC(2007), art. 19; 1963 TnNC, art. 30; 1970 DzNC(2005), art. 18).37
If the nationality law under which the person intends to naturalise pre-
scribes loss of previous nationality to complete the procedure, the nat-
uralisation inevitably aborts.
The punitive deprivation of nationality for having acquired foreign
nationality without state permission is the main orientation of Gulf leg-
islation (1963 IqNL(1980), art. 11; 1959 KwNED(1980), art. 11; 1963
BhNL, art. 9(1)(a); 2005 QaNL, art. 11(1)(5); 1972 AeFNL(1975), art. 15
(c); 1983 OmNSD, art. 9; 1957 SdNL, art. 12(1)(a); 1954 LyNL(1976),
art. 9(1)). In order to conform to the provisions of the 1954 Arab Lea-
gue Convention on the limitation of cases of dual nationality among
signatory states (art. 6), Jordan stipulated automatic loss of nationality
for the Jordanian who acquires the nationality of another Arab country
(1954 JoNL, art. 16).
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3.2.2.2 Loss due to deprivation (al-Faqd bi-l-tajrı¯d)
When the loyalty (wala¯’) of the national to the country fades away, the
individual is stripped of his nationality (tajrı¯d). While al-faqd bi-l-taghyı¯r
is aimed at avoiding cases of dual nationality, al-faqd bi-l-tajrı¯d is by far
the most common cause of statelessness.
For the deprivation of nationality (al-faqd bi-l-tajrı¯d), a distinction is
made between the national by descent and the naturalised. Only for
the latter is nationality withdrawn (sahb al-jinsı¯yah) for reasons related
both to the naturalisation process and to acts following naturalisation.
A second set of causes of loss also applies to the national by descent
and includes acts contrary to the loyalty due to the country. In order to
translate the French de´che´ance Arab authors employ the term isqa¯t
(loss), which can be optional (jawa¯zı¯) or mandatory (wuju¯bı¯).
Naturalisation can be revoked if it was obtained mendaciously (bi-aq-
wa¯l ka¯dhibah), by fraud or error (bi-tarı¯q al-ghashsh aw al-khata’), forgery
or falsification (tazwı¯r aw tazyı¯f) of documents, evidence or testimony
(1975 EgNL, art. 15(1); 1954 JoNL, art. 19(1)(2); 1969 SyNLD, art. 20;
1954 SaNR, art. 22; 1959 KwNED, art. 13(1); 1963 BhNL, art. 8(1); 2005
QaNL, art. 12(1)(1); 1972 AeFNL(1975), art. 16(1)(3); 1983 OmNSD,
art. 13(1); 1990 YeNL, art. 18(1)(c); 1957 SdNL(1959), art. 13(1)(a); 1954
LyNL(1979), art. 10(1)(a); 1958 MaNC, art. 14(2); 1963 TnNC, art. 37;
1970 DzNC(2005), art. 13). No time limit is set for revoking naturalisa-
tion in the abovementioned cases,38 while the naturalised can be
stripped of nationality within a number of years (usually five or ten)
after naturalisation if convicted for crimes – generally crimes against
public morality (jara¯’im khulqı¯yah) or infamous crimes (jara¯’im al-shar-
af) – or for having endangered public order or the security of the state
(1975 EgNL, art. 15(2)(1-2); 1963 IqNL, art. 19; 1954 JoNL, art. 19(1)(1);
LbLaw 31 January 1946(1962), art. 2(2)(1); 1954 SaNR(2004), art. 21(1)
(b); 1959 KwNED(1980), art. 13(2); 1963 BhNL(1981), art. 8(2); 2005
QaNL, art. 12(1)(2); 1972 AeFNL(1975), art. 16(1)(1); 1983 OmNSD,
art. 13(5); 1990 YeNL, art. 18(1)(a); 1957 SdNL(1959), art. 13(1)(c); 1954
LyNL(1979), art. 10(1)(b); 1958 MaNC(2007), art. 22(1)(1); 1963 TnNC,
art. 33; 1970 DzNC(2005), art. 22(1)(1)). In Lebanon, the UAE, Egypt
and Qatar naturalised citizens can be deprived of nationality if they
leave the country for more than five, four, two or one consecutive years
respectively (LbLaw 31 January 1946, art. 3; 1972 AeFNL(1975), art. 16
(1)(4); 1975 EgNL, art. 15(2)(3); 2005 QaNL, art. 12(1)(4)). In Kuwait the
naturalised can be deprived of nationality if they abandon Islam or be-
have in a way that shows their intention to apostatise (bi-irtida¯dihi can
al-isla¯m aw-sulu¯kihi maslakan yaqtac bi-nı¯yatihi fı¯ dha¯lika; 1959 KwNED
(1982), art. 4(1)(5)), and in Oman if they profess atheism (1983
OmNSD, art. 13(2)).
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The main reason for stripping nationals – whether by origin or nat-
uralisation – of their nationality (isqa¯t al-jinsı¯yah) is their connection to
another state (al-irtiba¯t bi-dawlah ajnabı¯yah; 1975 EgNL, art. 16; 1963
IqNL, art. 20; 1954 JoNL, art. 18; 1925 LbND, art. 8, and LbLaw 31 Jan-
uary 1946, art. 1; 1969 SyNLD, art. 21; 1954 SaNR, art. 13; 1959
KwNED, art. 14; 1963 BhNL, art. 10; 2005 QaNL, art. 11; 1972 AeFNL,
art. 15; 1983 OmNSD, art. 13; 1957 SdNL, art. 12; 1954 LyNL(1979),
art. 10(2); 1958 MaNC(2007), art. 19, 20, and 22; 1963 TnNC, art. 32;
1970 DzNC(2005), art. 22).39 The connection is generally inferred
from serving in the government or military of another country without
the consent of the national’s own government. Nationals are deprived
of their nationality after refusing to obey the government’s order to
leave the office (1975 EgNL, art. 16(1)(4); 1963 IqNL, art. 20(1)(2); 1954
JoNL, art. 18(1-2); 1925 LbND, art. 8(2), and LbLaw 31 January 1946,
art. 1(1)(2-4); 1969 SyNLD, art. 21(1)(c); 1954 SaNR, art. 13(1)(d); 1959
KwNED, art. 14(1)(1); 1963 BhNL, art. 10(1)(a); 2005 QaNL, art. 11(1)(1);
1972 AeFNL, art. 15(1)(a); 1983 OmNSD, art. 13(3); 1957 SdNL(1959),
art. 13(2); 1954 LyNL(1979), art. 10(2)(k); 1958 MaNC, art. 23(3); 1963
TnNC, art. 32; 1970 DzNC, art. 23). Zionism is a cause for deprivation
under Egyptian law (idha¯ ı˘ttasaf bi-ayy waqt min al-awqa¯t bi-l-sahyu¯-
nı¯yah; 1975 EgNL, art. 16(1)(7)). Supporting Zionism or merely visiting
Israel is a cause for deprivation under Libyan law (1954 LyNL(1979),
art. 10(2)(c))40. Under Libyan law, the national can also be stripped of
Libyan nationality for apostasy from Islam (1954 LyNL(1979), art. 10(2)
(h)). The spectrum of discretionary powers concerning deprivation is
quite broad: either they are unlimited (1954 SaNR, art. 29) or they are
ruled out completely (1990 YeNL, art. 17).
3.2.2.3 Restoration (Istirda¯d al-jinsı¯yah)
Restoration of nationality can reverse the effects of loss due to change
or deprivation. In the former case, the resumption is usually requested
by the former national (istirja¯c or istica¯dah), whereas in the latter case,
the return is undertaken by state authorities (radd or ica¯dah). Restora-
tion is strongly affected by the consideration of the voluntary or invo-
luntary causes of the loss.
Resumption of nationality (istirja¯c or istica¯dah) after the al-faqd bi-l-ta-
ghyı¯r varies according to the position of the former national. Adults
who freely decided to forsake their nationality are treated differently
from children or spouses who merely ‘followed’ their fathers’ or hus-
bands’ status. Different treatment is also accorded to nationals by ori-
gin or naturalisation, or to situations where the causes of the loss still
persist or have vanished. Nationals who acquired a foreign nationality
and want to reverse their decision usually need only to apply for re-
sumption (1975 EgNL, art. 18; 1954 JoNL(1987), art. 17(1)(b); LbLaw 31
110 CITIZENSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD
January 1946, art. 2; 1969 SyNLD, art. 24; 1963 BhNL, art. 11; 1972
AeFNL(1975), art. 17; 1983 OmNSD(1986), art. 12(b); 1990 YeNL,
art. 15; 1958 MaNC, art. 15), while some legislation requires residency
or marriage (1963 IqNL(1964), art. 11(2); 1959 KwNED(1980), art. 11
(2); 2005 QaNL, art. 7;41 1970 DzNC, art. 14;) and others simply do not
provide for resumption and impose the naturalisation process.
The woman who has lost her nationality to acquire her husband’s
can resume it when the marriage comes to an end (1975 EgNL, art. 13;
1963 IqNL(1972), art. 12(2); 1954 JoNL(1987), art. 8(2); 1925 LbND
(1960), art. 7; 1969 SyNLD, art. 14; 1954 SaNR, art. 18; 1959 KwNED
(1980), art. 12; 1963 BhNL(1981), art. 7(1); 2005 QaNL, art. 10; 1972
AeFNL(1975), art. 17; 1983 OmNSD(1986), art. 11; 1990 YeNL, art. 14;
1954 LyNL, art. 8(2)). During marriage, the wife’s resumption of her
previous nationality may be allowed either by an explicit provision
(1975 EgNL, art. 13(1)) or by the vagueness of the text (1959 KwNED
(1980), art. 12; 2005 QaNL, art. 10).
Under all Arab nationality laws, minors who acquired a foreign na-
tionality by virtue of their father’s naturalisation can claim their origi-
nal nationality when they come of age, but only few laws devote special
provisions to the case (a case in point is 1983 OmNSD, art. 9), and
general rules for restoration need to be applied.
Resumption applies only to nationals by origin in the UAE, where
the Federal Law states that nationality is granted only once (1972
AeFNL, art. 12). Moreover, the son of a naturalised citizen is also con-
sidered naturalised, not only in the UAE but also in some other Gulf
countries like Bahrain and Qatar (hereditary naturalisation, or tajannus
bi-l-wira¯thah; 1963 BhNL(1989), art. 6(4); 2005 QaNL, art. 2(2); 1972
AeFNL(1975), art. 17).42
Return of nationality after deprivation (radd or ica¯dah) is not set
down in many nationality laws, and nationals stripped of their nation-
ality need to apply for naturalisation if they want to regain their nation-
ality status. In other cases, state authorities have extensive discretionary
powers to return nationality to former nationals, but laws generally sti-
pulate the act that needs to be adopted (1969 SyNLD, art. 24; 1959
KwNED, art. 15; 1963 BhNL, art. 11; 2005 QaNL, art. 11(2); 1972
AeFNL, art. 20; 1990 YeNL, art. 16) and sometimes expressly require
that the causes that had brought about the deprivation must have been
removed (1983 OmNSD, art. 14). Only in Egypt does the law require
that at least five years have to elapse from loss to restoration (1975
EgNL, art. 18(1)).
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3.3 Nationality (jinsı¯yah) in the Islamic perspective
The emergence of the nation-state and nationality represented a chal-
lenge for Islam, which refuses to accept any form of membership that
goes beyond or cuts across confessional lines. Conversely, the long-
standing kin relations – subsumed rather than superseded by the Isla-
mic order – discreetly adapted to the new secular membership, the
rules of which in many ways coincided with principles of kin
affiliation.
The existence of an ‘Islamic citizenship’ has been – and still is in
many respects – a highly divisive and controversial issue. The debate
started in the late 19th century, kindled by the pan-Islamist thinker
al-Afgha¯nı¯ (d. 1897), who examined the problematic relations between
Islam and nationality in an article titled al-Jinsı¯yah wa-l-diya¯nah al-isla¯-
mı¯yah (Nationality and the Islamic Religion). The article was published
in al-cUrwah al-wuthqa` (The Firmest Bond), a journal al-Afgha¯nı¯
founded in Paris in 1884 with his foremost Arab disciple, the Egyptian
reformist cAbduh (d. 1905).
Since for many Arab constitutions Islam is proclaimed the official
religion of the state, and Islamic law (al-sharı¯cah al-isla¯mı¯yah) serves as
a source of its positive law, Islamic citizenship cannot be discarded as a
matter of mere historical interest but rather must be considered in its
actual and potential implications. Some provisions of Arab nationality
laws, for instance, openly breach Islamic rules when allowing for the
naturalisation of non-Muslims who are not even People of the Book
(ahl al-kita¯b), or when stripping the nationality of a Muslim for reasons
other than apostasy. On the other hand, these secular laws can be re-
garded as irrespective of Islamic law when they do not provide for dis-
crimination based on religious affiliation or for the deprivation of na-
tionality of the Muslim who commits apostasy.
Some Islamic scholars reject the idea of an ‘Islamic citizenship’,
which would conflict with Islam’s universalism and would, conversely,
vehiculate notions of secular affiliation unrelated to Islam (al-Jadda¯wı¯
1983: 84ff; Sulta¯n 1986: 155ff).43 Others advocate the existence of an
‘Islamic citizenship’, even if they disagree on its basis: Islam or Islamic
law (Sala¯mah 1989: 63ff). The distinction is not irrelevant. If Islamic
citizenship is based only on Islam, conversion to Islam is then the only
way to become a member of the polity, and dhimmı¯s are thus excluded
(Madku¯r 1983: 98ff; Sulta¯n 1986: 220ff). A more recent orientation
places the cornerstone of Islamic citizenship (Shaltu¯t 1985) in the law
(sharı¯cah) rather than in the creed (caqı¯dah). Dhimmı¯s are thus allowed
to be residents (ra¯bitat al-mawtin) but not citizens (ra¯bitat al-jinsı¯yah;
al-Sanu¯sı¯ 1957). If Muslims and dhimmı¯s are awarded the same Islamic
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citizenship, it all comes down to residence rights, not citizenship rights
(Jama¯l al-dı¯n 2001 and 2004).
A brief overview of rules and terms of secular nationality and Islamic
citizenship in the Arab world helps cast some light on the points of
friction and agreement between the two forms of membership, on the
different ways of legitimation and on the efforts to read the secular reg-
ulations of modern nationality from an Islamic point of view.
3.3.1 Attribution
The attribution of nationality by paternal descent (paternal jus sangui-
nis) is fully compliant with Islamic thought, both for the Muslim by vir-
tue of faith (ı¯ma¯n), and for the non-Muslim by virtue of the safe-con-
duct (ama¯n). The determination of nationality (thubu¯t al-jinsı¯yah) is de-
rived from the determination of filiation (thubu¯t al-nasab). The
principle of jus soli, on the other hand, applies almost exclusively to the
foundling (laqı¯t) in Arab nationality laws, and here again is in full ac-
cordance with Islamic law: if a foundling is found in an area inhabited
mainly by Muslims it is considered a Muslim, whereas if it is found in
an area inhabited mainly by non-Muslims it is considered a non-Mus-
lim (ibn Qayyim al-Jawzı¯yah, Ahka¯m ahl al-dhimmah).
3.3.2 Acquisition
Acquisition of nationality is traced back to the shift from short-term
safe-conduct (ama¯n mu’aqqat) to perpetual safe-conduct (ama¯n mu’ab-
bad or cahd al-dhimmah). Under classical Islamic law, the Muslim who
takes up residence in the da¯r al-isla¯m becomes ipso facto a Muslim citi-
zen, while the non-Muslim belonging to the ahl al-kita¯b can reside for
one year on safe-conduct as a musta’min. If he stays longer, he can be
‘naturalised’ as a dhimmı¯, and from that moment on he will be subject
to the rules of dhimmah. This ‘naturalisation’ is discretionary and can
be granted even if the non-Muslim never resided on Islamic territory,
unlike the secular rules that require longer or shorter residency.
Acquisition by marriage is inspired by the principle of unity of na-
tionality within the family (mabda’ wahdat al-jinsı¯yah fı¯ ’l-ca¯’ilah). The
classical doctrine of mixed marriages teaches that if a foreign non-Mus-
lim woman resident in the da¯r al-isla¯m (musta’minah) marries a Mus-
lim or a dhimmı¯, she becomes a dhimmı¯yah by marriage, whereas the
foreign non-Muslim man resident in the da¯r al-isla¯m (musta’min) who
marries a dhimmı¯yah does not become a dhimmı¯ by marriage (al-Sar-
akhsı¯, al-Siyar al-kabı¯r). Acquisition of Islamic citizenship by marriage
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depends therefore on the religious and gender-related status of the
spouses and their residence.
The effects of what can be described as ‘Islamic naturalisation’ are
direct and immediate. Muslims enjoy the citizen status upon their en-
try into the da¯r al-isla¯m, and non-Muslims upon their ‘naturalisation’,
having to abide by the dhimmah rules from that same moment. As for
familial effects of naturalisation, the non-Muslim wife of the Muslim
who enters the da¯r al-isla¯m, or of the non-Muslim who becomes a
dhimmı¯, becomes herself a dhimmı¯yah. Likewise, the minor children of
the former or of the latter follow the status of their father.44
3.3.3 Loss
Perpetual allegiance, a principle retained by most Arab nationality
laws, is one of the most shared and common elements and survived
the decline of the model in Europe. Muslims do not lose their national-
ity when leaving the da¯r al-isla¯m, nor do dhimmı¯s, unless the latter in-
tend not to return to the Islamic territory.45
Causes of loss are different for Muslim citizens and dhimmı¯s. A
Muslim can be stripped of Islamic citizenship only for apostasy,
whereas dhimmı¯s can voluntary or involuntary be deprived of their Isla-
mic denizenship. The classical breaches of the dhimmah are reorga-
nised in these two categories. Dhimmı¯s can forsake their status by (1)
converting to Islam and becoming full-fledged Islamic citizens,46 or by
(2) relocating to the da¯r al-harb and taking up residence there (liha¯q
al-dhimmı¯ bi-da¯r al-harb fa-yası¯r min ahliha¯). By contrast, they can be in-
voluntarily deprived of denizenship if they (3) refuse to pay the
jizyah,47 (4) fight against Muslims, (5) attack a Muslim trying to kill
him or turn him away from his religion, (6) commit adultery with a
Muslim woman, (7) spy or harbour a spy working against Muslims, (8)
utter blasphemy against God, His Book, His religion or His prophet or
(9) practice brigandage.
The effects of the loss of Islamic citizenship are invariably personal,
both in the case of the Muslim abandoning Islam and of the dhimmı¯
breaching the conditions of protection (dhimmah) in any of the above-
mentioned ways. Neither the wife nor minor children are required to
follow the father’s loss of citizenship.
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4 Citizenship and the three levels of membership
After a general outline of the three main levels of membership in the
Arab world, this closing chapter is devoted to the interplay of these le-
vels in the determination of the sphere of individual rights. Every level
has a different take on the individual, the rights and duties that should
be attached to him – or her – and the extent of the exercise of the for-
mer or compliance to the latter.
Citizenship (muwa¯tanah) in the Arab world is essentially defined by
the individual’s membership in a kin group, in a religious community
and in a nation-state. Arab intellectuals and activists who are engaged
in the struggle for equality and full citizenship rights condemn the cur-
rent system and call for the eradication of all forms of discrimination
between citizens based on any voluntary or involuntary membership
(al-Ja¯birı¯ 1990; Ben Achour 1993).
Membership is generally established by birth, thus involuntarily.
From the banu¯ Fula¯n (‘the sons of Tom’, i.e. the members of the kin
group) down to the abna¯’ al-balad (‘the sons of the homeland’, i.e. the
citizens of the nation-state), descent is the key device of membership.
Both banu¯n and abna¯’ are plural variants of the singular ibn (son),
showing the importance of jus sanguinis in the logic of Arab
membership.
Interesting analogies and contrasts can be drawn with the Roman
system of status (status liberta¯tis, familiæ and civita¯tis, all relevant for
full legal capacity). The status liberta¯tis lost its relevance with the aboli-
tion of slavery, but the status familiæ would still be applicable (even if
some adjustment would be required, since the Roman kin system was
much more rigid than the Arab, where a status gentis would be more
appropriate), a status religio¯nis should be added (for its bearing on the
determination of applicable law) and the status civita¯tis would maintain
its importance as a condition for the enjoyment of civil, political and
social rights of the modern Arab state.
4.1 Citizenship and the kin group (status gentis)
The kin system affects both nationality (jinsı¯yah) and citizenship (mu-
wa¯tanah). In other words, the status gentis contributes to the definition
of both the individuals’ relations with the state and their sphere of
rights. Kin affiliation is a resilient and vital feature of Arab society, in
spite of all the endeavours of the religious communities, and later the
nation-states, to do away with it. Kin membership does not play the
same role throughout the region. It presents different local features,
and urbanisation certainly tends to weaken the kin system by discon-
necting the individual from stricter control by the kin group. The kin
organisation’s intrinsic ability to adjust to new conditions, however,
grants it continuity.
Limitations of certain kin groups’ rights are usually carried out by com-
munal denial or deprivation of nationality (jinsı¯yah), even disregarding
national legislation. A case in point is the denial of Kuwaiti nationality
to some nomadic kin groups known as bidu¯n (literally: ‘without’, from
the phrase: bidu¯n jinsı¯yah, ‘without nationality’). Bidu¯ns used to live
across the borders between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, but in the 1960s
they settled in Kuwait. They did not register with the Kuwaiti authori-
ties, who seized the chance to keep a stateless and rightless population
on their territory. Grants of nationality were repeatedly postponed, and
most bidu¯ns are still stateless, excluded even from the strict rules of
Kuwaiti naturalisation.
A case of communal deprivation is that of the al-Ghufra¯n in Qatar.
Six thousand members of this branch of the al-Murrah tribe were
stripped of their Qatari nationality in March 2005 for lack of loyalty to
the Emir. The al-Ghufra¯n allegedly remained loyal to the former ruler,
sheikh Khalı¯fah A¯l Tha¯nı¯ – deposed by his son Hamad in 1995 – and
were accused of having backed a failed coup to restore Khalı¯fah’s rule
over Qatar in 1996. In order to force the al-Ghufra¯n out of the country,
they were denied access to state schools and hospitals, were served with
eviction notices, fired from public offices and deprived of water and en-
ergy.1 Qatari authorities, however, claimed that they were acting legally
against cases of dual nationality (namely Qatari and Saudi), which is
forbidden under the provisions of the new Qatari Nationality Law 38/
2005 (art. 18). In February 2006 restoration of Qatari citizenship was
announced for those who had ‘regularised’ their position (man sahhahu¯
awda¯cahum).2
Conversely, in Bahrain nationality is granted to counterbalance the
overwhelming demographic majority of Bahraini Shias. Bahraini
authorities have naturalised many members of a kin group, the A¯l
al-Dawsarı¯ or al-Dawa¯sir, who had migrated to mainland Saudi Arabia
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in the 1920s. The A¯l al-Dawsarı¯ are Sunnis from the Nejd region who
settled in Bahrain with the A¯l Khalı¯fah (Bahrain’s ruling family) in
1783, but left the country in 1923 due to conflicts with the British
forces. After the promulgation of the 2002 Bahraini constitution, large
groups of the A¯l al-Dawsarı¯ were naturalised in order to be enfran-
chised and vote in Bahraini elections. Such ‘political naturalisation’
(al-tajannus al-siya¯sı¯) has been repeatedly censured by opposition socie-
ties,3 mainly Shias, whose electoral force is not adequately mirrored in
elected bodies, partly due to heavy sectarian gerrymandering, naturali-
sation of Sunni expatriate workers4 and extension of voting rights in lo-
cal elections to nationals of other Gulf Cooperation Council member
states.
Membership in a certain kin group affects attribution, acquisition or
loss of nationality not only in the Gulf, where it is undoubtedly easier
to detect, but also in other countries, as is the case with the attribution
of Jordanian nationality to nomadic tribes of northern Jordan,5 or Leba-
nese nationality to the groups of the Wa¯dı¯ Kha¯lid or the ‘Seven Towns’
(al-qura` al-sabc).6
Kin groups also played a significant role in the creation or the config-
uration of nation-states, and still represent one of the main political
channels in the Middle East. Group solidarity (casabı¯yah), in particular,
is a raw nerve in contemporary Arab society, even if at times concealed
(Shara¯bı¯ 1990, al-Ja¯birı¯ 1995). The 2004 Arab Human Development
Report considers it the ‘major and more dangerous challenge facing
the spirit of citizenship’ (ru¯h al-muwa¯tanah).7
Public institutions are often permeated by influential kin groups,
which usually hold and control both lower and higher state positions
(Khoury & Kostiner 1990, Bonte, Conte & Dresch 2001). Here again,
intensity varies. In the Gulf the state (dawlah) and the ruling family
(al-usrah al-ha¯kimah) are but a hendiadys,8 whereas in other areas the
influence is not as plain but is nonetheless not irrelevant (Abdul-Jabar
& Dawod 2003).9 For instance, major kin groups tend to have repre-
sentatives in the elected bodies thanks to internal campaigning (candi-
dates are generally selected by and within the group’s notables), and
electoral constituencies can be drawn according to the group’s needs.10
Even parties and kin groups sometimes overlap, as in Yemen, where
the phenomenon is known as ‘tribality of the party’ (qabalı¯yat al-hizb)
or ‘partification of the tribe’ (tahzı¯b al-qabı¯lah). In the case of the Ber-
bers of Kabylie, protests against the modern Algerian state were orga-
nised through kin channels (carsh, plur: caru¯sh; Basagana & Sayad
1974), and in the spring of 2001 the movement adopted the eloquent
name of ‘citizens of the caru¯sh’ (Salhi 2003).
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Some features of traditional kin justice can still be found in the folds
of contemporary judicial systems. On the one hand, rules and proce-
dures of customary law may survive in an informal setting (abu¯ Has-
sa¯n 1987), and on the other hand they may be incorporated into state
legislation if the state wants to control them. In Jordan, the Ministry of
Justice has been undertaking a project to bring traditional tort settle-
ment (sulh or musa¯lahah) under judicial control as a ‘criminal media-
tion’ (al-wisa¯tah al-jina¯’ı¯yah).
Kin order links up with the ethnic dimension, a problematic and unre-
solved issue throughout the Middle East, from the Kurds in the Arab
East to the Berbers in the Arab West, while Arabs experience similar
hardships in Iran in the Arab-majority region of Khawzasta¯n.11 Migra-
tions complicate the situation even more: high migration flows within
the Arab world, from Arab to non-Arab countries (especially from
North African Arab countries) and from non-Arab to Arab countries
(especially to Gulf countries) are recorded. The issue of ethnicity in the
Arab world has been addressed by all the main political currents of the
20th century (pan-Arabism (Sa¯tic al-Husrı¯ and cAflaq), pan-Islamism
(Khalaf alla¯h, but also al-cAbbu¯d, al-cAna¯nı¯, al-Najı¯b) and Regionalism
(al-Sayyid)), but is yet unsettled.
4.2 Citizenship and the religious community (status religio¯nis)
Relations among religious communities (ta¯’ifah or millah) are regulated
along the lines of the Ottoman millet system. At the top of the ladder is
the Islamic community (millet-i ha¯kime, or ruling millet under the Otto-
mans), and individual rights are modulated according to religious af-
filiation.12 Relations among different Islamic denominations escape
this systematisation but are nonetheless quite relevant for the political
life of the Muslim.13
The prominence of the Islamic community leads to an almost im-
penetrable political system that excludes non-Muslims, even if non-
Muslims have held important ministerial positions (especially in the
past, and mainly in the Levant). All through the 20th century, non-
Muslims (chiefly Christians) contributed to the Arab renaissance
(al-nahdah or al-yaqzah al-carabı¯yah) more than their low demographic
figures might suggest, and played an active role in the organisation of
new nation-states, notably at middle and top administrative levels. The
status of non-Muslims greatly depends on the relations they establish
with the authority. They therefore live in a state of subjection to these
authorities, and any change in the power structure affects them directly
and immediately. This dependence on the authority earned non-Mus-
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lim Arabs the reputation of being particularly loyal to the state. Non-
Muslims’ insecurity, however, is at the root of the large migrations of
Eastern Christians, the Lebanese diaspora and the hardships of Palesti-
nian Christians of Israel and the Occupied Territories.
The constitutions of almost all Arab countries stipulate that the pre-
sident has to be Muslim.14 On the other hand, the oath ‘in the name of
God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful’ (bi-smi a˘lla¯h al-rahma¯n al-rahı¯m),
which is required for some key state positions, can also be pronounced
by non-Muslims, although it is a very Islamic-oriented invocation. Re-
markably, some local ‘Islams’ have supported the formation of national
communities (al-ummah al-watanı¯yah) by projecting onto them what Is-
lam declared as constitutive of the Islamic community (al-ummah al-is-
la¯mı¯yah), and have presented the centralisation of power of the nation-
state as fully compliant with the classical Islamic doctrine of the wi-
la¯yah. Such a stance is now questioned on many sides. On the one
hand, radical Islamists believe that the nation-state openly challenges
the unity of the Islamic ummah, and on the other hand, ethnic and re-
ligious minorities condemn an Islam that denies their traditional pecu-
liarities. Supranational Islamic movements still need to overcome ser-
ious obstacles in order to take root, but processes of political and ad-
ministrative decentralisation, conversely, are quickly developing and
may even breathe some new life into the kin organisation.
In a complex set of jurisdictions and legislative frameworks, Islamic
law and the Islamic judge maintain a privileged position in all the Arab
systems (except Lebanon; Gannage´ 1983). In spite of its confessional
nature and the ensuing personal character, Islamic law operates as a re-
ference system, applying even to non-Muslims in certain cases. Both
legislation and case law ensure the maximum extension of Islamic law
and the broadest jurisdiction to the Islamic judge through a particular
adaptation of the conflict of laws rules (Aldeeb 1979; Charfi 1987; De-
prez 1988; Aluffi Beck-Peccoz 1993), viz. by invoking public policy (re´-
serve d’ordre public).
Islamic law applies to the non-Muslim not only when the opposing
party is Muslim, but also when non-Muslim parties belong to different
communities (ta¯’ifah). In Egypt, for instance, state tribunals – which
have replaced confessional jurisdictions since 1955 (el-Geddawi 2001) –
apply Islamic law according to the Hanafi rite to non-Muslims as well
if the parties are affiliated to different religions (diya¯nah), denomina-
tions (millah) or communities (ta¯’ifah).15 The Egyptian solution raises
some questions: can the Christian husband of a Christian wife belong-
ing to a ta¯’ifah or millah other than his own take one or more wives?
Or can he divorce his wife according to the rules of tala¯q? Egyptian
courts apply Islamic law not only for the prerogative of religion but
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also for the prerogative of citizenship, as in the case of the non-Muslim
Egyptian married to a non-Muslim foreign woman of another ta¯’ifah.16
An even trickier question is: what law applies to the personal status
of a foreign Muslim? According to conflict of laws rules, the national
law of the subject should be applicable, but some courts (most notably
the Egyptian Court of Cassation17 and the Moroccan Supreme Court18)
invoke public policy and resort to Islamic law as a lex fori. This policy
has a curious outcome: Islamic law becomes applicable to foreign Mus-
lims whose national law may not abide by Islamic principles, as it does
to those whose national law does abide by Islamic principles. There-
fore, lex fori is treated as the only applicable Islamic law, regardless of
all other interpretations. On the other hand, the principle of unity of
the Islamic community, irrespective of national borders or distinctions,
proves its enduring legal strength.
Matters of personal status are regulated throughout the Arab world
on religious bases. If there are no local minorities in the country with
special rules on personal status, the court will apply Islamic law as lex
fori. The Moroccan Nationality Code of 1958 used to expressly provide
for it, but since the 2007 amendment the text only refers to the 2004
Moroccan Family Code.
Religious affiliation affects the citizenship of the individual in many
ways, even if it is rarely delineated in legislation. Special provisions in-
volving religion can be found in the 1954 Libyan Nationality Law
(1979), which strips citizens of their Libyan nationality for committing
apostasy (art. 10(2)(h)); in the 1959 Kuwaiti Nationality Law (1982),
which requires conversion to Islam in order to naturalise (art. 4(1)(5));
in the 1990 Yemeni Nationality Law, which does not allow for the nat-
uralisation of non-Muslims (art. 5-6); and in the 1983 Omani National-
ity Law, which deprives nationality to whoever upholds non-religious
(la¯ dı¯nı¯yah) beliefs (art. 13(2)). The doors of nationality can thus be
closed to non-Muslims, and forsaking Islam can be a reason to end the
relation between the individual and the state.
Even where apostasy has no effect on nationality status, apostasy eli-
cits such a general condemnation in society that the individual charged
of being a renegade is often forced to relocate or abandon the country.
In such circumstances, nationality is of little help, even if the person is
not stripped of it. A remarkable case in point is that of Hussayn cAlı¯
Qambar, since it took place in a country – Kuwait – where a clear posi-
tion on status religio¯nis had been adopted (Law 1/1982). In May 1996 a
Kuwaiti Shia Court declared Qambar’s apostasy and called for his ex-
ecution, but state authorities unexpectedly showed a conciliatory atti-
tude and issued him a passport with which he left the country (Longva
2002).
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In most Arab countries, apostasy is no longer punished by death,
but it still carries serious legal and social consequences (Peters & De
Vries 1976-1977). Accusing someone of being an apostate is also a
means of political coercion, especially in the actual historical phase of
re-Islamisation, or Islamic awakening (al-sahwah al-isla¯mı¯yah). The
death penalty for apostasy has been a matter for contentious dispute
throughout Islamic history, especially in the 19th and 20th century.
Drawing on the Qur’a¯n and the Sunnah, reformers like cAbduh or Rida¯
championed the idea that apostasy was not sufficient for the death pen-
alty. The renegade also had to pose a real threat to the Islamic state.
Most culama¯’, however, follow the traditional rule, advocating the ex-
ecution of the renegade, who – in their view – is a threat to the Islamic
state by the sole act of apostasy (cAwdah 1981: I, 536; al-Ghazza¯lı¯ 1963:
101f; Bilmen 1949-1952: III, 483ff).19 Since contemporary legislation
does not prescribe the death penalty for apostasy, an Egyptian Islamist
like cAwdah maintains that it is upon every Muslim to kill the apostate,
and the killer will not be liable because the Egyptian Penal Code states
that no one can be punished for acts rendered bona fide on the basis of
a right established by Islamic law (art. 60; cAwdah 1981: I, 535-538). Be-
sides the death penalty, apostasy has other severe civil consequences in
personal status and inheritance law, where Islamic law has a firmer
grip. For instance, marriage can be nullified for the apostasy of one of
the spouses. This is the most common legal action against an alleged
apostate, and Islamist activists usually file suits in state courts to pro-
nounce the separation of the couple (tafrı¯q).20
Accusations of apostasy (takfı¯r) have been used throughout Islamic
history as a means of political struggle (ever since the Kharijite schism,
in the early days of Islam), but recently takfı¯r has turned into a political
strategy that takes the name of takfı¯rı¯yah. While in the past the accusa-
tion was addressed to rival political groups of militant Islam (namely,
Arab communists), it is now directed towards the entire ruling system,
accused of being corrupt and disposed to the infidel West (Ramada¯n
1995).
Members of religious minorities endure limitations of citizenship
rights. Even in a formally secular state like Lebanon (although based
on communitarianism: al-ta¯’ifı¯yah), the political, social and demo-
graphic equilibrium is so delicate that religious-related aspects of na-
tionality and citizenship stir great political animosity. Every naturalisa-
tion decree turns into a battlefield, especially on the repartition of nat-
uralisation candidates by community (Maktabi 2000). Lebanese
religious authorities intervene, as was the case with Decree 5274/1994
of 20 June 1994, which was contested by the Maronite League (al-Ra¯bi-
tah al-ma¯ru¯nı¯yah) in the Lebanese Council of State. The Decree was
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sent back for reconsideration, and competent state authorities (namely,
the president of the Lebanese Republic and the Interior Ministry) regu-
larly reported to the Maronite Patriarch on how the work was
advancing.
The condition of Jews became more critical after the foundation of
the state of Israel in 1948 due to unrelenting Arab hostility. Many Jews
moved to Israel and others migrated to other countries, thus leaving
Jewish Mizrahi communities in the Arab world close to extinction. In
Morocco, the members of one of the largest Jewish (Sephardi) commu-
nities left in the region are at times considered ‘foreigners’ by state
authorities, even if scholars censure such a practice (al-Hussayn 2000).
In the state of Israel, conversely, non-Ashkenazi Jewish and Arab non-
Jewish citizens alike endure discriminatory practices. Among the many
facets of the conflict in the Middle East is the case of the members of
the South Lebanon Army, who were granted Israeli denizenship (and
later full citizenship) because they had to flee Lebanon due to their role
in the war.
4.3 Citizenship and the nation-state (status civitatis)
Nationality regulations are obliged to comply with some international
and constitutional provisions. At the international level, the 1948 Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 UN Covenants have
set a general framework for nationality legislation, along with more
specific conventions such as the 1958 Convention on the Nationality of
Married Women, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Stateless-
ness, the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women and the 1989 Convention on the
Rights of the Child. These conventions have generally been signed and
ratified by Arab countries but rarely implemented.
At a regional level, the most relevant international document is the
1945 Charter of the Arab League, which stipulates that one of the statu-
tory purposes of the League is the close cooperation of member-states
on nationality matters (jinsı¯yah; art. 2(d)). Accordingly, an agreement
on nationality was signed in 1945 but never ratified. Its implementa-
tion thus became the free choice of its signatory parties. Some refer-
ence to nationality can be found in regional declarations of human
rights, but only one of them recently entered into force. Arab charters
do carry some reference to nationality, however, thanks to the emphasis
placed on Arab nationalism (al-qawmı¯yah al-carabı¯yah) that allows them
to embrace all Arab citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.21 A right
to nationality is recognised by the 1994 Arab Charter of Human Rights
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(and its 2004 update). The original version provided that none could
be either arbitrarily deprived of his original (aslı¯yah) nationality or pre-
vented from acquiring another nationality (art. 24). But the 2004 up-
date broadened the 1994 formulation by stipulating that every person
has a right to nationality and cannot be arbitrarily or illegally stripped
of it (art. 29).22 The update (Tahdı¯th al-mı¯tha¯q al-carabı¯ li-huqu¯q al-in-
sa¯n) entered into force in early 2008 (having been ratified by Jordan,
Bahrain, Libya, Algeria, the UAE, Palestine and Yemen).
Arab constitutions usually prescribe that nationality be regulated by
law23 and that nationals cannot be arbitrarily deprived of it.24 Particular
political conditions may require further, specific provisions. Such is the
case with Bahrain, where the practice of exiling citizens by simply bar-
ring them from re-entering the country was outlawed by the 2002
Constitution (art. 17(b)). The 2005 Iraqi Constitution, on the other
hand, expressly proscribed the depriving of nationality to ‘Iraqis by
birth’ and recognised the right of all those who had been illegally
stripped of their Iraqi nationality to be reintegrated into the citizen’s
status (art. 18(3)(a)). The agreement on a date by which reconsideration
of arbitrary deprivations had to start could not be reached, and indica-
tion of the date was left out of the final draft submitted to popular
referendum.
Several questions on the definition of nationality and citizenship in the
Arab world are still open, due to major, thorny issues of international
law and regional politics. The paramount problem is probably Palesti-
nian citizenship, i.e. citizenship of the Palestinians of the Occupied
Territories, of Israel, of the refugee camps in neighbouring countries
and of the diasporic communities. The solution is further complicated
by the unclear international personality of the Palestinian National
Authority. In the Arab West, the definition of the status of Western Sa-
hara is also still pending and affects the citizenship status of Sahrawis.
Even the UN referendum on self-determination25 has not yet taken
place because an agreement on who is entitled to participate in it could
not be reached. In the regional plan, ‘Gulf citizenship’ (or the Gulf Co-
operation Council citizenship) can be regarded as an interesting experi-
ment in the area and seems oriented towards the European model of
integration. Even a radical reform of the Arab League – widely and re-
peatedly announced over the last decades – would positively affect the
determination and the coordination of state disciplines of nationality,
since it is one of the League’s main statutory purposes.
The theoretical debate on citizenship emerged in the Arab world at the
turn of the 20th century, along with the discourse on the nation-state.
The dispute soon focused on the status of non-Muslims in the Islamic
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world. Instead of looking into the concept of citizenship and defining
its contents (viz. the position of the individual vis-a`-vis the state and the
bundle of rights attached to citizenship), intellectuals and reformers
engaged in arguments over the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims
in an Arab-Islamic state. All the major trends of modern and contem-
porary Arab-Islamic thought – Islamic Reformism, Arab Nationalism,
the Muslim Left and anti-Western Modernism – took a stand on the
issue.
The dominant position was the one championed by intellectuals like
al-Mawdu¯dı¯, who maintained that non-Muslims could enjoy only lim-
ited political rights (namely, they could not serve as heads of states or
representatives; al-Mawdu¯dı¯ 1978). For others, like Zayda¯n, the state
was free to grant citizenship to dhimmı¯s if they respected Islamic prin-
ciples and served the public good (Zayda¯n 1963). Western scholars thus
defined the status of non-Muslims in the new nation-states of the re-
gion as a ‘second-class citizenship’ or ‘non-citizenship’ (MacDonald
1913; Khadduri 1955). Occupying an isolated position is the Egyptian
thinker and journalist Huwaydı¯, who advocated full citizenship rights
(huqu¯q al-muwa¯tanah al-ka¯milah) for non-Muslims, rejecting the cate-
gory of dhimmah, which he considered a pre-Islamic practice included
in non-binding hadı¯ths (Huwaydı¯ 1985). Other – more conventional –
authors tried to accommodate the status of non-Muslims living under
Muslim authority (wila¯yah) with the notion of citizenship, but only
achieved modest results. The Tunisian Islamist al-Ghannu¯shı¯, for in-
stance, proposed a distinction between a ‘general or public citizenship’
(al-muwa¯tanah al-ca¯mmah) for Muslims, and a ‘special or private citi-
zenship’ (al-muwa¯tanah al-kha¯ssah) for non-Muslims, justifying the dis-
crimination on grounds of the non-Muslims’ free choice (al-Ghannu¯shı¯
1993). Likewise, the Iraqi intellectual al-cAlwa¯nı¯ dismissed citizenship
as a byproduct of Western secularism incompatible with Islam, and as-
serted that ‘religious separatism’ would favour non-Muslim minorities
anyhow (al-cAlwa¯nı¯ 1993). Some Islamist thinkers like the Egyptian cA-
ma¯rah or the Sudanese Na¯dir argued that citizenship was not an un-Is-
lamic concept but in fact was an originally Islamic idea developed dur-
ing the first Medinese years of Muhammad (cAma¯rah 1989; Na¯dir
1999).
The ongoing debate is still quite heated in Egypt, where Christian
Copts make up the largest non-Muslim religious community of the
Arab world. Faced with the rise of political Islam, Coptic religious
authorities promote dialogue and public awareness on citizenship with-
in Egyptian society. Ever since the early 1990s, both Muslim and Chris-
tian intellectuals, jurists, politicians and scholars have been called to
contribute to the discussion, and their contributions have been system-
atically published and circulated.
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Since the end of the 20th century the debate on citizenship has gained
renewed impetus and interest, mainly as a result of external pressure
on the status of women in the Arab-Islamic context. The risk, however,
is to fall into the same circularity as in the past. Intellectuals discuss
the possibility of a woman enjoying citizenship rights equal to those of
a man, but do not address the core issue of what citizenship is about,
in the Arab world as a whole or in each individual Arab country.26
Even the term muwa¯tin (citizen) still does not appear in Arab works on
Islamic or constitutional law, with some rare exceptions (Ghalyu¯n
1996; Karcic 2005).
Lately, Arab politicians and media are increasingly bringing citizen-
ship into the public discourse. The greater recurrence of the terms ‘citi-
zen’ and ‘citizenship’ does not by itself guarantee the achievement of a
corresponding advancement. Thus, the witty question raised by the
Coptic Egyptian intellectual Rizq in a conference on democratisation
and modernisation in Egypt sounds even more thought-provoking: ‘Are
we subjects or citizens?’27
It was precisely in Egypt in March 2007 that a controversial constitu-
tional reform introduced ‘citizenship’ (muwa¯tanah) in the 1971 Egyp-
tian constitution. For the first time in world history, a constitution es-
tablished a ‘democratic system based on citizenship’ (niza¯muha¯ dı¯muq-
ra¯tı¯ yaqu¯m cala` asa¯s al-muwa¯tanah; art. 1).28 The choice, however, was
but a means to serve other, more pressing ends of regime stability.29
4.4 Contrasting citizenships: the role of migrations
Migrations are a major testing ground for citizenship, for the East and
the West alike. International migration phenomena are quite diversi-
fied throughout the Arab world. Large human flows reach oil-rich Gulf
countries from the Far East, sub-Saharan Africa or other Arab coun-
tries (i.e. ‘inter-Arab migration’), other groups of skilled workers leave
the Levant for Europe, the Americas or Oceania, while movements of
mostly unskilled workers from North Africa head for the nearby shores
of southern Europe.
In the Gulf, the numbers of expatriate communities make the few
Gulf citizens a true elite, living separately from the mass of foreign
workers. In Europe, Arab migrants are but a small group among the
immigrant communities, but in the public eye they represent the ‘im-
migrant’ par excellence due to their strongly defined and affirmed
identity.
The doors of Gulf nationality are closed to Arab and non-Arab mi-
grants. After the oil crisis, Gulf countries introduced even stricter regu-
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lations for naturalisation and extended the period after naturalisation
in which political rights are suspended. The broad discretionary powers
of state authorities in repatriating migrants (usually reconsideration
cannot be filed due to laxity of legislation or lack of judicial remedies
against administrative decisions for foreigners; cAshshu¯sh 1991: 57-75),
together with the massive amount of foreign workers waiting beyond
the borders, make the ‘privileged’ residence in the Gulf a precarious
and arbitrarily revocable condition (al-Fayfı¯ 1994; al-Mu¯sa` & cAzı¯z
1981; al-Saba¯h 1987).
In Europe, conversely, the acquisition of nationality, or its attribution
by jus soli, is more accessible to foreign migrants, and fundamental civil
rights are generally enjoyed even by foreigners. As for Arab migrants,
their membership in the kin group is often quiescent but can be reacti-
vated – habitually in the country of origin – during key phases of hu-
man life – according to the Arab mentality – such as marriage. Mem-
bership in the religious community, on the contrary, remains vibrant
as a basic component of the migrant’s identity. The differences in the
concepts of religious freedom that prevail in the migrant’s original and
recipient legal and social environments, however, often lead to friction
between the local society and the Arab Muslim migrant communities.
Islamic law, for instance, is a fundamental element of Islam. Accord-
ingly, ‘Islamic religious freedom’ includes the right for non-Muslims to
be judged according to their confessional law, and by judges of their
own community. Conversely, however, Muslims who acquire a Eur-
opean nationality are subject to the positive, secular law of that country,
like all the other citizens. Here, membership in the nation-state clashes
with religious affiliation. Acquiring a foreign, non-Islamic nationality
for many Muslim intellectuals meant apostasy, and some courts have
upheld the view, especially in the colonial years. A leaflet with the re-
vealing titling ‘Change of Nationality is Apostasy and Treason’30 has
been recently re-published in Paris, with all the fatwa`s and articles on
the effect of foreign naturalisation (al-Jaza¯’irı¯ 1993). Muslim migrants
who did not naturalise, on the other hand, can be judged on Islamic
law as formulated in their own countries of origin, thanks to the rules
of conflict of laws (if public policy is not invoked; Mezghani 2003). Na-
tionality – originally seen as an evil innovation against the unity of the
Islamic ummah – can now serve as a means for Muslim migrants to
abide by Islamic law (as framed in their own countries of origin). At
present Arab Muslims who migrated to Europe in the 1990s are not
eligible for nationality in most cases, but more and more will soon
meet the residency requirements. What will be the stance of sending
and receiving countries on the naturalisation of Muslims? On the Eur-
opean side, no country has a system of Islamic courts for its Muslim ci-
tizens except Greece, but the Greek exception is limited to the historic
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Muslim communities of Thrace, and newly settled Muslim expatriate
communities cannot file their suits in these special courts (Tsitselikis
2004). On the Arab side, some countries – like Morocco – spelled out
in their legislation that rules of personal status will be applied to their
nationals even if in possession of another nationality.31 The conflict be-
tween territorial and personal law, i.e. national versus religious affilia-
tion, was an issue that was raised in the colonial age both for France in
the Muslim West and for Italy in Libya, but migration fluxes helped to
renew the interest on the topic.
4.5 Patterns of citizenship in the Arab world
By intertwining and overlapping, the three levels of membership deter-
mine the actual extension of individual citizenship (muwa¯tanah) and
affect the local regulations on nationality (jinsı¯yah). Analysing the rules
governing the jinsı¯yah, some specific characteristics of the muwa¯tanah
can be detected, but the latter’s distinctive peculiarities usually lay be-
neath the folds of each country’s legal system. With this caveat, some
patterns can be reconstructed, and some strain on conflicting fields
presented.
A general, preliminary remark regards the form: nationality is regu-
lated throughout the Arab world by state legislation (even in countries
more ideologically opposed to positive law). This should not come as a
surprise, since nationality surfaced with the modern nation-state and
its determination is considered one of the bastions of state sovereignty.
Membership in the kin group and the religious community, on the
other hand, has remained within the traditional domain of customary
and confessional law but nonetheless has played quite a relevant role
in the state’s legal system.
Responses to the actual content of nationality regulations, conversely,
follow the rules of model circulation in comparative law. Some regula-
tions matching Arab mentality have been fully implemented and some
were rejected by the legal environment, while other local rules even
prevailed on the foreign model.
Attribution of nationality by jus sanguinis can undoubtedly be in-
cluded among the principles that were fully implemented due to their
conformity with the local legal environment. Descent is the main
source of affiliation in the Arab world: paternal descent for member-
ship in the kin group, the religious community and also the nation-
state. Maternal descent, by contrast, is still an open issue in many Arab
countries. Even if no religious obstacle stands in the way of its intro-
duction or implementation, the strong appeal of paternal descent and
the firm opposition to dual nationality somehow hinder it.
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If not attributed by paternal descent, nationality in the Arab world is
essentially closed. Jus soli plays a very limited role in the attribution of
nationality, while its acquisition by naturalisation is not only cautiously
restricted by legislation but also severely circumscribed by the discre-
tionary powers granted to state authorities by international law and in-
ternal legislation. The degree of openness of nationality legislation fluc-
tuates between more liberal sending countries like Egypt or Lebanon
and traditionally more conservative receiving countries like the Gulf
Cooperation Council member states.
Acquisition of nationality is generally easier for those who present
some ethnic or religious affinity with the country. Most Arab legislation
provides for special naturalisation rules for nationals of other Arab
countries (co-ethnic preference) and a few also for foreign Muslims
(co-religious preference). Such preferences, however, chiefly operate
under the silent mechanisations of legislation, especially when internal
ethnic or religious balances are unstable (such as in Iraq, Bahrain or
Lebanon), while some ethnic, religious or national categories can be ex-
cluded for sheer political reasons (namely, the taboo stabilisation (taw-
tı¯n) of Palestinians).
The most strident and enduring rejections, however, are to be found
outside the province of the rules on attribution, acquisition or loss of
nationality (adjusted but somehow internalised by all Arab countries).
Rather, they concern citizenship as a vehicle for the principles of equal-
ity and territoriality. Personal status regulations provide an interesting
case in point: how can citizenship be incorporated in a system that ap-
plies different laws to its citizens and the same law to a citizen and a
foreigner? When the first nationality law to be applied in the Arab
world was introduced by the Porte in 1869, the intent was precisely to
subject all Ottoman nationals to the same law. Even then, reality fell
short of expectations nevertheless, and personal status was left out and
maintained under the traditional confessional system.
Predominance of the form and the formal territoriality of positive
law (qa¯nu¯n), however, should not overshadow the resilience and vitality
of the personality of confessional laws (sharı¯cah). Thanks to conflict of
laws rules, even nationality grants confessional laws an unintentional
and unexpected renewed vigour. For instance, Arab migrants (Muslims
and non-Muslims alike) are subject to their confessional law as their
national law, even abroad.
On the other hand, a special feature of the late 19th century Eur-
opean model of citizenship, i.e. perpetual allegiance, was acquired by
Arab systems and is preserved, even if it has been abandoned in the
European systems where the model originated. Major Arab sending
countries rather tend to strengthen the principle of perpetual alle-
giance, and reinvigorate the patriotic sentiments of their expatriate
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communities towards the home country in order to take advantage of
these national communities abroad.
Some later mutations of the European model (viz. after its first circu-
lation in the Arab world), however, have been accepted and introduced
in some Arab countries as well. Such is the case with the extension of
the principle of non-discrimination between man and woman in the
domain of nationality rules. European pieces of legislation were
amended to allow for the attribution of nationality by maternal descent
on equal footing. Likewise, some Arab countries – especially in North
Africa – are introducing in their legislation the attribution by maternal
jus sanguinis alongside with the dominant paternal regulation. These
reforms of the nationality laws are adopted in a context of fervent de-
bate on the full citizenship of women.
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Notes
Introduction
1 Elements of pre-Islamic poetry suggest – according to some scholars – that some
form of contact was established, albeit limited to the needs of commerce.
2 The most famous controversy was the one sparked by al-Ghazza¯lı¯ (d. 1111 AD), who
openly criticised Avicenna (Ibn Sina¯’, d. 1037 AD) and al-Fa¯ra¯bı¯ (d. 950 AD) in The
Incoherence of the Philosophers (Taha¯fut al-fala¯sifah). Almost a century later, Ibn Rushd
(d. 1198 AD) refuted al-Ghazza¯lı¯’s arguments in The Incoherence of the Incoherence
(Taha¯fut al-Taha¯fut).
3 It has been told that Muhammad said, ‘Beware. Every one of you is a shepherd and
every one is answerable with regard to his flock. The caliph is a shepherd over the
people and shall be questioned about his subjects (as to how he conducted their
affairs). A man is a guardian over the members of his family and shall be questioned
about them (as to how he looked after their physical and moral well-being). A woman
is a guardian over the household of her husband and his children and shall be ques-
tioned about them (as to how she managed the household and brought up the chil-
dren). A slave is a guardian over the property of his master and shall be questioned
about it (as to how he safeguarded his trust). Beware, every one of you is a guardian
and every one of you shall be questioned with regard to his trust.’ See kullukum ra¯cin
wa-kullukum mas’u¯l can racı¯yatih, fa-l-ima¯m ra¯cin wa-huwa mas’u¯l can racı¯yatih,
wa-l-rajul ra¯cin cala` ahlihi wa-huwa mas’u¯l can racı¯yatih, wa-l-mar’ah ra¯cı¯yah cala` bayt
zawjiha¯ wa-hiya mas’u¯lah can racı¯yatiha¯, wa-l-cabd ra¯cin cala` ma¯l sayyidihi wa-huwa
mas’u¯l can racı¯yatih, a-la¯ fa-kullukum ra¯cin wa-kullukum mas’u¯l can racı¯yatih, in
al-Bukha¯rı¯, jumcah, 11, jana¯’iz, 32, istiqra¯d, 20, wasa¯ya¯, 9, citq, 17, 19, nika¯h, 81, 90,
ahka¯m, 1; Muslim, ima¯rah, 20; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, ima¯rah, 1, 13; al-Tirmidhı¯, jiha¯d, 27; ibn
Hanbal, 2 (5, 54, 55, 108, 111, 121).
4 Similarly: in Turkish, vatandas¸ and, in Persian, hamvatan.
5 Reference is to the Affaire Abdel-Hakim, ruled by the Tribunal civil de la Seine on 2
May 1903. See Dalloz jurisprudence ge´ne´rale, 1908, II, 123, commented on by de
Boeck. For further details on the case, see Chapter Three.
Chapter 1
1 When referring to the ‘subject’, and later to the ‘citizen’, it was clearly understood
that the reference was solely to the paterfamilias, the male head of the household.
This has been the case long since the abandonment of political Aristotelianism.
2 Sharing the same social structure did not entail ‘social union’, however (Tyan 1954:
3f).
3 According to Sacı¯d, even Mecca’s centrality in pre-Islamic studies is due only to the
city’s being the cradle of Islam (Sacı¯d 2006).
4 E.g. the cA¯ds, the Thamu¯ds, the Irams, the Jurhums, the Tasms and the Jadı¯ses.
5 According to Genesis, Joktan is son of Eber (Hebrew: cE¯ber, Arabic: cA¯bir), son of Se-
lach (Hebrew: Sha¯lah, Arabic: Sha¯lakh), son of Arpacsad (Hebrew: ’Arpakhshadh,
Arabic: Arfakhshadh), son of Sem (Hebrew: She¯m, Arabic: Sa¯m) son of Noah (He-
brew: No¯akh, Arabic: Nu¯h). Gen. 10:1-25.
6 For the to¯ledo¯th of Ishmael (Hebrew: Yishma¯ce¯l, Arabic: Isma¯cı¯l) see Gen. 25:12-18.
7 Especially under the reign of the Caliph Marwa¯n ibn al-Hakı¯m (64-65 AH/684-685
AD) (al-Kacbı¯ 2005, cAlı¯ 1951-1960). A Jewish convert to Islam, the Palmyrene abu¯
Yacqu¯b is believed to be the one who provided fictitious genealogies that linked Arabs
with Biblical figures (Goldziher 1889, I: 178).
8 In 1412 al-Qalqashandı¯ (d. 1418 AD) published his most renowned work, the Subh
al-acsha` fı¯ sina¯cat al-insha¯’ (Dawn of the Blind in the Art of Composition). In the Subh
al-acsha`, al-Qalqashandı¯ devoted a section to genealogies, deeming its knowledge to
be necessary for the good secretary, who had to properly identify the recipients and
suitably address them. Later on, al-Qalqashandı¯ dedicated an entire work to genealo-
gies, the Niha¯yat al-arab fı¯ macrifat ansa¯b al-carab (The Ultimate Goal in the Knowl-
edge of the Lineages of the Arabs), and its 1416 rectification (istidra¯k), the Qala¯’id
al-juma¯n fı¯ ’l-tacrı¯f bi-qaba¯’il carab al-zama¯n (The Necklaces of Pearls in the Identifica-
tion of the Tribes of the Arabs of the Past).
9 The role of social and political relations in determining kin relationships is also start-
ing to be acknowledged in the Arab world. See the recent work by Muhammad Sacı¯d
and his theory on the origins and formation of familiar alliances, i.e. the ı¯la¯fs (Sacı¯d
2006).
10 After the birth of the first child, the name of the parent is preceded by the kunyah:
composition of abu¯ (‘father of’) or umm (‘mother of’) and the name of the firstborn.
11 According to Robertson Smith one of the typical characters of ‘tribal religions’ is their
particularism; the individual is responsible to the deity for all damage caused to an-
other member of the group but can freely deceive, plunder or kill any ‘stranger’. See
in particular Robertson Smith’s first two Lectures on the Religion of Semites (Robertson
Smith 1923).
12 Robertson Smith deems it an application of the Arab proverb ‘the child [belongs] to
the bed’ (al-walad li-l-fira¯sh; Robertson Smith 1885: 142). Muslim scholars consider it
a prophetic tradition (hadı¯th), and include it in traditional collections. According to
Goldziher, correspondence with the Latin maxim ‘the father is the one established by
the wedding’ (pater est quem nuptiæ demonstrant) would confirm some influence of
Roman law (Goldziher 1889: I, 184). Schacht, on the other hand, argues that such a
rule never played any ‘effective role’ in Islamic law (Schacht 1950: 182). Not so for
Linant de Bellefonds (Linant de Bellefonds 1973: 26f).
13 The prophetic tradition is related in the form ‘the child [belongs] to the bed, and to
the fornicator [belongs] the stone’ (al-walad li-l-fira¯sh wa-li-l-ca¯hir al-hajar), as reported
in al-Bukha¯rı¯, wasa¯ya¯, 4, buyu¯c, 3, 100, magha¯zı¯, 53, fara¯’id, 18, 28, hudu¯d, 23, ahka¯m,
29; Muslim, rida¯c, 36, 38; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, tala¯q, 34; al-Tirmidhı¯, rida¯c, 8, wasa¯ya¯, 5; al-Na-
sa¯’ı¯, tala¯q, 48; ibn Ma¯jah, nika¯h, 59, wasa¯ya¯, 6; al-Da¯rimı¯, nika¯h, 41, fara¯’id, 35; (Ma¯l-
ik) al-Muwatta’, aqdiyah, 20; ibn Hanbal, 1 (59, 65, 104), 4 (186, 187, 238, 239), 5
(267, 326), 6 (129, 200, 237, 247).
14 The contrast with the principle of exogamy induces anthropologists to speak of a
‘Middle Eastern anomaly’ (Fabietti 2002: 58f).
15 Ibn Sacd reports that wala¯’ was contracted at a specific time of year (on the tenth day
of dhu¯ ’l-hijjah), and a particular way of shaking hands sealed the agreement, as in a
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completed sale. In Mecca it was contracted in the Kacbah, thus assuming a clear reli-
gious connotation (Tabaqa¯t: VI, 77 and V, 41ff).
16 Al-Nawawı¯ (d. 1278 AD) even accounts for the principle mawla` al-qawm min anfusi-
him (‘the client of the group is a full member’, literally: ‘one of their own [by nat-
ure]’); the expression min anfusihim was precisely used to make the distinction be-
tween the full, original member and the client (al-Nawawı¯, Tahdhı¯b: I, 14, cit. in Tyan
1954: 26f). This principle is related in many variants as a prophetic tradition (al-Bu-
kha¯rı¯, mana¯qib, 14, fara¯’id, 24; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, zaka¯h, 29; al-Tirmidhı¯, zaka¯h, 25; al-Na-
sa¯’ı¯, zaka¯h, 97; al-Da¯rimı¯, siyar, 82; ibn Hanbal, 2 (448), 4 (35, 340), 6 (8, 10, 390)).
17 Reported by al-Nawawı¯, and also transposed in a prophetic tradition (al-Tirmidhı¯, far-
a¯’id, 53).
18 This is a breach of the principle of unconditional assistance condensed in the Arab
maxim: ‘help your brother, be he the wrongdoer or the wronged’ (unsur akha¯k za¯liman
ka¯n aw mazlu¯man). The maxim was later transposed in a prophetic tradition (al-Bu-
kha¯rı¯, maza¯lim, 4).
19 The Arab proverb ‘noble blood is the vengeance granting peace’ (al-dam al-karı¯m
huwa al-tha’r al-munı¯m) shows the lack of the principle of personal responsibility and
proportionality with the offence; noble blood is the blood of one of the notables of
the offender’s group and not necessarily the offender’s, while the vengeance granting
peace is a clear reference to the physical and moral satisfaction that comes with ven-
geance.
20 The religious character of the duty was first noticed by Goldziher (1889: I, 23), and
later fully analysed by Lammens (1924b: 181ff). See Tyan as well (1926).
21 See Nallino’s ‘Sulla costituzione delle tribu` arabe prima dell’islamismo’ (1939-1948:
III, 64ff).
22 If the sayyid could not pay the blood money, he could be delivered into the hands of
the lawful avengers (al-Qa¯lı¯, Dhayl al-ama¯lı¯: 22).
23 The commander is recognised the right to one fourth of the booty, the mirba¯c, hence
the title ra¯bic o sayyid al-mirba¯c. But see, contra, Caetani (1905-1926: IV, 368f).
24 With some exceptions, as in the case of Ha¯rith ibn cAbba¯d (Cheikho 1890-1891: 271).
25 Hilm is at once gentleness, clemency, mildness, forbearance, patience, insight, dis-
cernment and reason.
26 In the case of mala’, the term preferred in Qur’a¯n (66:24, 34, and 48; 69:29, and
32), the use in the sense of ‘assembly of notables’ is confirmed by commentators (ibn
Hisha¯m, al-Sı¯rah al-nabawı¯yah: II, 232f).
Chapter 2
1 Authenticity admitted by scholars like Caetani or Lammens, known for their cau-
tiousness towards the Islamic tradition. Wensinck believes, though, that the docu-
ment dates from the days of the rupture of relations with the Jews (Wensinck (ed.
Behn) 1975: 70f).
2 See Guillaume’s translation: The Life of Muhammad (Oxford 1955). The text of the
Charter is not included in the works of al-Wa¯qidı¯, al-Bala¯dhurı¯ and al-Tabarı¯. Accord-
ing to Rubin, Ibn Isha¯q (d. 761) himself had to adapt some parts of the Charter (like
art. 25) to the later deteriorated relations with the Jews (Rubin 1985: 19f).
3 The division into articles was introduced by Wellhausen (1884-1889: IV) and is still
followed by most scholars, except for Serjeant (1964 and 1978).
4 Ummah in the sense of ‘group of people’ or ‘community’ could be related to the He-
brew umma¯, the Aramaic umetha, or the Accadic ummatu (Denny 1975: 34-70).
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5 Submission was stipulated in early pacts between Muhammad and the Christian po-
pulation of Najra¯n (Ibn Sacd, Tabaqa¯t: I, 21 and 85, Ibn al-Athı¯r, al-Ka¯mil: II, 122,
and al-Maqrı¯zı¯, Imta¯c: I, 502. On the pact, see Armand Abel, La Convention de Nedj-
raˆn et le de´veloppement du «droit de gens» dans l’islam classique, Brussels, 1945), or Ta-
ba¯lah and Jurash (al-Bala¯dhurı¯, Futu¯h al-bulda¯n: 70 and 79f).
6 Similarity with Saint Augustine’s concept of the anı˘ma naturalı˘ter christia¯na (De Civi-
tate Dei, XV) is pointed out by Kerber, who transforms the formula in: anima natura-
liter muslimica (1991: 86ff).
7 See also Q. 42:13, 44:8 and 98:5.
8 Tradition passed down in different versions. See kull insa¯n taliduhu ummuhu cala` ’l-fi-
trah, in Muslim, qadar, 25, or: kull mawlu¯d yu¯lad, wulida cala` ’l-fitrah; kull nasamah tu¯-
lad cala` ’l-fitrah, in al-Bukha¯rı¯, jana¯’iz, 92; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, sunnah, 17; al-Tirmidhı¯, qudar,
5; (Ma¯lik) al-Muwatta’, jana¯’iz, 52, ibn Hanbal, 2 (233, 275, 393, 410, 481), 3 (252).
9 The sacrifice is grounded in hadı¯ths. See maca al-ghula¯m caqı¯qah, fa-ahrı¯qu¯ canhu da-
man wa-amı¯tu¯ canhu al-adha`, in al-Bukha¯rı¯, caqı¯qah, 2; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, ada¯hı¯, 20; al-Tir-
midhı¯, ada¯hı¯, 16; al-Nasa¯’ı¯, caqı¯qah, 2; ibn Ma¯jah, dhaba¯’ih, 1; ibn Hanbal, 4 (17, 18,
214, 215), 5 (12). The different amount of livestock for a boy or a girl is also grounded
in hadı¯ths. See can al-ghula¯m sha¯ta¯n, wa-can al-ja¯rı¯yah sha¯h, in abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, ada¯hı¯, 20;
al-Tirmidhı¯, ada¯hı¯, 16; al-Nasa¯’ı¯, caqı¯qah, 1-4; ibn Ma¯jah, dhaba¯’ih, 1; al-Da¯rimı¯, ada¯hı¯,
9; ibn Hanbal, 2 (183, 185, 194), 6 (31, 158, 251, 381, 422, 456).
10 See wa-tafarraqu ummatı¯ cala` thala¯th wa-sabcı¯n firqah, in abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, sunnah, 1;
al-Da¯rimı¯, siyar, 74.
11 In another of his works, Faysal al-tafriqah bayna al-isla¯m wa-l-zandaqah (The Decisive
Criterion of Distinction between Islam and Masked Infidelity), al-Ghazza¯lı¯ identified
Muhammad as the sole infallible master. The righteous path for the Muslim is to ac-
cept Muhammad’s preaching by faith.
12 See la¯ nubu¯wah bacdı¯, in Muslim, fada¯’il al-saha¯bah, 30-32; ibn Hanbal, 5 (454) or the
more renowned wa-ana¯ kha¯tim al-nabı¯yı¯n, in al-Bukha¯rı¯, mana¯qib, 18, tafsı¯r su¯rah
XVII, 5; Muslim, ı¯ma¯n, 327; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, fitan, 1; al-Tirmidhı¯, qiya¯mah, 10; al-Da¯rimı¯,
muqaddimah, 8; ibn Hanbal, 1 (296), 2 (398, 436), 4 (127, 128), 5 (278), and similarly
also in ibn Ma¯jah, iqa¯mah, 25.
13 See al-muslim akhu¯ ’l-muslim, in al-Bukha¯rı¯, maza¯lim, 3; Muslim, birr, 32; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d,
adab, 38; al-Tirmidhı¯, hudu¯d, 3, birr, 18, tafsı¯r su¯rah IX, 2; ibn Hanbal, 2 (9, 68), 5
(24, 71).
14 Translation by Hourani from the collection: abu¯ ’l-cAbba¯s Ahmad ibn cAbd al-halı¯m
ibn Taymı¯yah, Majmu¯cat al-rasa¯’il al-kubra`, Cairo, 1905, I, 307-309 (Hourani 1991:
180).
15 Narantakath v. Parakkal, 45 Indian Law Reports (Madras) 986 (1922). The Madras
ruling has been interpreted as an effort to eliminate religious discrimination, typical
of Anglo-Mohammedan Law (Fyzee 1965: 57-67). For an earlier rule in the same
sense see Hakim Khalil Ahmad v. Malik Israfi, 37 Indian Law Reports (Patna) 302
(1917).
16 See art. 260(3)(a) and (b). Subsection (a) reads: ‘“Muslim” means a person who be-
lieves in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified
Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH), the last of the prophets, and does not believe,
or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to
be a prophet, in any sense of the word or any description whatsoever, after Muham-
mad (PBUH).’ Subsection (b) reads: ‘“Non Muslim” means a person who is not a
Muslim and includes a person belonging to the Christians, Hindus, Sikh, Buddhist
or Parsi community, a person of the Qadiani Group or Lahori Group (who call them-
selves “Ahmadis” or by any other name) or a Baha’i, and a person belonging to any
of the scheduled castes.’
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17 The 1974 Declaration, adopted at the annual conference of the Muslim World League
held in Mecca with the participation of over 140 delegations of Muslim countries and
organisations, read: ‘A subversive movement against Islam and the Muslim world,
which falsely and deceitfully claims to be an Islamic sect; which under the guise of
Islam and for the sake of mundane interests contrives and plans to damage the very
foundations of Islam’.
18 The six recommendations read: ‘(1) All the Muslim organisations in the world must
keep a vigilant eye on all the activities of Qadianis in their respective countries, to
confine them all strictly to their schools, institutions and orphanages only. Moreover
the Muslims of the world must be shown the true picture of Qadianism and be
briefed of their various tactics so that the Muslims of the world are saved from their
designs; (2) They must be declared non-Muslims and ousted from the fold of Islam.
And must be barred from entering the Holy lands; (3) There must be no dealings
with the Qadianis. They must be boycotted socially, economically and culturally. Nor
may they be married with or to. Nor may they be allowed to be buried in the Mus-
lims’ graveyards. And they must be treated like other non-Muslims; (4) All the Mus-
lim countries must impose restrictions on the activities of the claimant of Prophet-
hood Mirza Ghulam Ahmed Qadiani’s followers, must declare them a non-Muslim
minority must not entrust them with any post of responsibility in any Muslim coun-
try; (5) The alterations effected by them in the Holy Quran must be made public and
the people be briefed on them and all these be prohibited for further publication; (6)
All such groups as are deviators from Islam must be treated at par with the Qadia-
nis’.
19 The Law was challenged in March 1975, but the High Court rejected the challenge.
20 The Egyptian government itself appealed the ruling of the Court of Administrative Li-
tigations of Cairo, after the heated questions of 3 May 2006 in Parliament. See
al-Haya¯h, 4 May 2006.
21 Only a few scholars hold the opposite view. Among them, the Ku¯fah jurist al-Nakhacı¯
(d. 713), the ‘Prince of believers’ for the Sunnah (amı¯r al-mu’minı¯n li-l-hadı¯th)
al-Thawrı¯ (d. 772), and some Andalusi scholars. Against the latter, ibn Hazm
(d. 1064) devotes a section of his Kita¯b al-Muhalla` to confute their arguments.
22 See man baddala dı¯nahu fa-u˘qtulu¯h, in al-Bukha¯rı¯, jiha¯d, 149, istita¯bah, 2, ictisa¯m, 28;
abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, hudu¯d, 1; al-Tirmidhı¯, hudu¯d, 25; al-Nasa¯’ı¯, tahrı¯m, 14; ibn Ma¯jah, hudu¯d,
2; ibn Hanbal, 1 (217, 283, 323), 5 (231).
23 See la¯ yahill dam imri’ muslim yashhad an la¯ ila¯h illa¯ alla¯h wa-annı¯ rasu¯l alla¯h illa¯ bi-
ihda` thala¯th: al-nafs bi-l-nafs, al-thayyib al-za¯nı¯, wa-l-ma¯riq min al-dı¯n al-ta¯rik li-l-jama¯-
cah, in al-Bukha¯rı¯, diya¯t, 6; Muslim, qasa¯mah, 25, 26; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, hudu¯d, 1; al-Tir-
midhı¯, hudu¯d, 15; al-Nasa¯’ı¯, tahrı¯m, 5, 11, 14; al-Da¯rimı¯, siyar, 11; ibn Hanbal, 1 (61, 63,
65, 70, 163, 382, 428, 444, 465), 2 (181, 214).
24 Different compilations are strongly influenced by the scholar’s background and envir-
onment. A good case in point is the Majmac al-anhur of the Hanafi jurist Shaykhza¯-
deh (d. 1667 AD); it was clearly conceived in a Persian milieu.
25 See ma¯ ka¯nat ha¯dhihi tuqa¯til fı¯-man yuqa¯til, in abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, jiha¯d, 111; ibn Ma¯jah,
jiha¯d, 30; ibn Hanbal, 2 (115), 3 (488), 4 (178).
26 See anna cAlı¯yan harraqa qawman irtaddu¯ can al-isla¯m, in al-Tirmidhı¯, hudu¯d, 25; al-Bu-
kha¯rı¯, jiha¯d, 149, istita¯bah, 2; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, hudu¯d, 1; al-Nasa¯’ı¯, tahrı¯m, 14; ibn Hanbal,
1 (217, 282, 322).
27 See la¯ tacadhdhibu¯ bi-cadha¯b alla¯h in al-Bukha¯rı¯, istita¯bah, 2; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, hudu¯d, 1;
al-Tirmidhı¯, hudu¯d, 25; al-Nasa¯’ı¯, tahrı¯m, 14; ibn Hanbal, 1 (217, 220, 282).
28 See man kharaja muha¯riban li-lla¯h wa-rasu¯lihi yuqtal aw yuslab aw yunfa` min al-ard, in
al-Nasa¯’ı¯, tahrı¯m, 11, qasa¯mah, 14; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, hudu¯d, 1.
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29 Capital punishment is also prescribed for the prophet or the dreamer of dreams who
entices apostasy (Deu. 13:2-6, NJB), but stoning to death is specified only for the
common Jew (Deu. 13:7-12, NJB).
30 See le-haddıˆhaka¯ min-had-derekh (Deu. 13:6, MT), and le-haddıˆhaka¯ me¯-cal ’Ado¯na¯i
(Deu. 13:11, MT).
31 See ’ıˆsh ’oˆ-’ishshaˆ ’asher yacas´e ’eth-ha¯-rac beceˆneˆ ’Ado¯na¯i-’elo¯hekha¯ la-cabho¯r berıˆthoˆ way-
ye¯lekh way-yacabho¯dh ’elo¯hıˆm ’ahe¯rıˆm way-yishtahuˆ la¯hem (Deu. 17:2-3, MT).
32 Stoning to death is the common punishment for apostasy or idolatry (properly the
service to foreign gods: cabho¯dha¯h za¯raˆh, one of the Talmudic treatises), except for the
men of the city that apostatised, who must be put to the sword.
33 The casuistic approach of Islamic scholars as applied to jurisdiction proves highly un-
economical. A detailed but concise overview can be found in Ahmad cAbd al-karı¯m
Sala¯mah, Maba¯di’ al-qa¯nu¯n al-duwalı¯ al-kha¯ss al-isla¯mı¯ al-muqa¯rin (Cairo, 1989) 139-
168.
34 Only if the law infringes a fixed Islamic rule (qatcı¯ not just ijtiha¯dı¯) according to Rida¯
(1970: IV, 1309ff) or Shaltu¯t (1969: 37ff), in all cases according to stricter scholars
like cAwdah (1981: II, 708ff).
35 Some scholars encourage the foundation of a new theoretical model to handle inter-
national relations on a peaceful basis (Sala¯mah 1989: 24; and al-Zuhaylı¯ 1983: 130ff).
36 The phrase in Arabic sounds fairly baroque: lahum ma¯ li-l-muslimı¯n wa-calayhim ma¯
cala` ’l-muslimı¯n (literally: ‘to them [is] what is to Muslims and upon them what is
upon Muslims’; al-Qarada¯wı¯ 1977 and al-Mawdu¯dı¯ 1978).
37 A covenant (cahd) differs from international treatises (muca¯hadah) and common con-
tracts (caqd) (al-Buhu¯tı¯, Kashsha¯f al-qina¯c can matn al-iqna¯c).
38 The control over dhimmı¯s was generally vested in the muhtasib (Tyan 1938: 642f).
Ibn Hanbal listed nine violations of the covenant: (1) non-payment of the jizyah
(cadam badhl al-jizyah); (2) refusing to abide by Islamic rules (iba¯’ iltiza¯m ahka¯m
al-isla¯m); (3) fighting against Muslims (qita¯l al-muslimı¯n); (4) entering the da¯r al-harb
and establishing his residence there (liha¯q bi-da¯r al-harb muqı¯man); (5) committing
adultery with a Muslim woman or raping her (al-zina¯ bi-muslimah aw yusı¯buha¯ bi-sm
al-nika¯h); (6) brigandage (qatc al-tarı¯q); (7) uttering blasphemy against God, His Book,
His religion or His prophet (dhikr alla¯h aw kita¯bihi aw dı¯nihi aw rasu¯lihi bi-su¯’ wa-nah-
wih); (8) spying or harbouring a spy (tajassus aw ı¯wa¯’ ja¯su¯s); (9) attacking a Muslim to
kill him or turn him away from his religion (al-tacaddı¯ cala` muslim bi-qatl aw fitnatihi
can dı¯nih). See al-Huja¯wı¯ al-Maqdisı¯ (d. 1560 AD), al-Iqna¯c fı¯ fiqh al-ima¯m Ahmad Ibn
Hanbal (Beirut, s.d.) II, 54f.
39 Santillana opened his treatise on Islamic law with the rather sharp statement that Is-
lam maintained the kin group in its substantial features, and only substituted the
bond of blood (social and political basis of the Arab tribe) with the bond of the com-
mon faith, quoting Q. 9:3 (1926: I, 1). From another perspective, the anthropologist
and psychoanalyst Chebel explored the elements of continuity of pre-Islamic Arab
characteristics in Islam in the work Le sujet en islam (Paris 2002). Of particular inter-
est here is chapter five, tellingly entitled: ‘Individu/Ummah, ou le triomphe de l’am-
bivalence’ (Chebel 2002: 148-191).
40 The permanence of the Arab traditional mentality even in the celebrated Islamic
aurea ætas is portrayed in a work by al-Maqrı¯zı¯ (d. 1442) on the conflict between the
two main branches of the Quraish, the banu¯ Umayyah and the banu¯ Ha¯shim:
al-Niza¯c wa-l-takha¯sum fı¯-ma¯ bayna banı¯ Umayyah wa-banı¯ Ha¯shim (Leiden, 1888).
41 See innama¯ ’l-mu’minı¯na ikhwatun fa-aslihu¯ bayna akhawaykum wa-ı˘ttaqu¯ a˘lla¯ha lacalla-
kum turhamu¯na (Q. 49:10); but also Q. 3:103; 9:11; 59:9-10 and the hadı¯th ‘The Mus-
lim is a brother to the Muslim, he should not oppress him, neither hand him over
[to an oppressor]’ – al-muslim akhu¯ ’l-muslim, la¯ yazlimuhu wa-la¯ yuslimuh, in
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al-Bukha¯rı¯, maza¯lim, 3; ikra¯h, 7; Muslim, birr, 58; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, adab, 38; al-Tirmidhı¯,
hudu¯d, 3; ibn Hanbal, 2 (91), 4 (104).
42 In Baghdad the unit term qata¯’ic was preferred to khitat.
43 The latter being the case of the Jews of Yathrib (Wellhausen 1884-1889: IV, 7ff).
44 See man aslama cala` yad ghayrihi fa-huwa mawla¯h, reported by al-Sanca¯nı¯ (d. 827),
al-cAsqala¯nı¯ (d. 1449), ibn Manzu¯r (d. 1312), ibn al-Athı¯r (d. 1210), al-Sarakhsı¯
(d. 1090) and ibn al-Jawzı¯ (d. 1201), but not included in any of the six major collec-
tions of hadı¯ths, which, however, recount the tradition of Tamı¯m al-Da¯rı¯ asking
Muhammad: ‘What is the Sunnah about a man who accepted Islam by advice and
persuasion of a Muslim?’ and Muhammad’s reply: ‘He is the nearest to him in life
and in death’ (huwa awla` al-na¯s bi-mahya¯hu wa-mama¯tih), in al-Bukha¯rı¯, fara¯’id, 22;
abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, fara¯’id, 13; al-Tirmidhı¯, fara¯’id, 20; ibn Ma¯jah, fara¯’id, 18; al-Da¯rimı¯,
fara¯’id, 34; ibn Hanbal, 4 (102, 103). The verb awla` comes from the same root (w.l.y)
of wala¯’.
45 Traditionally expressed in the form: lahum ma¯ lana¯ wa-calayhim ma¯ calayna¯.
46 The adage: ‘Clientage is a tie like a kin tie’ (al-wala¯’ luhmah ka-luhmat al-nasab) is of-
ten quoted (al-Nawawı¯, Tahdhı¯b al-asma¯’ wa-l-lugha¯t), and it is also reported as a
hadı¯th in al-Tirmidhı¯, fara¯’id, 53.
47 Equality was backed by many traditions, the most renowned probably being the one
on Bila¯l, Muhammad’s Ethiopian muezzin. Some Western scholars advance doubts
on the authenticity of these traditions, especially the one on Bila¯l, and present other
narratives of opposite significance (Lewis 1971).
48 See ismacu¯ wa-atı¯cu¯ wa-in istucmila calaykum cabdun habashı¯yun ka’anna ra’sahu zabı¯-
bah, in al-Bukha¯rı¯, ahka¯m, 4; Muslim, ima¯rah, 26, 27; abu¯ Da¯wu¯d, sunnah, 5; al-Tir-
midhı¯, jiha¯d, 28, cilm, 16; al-Nasa¯’ı¯, baycah, 26; ibn Ma¯jah, jiha¯d, 39; ibn Hanbal, 4
(69, 70), 5 (381), 6 (402, 403).
49 See inna ha¯dha¯ ’l-amr fı¯ Quraysh, in al-Bukha¯rı¯, ahka¯m, 2; al-Da¯rimı¯, siyar, 77;
Muslim, ima¯rah, 4, 8; ibn Hanbal, 6 (94). Al-Ma¯wardı¯ also quoted: ‘Princes are from
the Quraish’. See al-umara¯’ min Quraysh, in al-Bukha¯rı¯, ahka¯m, 2; al-Da¯rimı¯, siyar,
77; ibn Hanbal, 3 (129, 183), 4 (421, 424).
50 See nahnu al-umara¯’ wa-antum al-wuzara¯’, in al-Bukha¯rı¯, fada¯’il asha¯b al-nabı¯, 5; ibn
Hanbal, 1 (5).
51 See lan tanfacakum arha¯mukum wa-la¯ awla¯dukum yawma al-qiya¯mati yafsilu baynakum
wa-a˘lla¯hu bi-ma¯ tacmalu¯na bası¯run (Q. 60:3).
52 See ya ayyuha¯ ’l-na¯su inna¯ khalaqna¯kum min dhakarin wa-untha` wa-jacalna¯kum shucu¯-
ban wa-qaba¯’ila li-taca¯rafu¯ inna akramakum cinda a˘lla¯hi atqa¯kum inna a˘lla¯ha calı¯mun
khabı¯run.
53 Although the sole example of non-Persian Shucu¯bı¯yah literature is al-Fila¯hah al-naba-
tı¯yah (Nabatean Agriculture) by ibn Wahshı¯yah (d. 951).
54 See ibn al-Athı¯r, al-Ka¯mil fı¯ ’l-ta¯rı¯kh, Tornberg’s edition (Leiden 1851: IX, 228-293).
Chapter 3
1 See Msgr. al-Homsı¯’s witty remark: ‘Les Turcs excellaient dans l’art d’assouplir, suivant
les circonstances, les rigeurs des exigences coraniques’ (Homsy 1956: 19).
2 An 1856 Anglo-Moroccan Treaty expressly provided for the same treatment of Mus-
lim and non-Muslim British subjects vis-a`-vis Moroccan authorities (Belkeziz 1963:
8).
3 In 1788 the French ambassador Choiseul-Gouffier even stated that the Ottoman Em-
pire was: ‘une des plus riches colonies de la France’ (Masson 1911: 279).
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4 Figures are clear: in Aleppo in 1793 there were as many as 1,500 dragomans, but
only six of them actually acted as professional interpreters. The phenomenon was so
widespread that the term bera¯tlı was coined for the dhimmı¯ holding a patent (bera¯t).
5 Egypt is a good case in point for indigenous nationality, which is believed to have
been theorised for the first time there (Badawi Pacha 1926).
6 A strong connection between the Nationality Law of 26 June 1889 and the Conscrip-
tion Law of 15 July 1889 is usually drawn (Niboyet 1947: I, 128).
7 Former Ottoman subjects, having opted for a foreign nationality and having been or-
dered to leave Egypt, could be ousted under the 1929 provisions, while earlier they
were considered Egyptian nationals (Journal of Mixed Courts, 25-26 March 1929).
8 Law 42/1924 was repeatedly amended in 1928 (Law 3/1928), 1932 (Law 16/1932),
1933 (Decree 62/1933), 1941 (Law 6/1941), 1950 (Law 1/1950), 1951 (Law 12/1951)
and 1954 (Law 17/1954).
9 Palestinians refugees are those recognised by the United Nations Relief and Work
Agency. The UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East was established by Re-
solution 302(IV) of the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1949.
10 Jus soli also played a role in the 1937 Bahraini Nationality Law, issued when the coun-
try was under British protection.
11 al-Ra’y, 8 January 2006.
12 Integrated by the Law 11/1963 of 12 October 1963.
13 Decision of the Tribunal Civil de la Seine of 2 May 1903 (Dalloz jurisprudence ge´ne´rale
1908: II, 123).
14 The fatwa` was issued in Constantine (Algeria) on 10 Juma¯da` al-tha¯nı¯ 1356 AH, first
published on the Algerian al-Basa¯’ir (III: 95) of 14 January 1938 and recently repub-
lished in Paris in 1993 (al-Jaza¯’irı¯ 1993). A French translation read: ‘l’action d’acque´rir
une nationalite´ non musulmane (jinsı¯yah ghayr isla¯mı¯yah) implique l’abandon de la
le´gislation mahome´tane (al-sharı¯cah al-isla¯mı¯yah). Meˆme la renonciation a` un seul
pre´cepte du Coran entraıˆne, selon la doctrine admise par tous les oule´mas de l’islam
(bi-l-ijma¯c), l’apostasie. Le naturalise´ est un rene´gat’ (Collot & Henry 1978: 126).
15 Only if the father is a Sudani by birth (Law 55/1970).
16 The case, originally provided for by 1959 KwNED, art. 3(1), was later repealed to pre-
vent children of Kuwait’s bidu¯ns from acquiring Kuwaiti nationality (Decree-Law
100/1980).
17 Even if the case is listed in the section of attribution of nationality, it really is a form
of facilitated naturalisation (cAshshu¯sh 1991: 216-221).
18 The original provision of Decision 16/S of 19 January 1925 was later reproduced in
the Legislative Decrees 21/1953, and 276/1969.
19 The sixth section of Legislative Decree 276/1969 is titled ‘Special rules for the sons
of the Arab lands’ (ahka¯m kha¯ssah bi-abna¯’ al-bila¯d al-carabı¯yah). ‘Sons’ is a literal
translation, but abna¯’ can also be translated as ‘nationals’ or ‘citizens’.
20 A further reduction to three years is granted to nationals of Oman, Qatar and Bah-
rain (1972 AeFNL(1975), art. 5(1)(a)), and to members of the Arab tribes that moved
to the UAE from neighbouring countries (1972 AeFNL(1975), art. 5(1)(b)).
21 In Algeria, however, knowledge of Arabic can be considered a proof of the assimila-
tion required by 1970 DzNC, art. 10(1)(7). Technically, the Libyan and Iraqi laws do
not require knowledge of Arabic. In Libya, however, non-Arabs cannot even be natur-
alised, and in Iraq naturalisation of non-Arabs is a form of extraordinary naturalisa-
tion granted by the Council of Ministers according to 1963 IqNL, art. 8(2).
22 Otherwise the Sudanese Nationality Law doubles the residency requirement to twenty
years.
23 The provision, however, tends to be interpreted in a stricter sense (cAshshu¯sh &
Ba¯khashab 1990: 244).
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24 The Tunisian Nationality Code requires a knowledge of Arabic commensurate with
the person’s social status.
25 The Egyptian Nationality Law of 1958 laid down extraordinary naturalisation for
aliens who rendered special service to Egypt, Arab nationalism (li-l-qawmı¯yah
al-carabı¯yah) or the Arab nation (li-l-ummah al-carabı¯yah; Law 82/1958, art. 11(2)).
26 Once the Lebanese expatriate returns to Lebanon, the Council of Ministers issues a
decree to make of him a Lebanese national.
27 Including the ‘illegally occupied territories’ (maghsu¯b) of Palestine.
28 The broad definition of ‘national expatriate’ was adopted also by the Iraqi Law 5/1975
(art. 17, soon repealed by Law 49/1975), and the Egyptian Law 82/1958 (art. 31(1)(c),
repealed by Law 25/1975).
29 If original nationals of Oman, Qatar or Bahrain, the naturalised are granted full
rights seven years after naturalisation.
30 It is not clear whether the 1983 Omani Nationality Law, which stipulates that the nat-
uralised enjoys ‘civil rights’ (al-huqu¯q al-madanı¯yah) upon naturalisation, excludes po-
litical rights or includes them (1983 OmNSD, art. 7).
31 As well as for standing for legislative councils (tarshı¯h li-l-maja¯lis al-niya¯bı¯yah).
32 In Oman adult children of the naturalised have – nonetheless – to fulfil all the re-
quirements for naturalisation (1983 OmNSD(1986), art. 4).
33 In the Moroccan and Tunisian codes, however, the minor child is not naturalised if
married.
34 Only if the children where at least sixteen years old at the father’s naturalisation.
35 Only after three years of marriage, and proving good behaviour and adequate eco-
nomic conditions.
36 Perpetual allegiance was a well-known concept even in Medieval Europe, both in
Britain and on the continent (Lombardi 1967). Blackstone defined perpetual alle-
giance as ‘the tie or “ligamen” [that] binds the subject to the King, in return for that
protection which the King affords the subject’ (Commentaries on the Laws of England:
I, 366).
37 In Algeria and Morocco, however, loss of nationality is allowed only if foreign natura-
lisation takes place outside the country and with state permission. Even with state
permission, therefore, a Moroccan or an Algerian national cannot acquire foreign na-
tionality within national boundaries.
38 An exception is the Egyptian legislation that sets a time limit of ten years (1975
EgNL, art. 15(1)).
39 Only Yemeni nationals by naturalisation can be stripped of nationality (1990 YeNL,
art. 19).
40 The similar Qatari provision contained in the 1961 Law, art. 15(1)(4), was not retained
in the new Qatari Nationality Law 38/2005.
41 Political rights are suspended for ten years for any national who has resumed Qatari
nationality (2005 QaNL, art. 15).
42 In Kuwait, Law 44/1994 added a paragraph (2) to the Kuwaiti Nationality Law, art. 7,
laying down that the child born after the naturalisation of the father is a national by
origin or descent (1959 KwNED(1994), art. 7(2)).
43 Authors of this orientation usually quote the ruling of the Egyptian Administrative
Court (Mahkamat al-qada¯’ al-ida¯rı¯) of 1 February 1951. See Majmu¯cat ahka¯m al-qada¯’
al-ida¯rı¯ (v, 549).
44 The effects of the mother’s conversion to Islam on minor children are debated
(al-Dasu¯qı¯, Ha¯shı¯yah cala` ’l-sharh al-kabı¯r: VII, 200).
45 Loss of citizenship is thus properly conceivable only for non-Muslims (Jama¯l al-dı¯n
1998: 148f).
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46 The conversion of the dhimmı¯ to Islam (isla¯m al-dhimmı¯) is framed as a change of
loyalty (wala¯’).
47 Since the jizyah was imposed on non-Muslims who did not serve in the Islamic
army, a non-Muslim can be relieved of it if he serves in the army (cA¯mir 1979: 189).
Chapter 4
1 al-Haya¯h, 1 April 2005.
2 al-Haya¯h, 2 February 2006.
3 al-Ayya¯m, September 2003, and al-Wasat, August-November 2006.
4 Naturalisation of Sunni expatriate workers – especially those working in the military –
was going on even before the A¯l al-Dawsarı¯’s case (Dazi-He´ni 2001: 56).
5 See the addendum to the Jordanian Nationality Law 6/1954 (Provisional Law (qa¯nu¯n
mu’aqqat) 18/1969 made permanent (qa¯nu¯n da¯’imı¯) in 1971).
6 The groups of the Wa¯dı¯ Kha¯lid were excluded until 1993 because they had refused to
register in the 1932 census, whereas those of the al-qura` al-sabc had to wait until
2004 due to territorial disputes with Israel and their status of Palestinian refugees
(even if they were listed in the 1921 census).
7 UNDP, Taqrı¯r al-tanmiyah al-insa¯nı¯yah al-carabı¯yah li-l-ca¯m 2004: Nahwa al-hurrı¯yah fı¯
’l-watan al-carabı¯, 137ff
8 The original meaning of dawlah was actually ‘dynasty’; only later was dawlah used to
indicate by metonymy the ‘state’.
9 See also the 1995 special issue ‘Tribus, tribalisme et Etats au Moyen-Orient’ of Monde
arabe Maghreb-Machreq, and, for Lebanon, Favre’s work in the Annuaire de l’Afrique
du Nord (Favres 2003).
10 Riots in Tafı¯lah and Nacu¯r (Jordan) followed the 2003 Jordanian general elections be-
cause candidates of some kin groups failed to win ‘their’ seats (al-Dustu¯r, 18-19 June
2003).
11 al-Haya¯h, 18-19 April 2005.
12 Santillana wrote that only the Muslim is a full citizen (cittadino optimo iure) under
Islamic law (Santillana 1926: I, 98).
13 Recently renewed tensions between Sunnis and Shias confirm it. Conversions from
Sunni to Shia Islam (tashyı¯c or tashayyuc) is a taboo subject in the Arab world (espe-
cially in countries like Palestine or Yemen).
14 With the obvious exception of Lebanon.
15 In a case of family law involving an Armenian Catholic woman and a Maronite
(Catholic) man, the Egyptian judge applied Islamic law. The Egyptian judge, however,
has no religious legal education; the rule ‘iura novit curia’ does not apply, and it is
thus upon the parties to argue the law (el-Geddawi 2001).
16 Egyptian Court of Cassation, 17 November 1960 (Ahka¯m Mahkamat al-Naqd, XI,
583ff) (el-Geddawi 1971).
17 Egyptian Court of Cassation, 31 January 1968 (Ahka¯m Mahkamat al-Naqd, XIX,
179ff) and 14 January 1970 (Ahka¯m Mahkamat al-Naqd, XXI, 96ff).
18 Moroccan Supreme Court, 24 November 1964 (Journal de Droit international prive´,
XCIII (1966), 389) and 5 July 1974 (Journal de Droit international prive´, CV (1978),
681ff).
19 A scholar like al-Mawdu¯dı¯ even asserts that death is to be preferred to exile or a life
deprived of ‘citizenship rights’ (Peters & De Vries 1976-1977:16).
20 On the Abu¯ Zayd case, see the protagonist’s own recollection (Abu Zaid 2004).
21 Only a 1981 draft of the Charter of Human Rights in Islam (by the Organisation of
the Islamic Conference) carried reference to nationality (art. 7), but such reference
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was not included in the final version of the 1990 Cairo Declaration (Icla¯n al-Qa¯hirah).
For the French texts see Aldeeb (1994).
22 Li-kull shakhs al-haqq fı¯ ’l-tamattuc bi-jinsı¯yatin, wa-la¯ yaju¯z isqa¯tuha¯ can ayy shakhs
bi-shakl tacassufı¯ aw ghayr qa¯nu¯nı¯. Moreover, art. 29 is included in the list of the rights
that cannot in any way be infringed (art. 4(b)).
23 So in Egypt (art. 6), Jordan (art. 5), Lebanon (art. 6), Sudan (art. 22), Algeria (art. 29)
and Saudi Arabia (art. 35).
24 So in Iraq (art. 18), Qatar (art. 4), Oman (art. 15), United Arab Emirates (art. 8), Ku-
wait (art. 27) and Yemen (art. 22).
25 UN Security Council Resolution n. 690 of 29 April 1991 (MINURSO Mission).
26 On gender and citizenship in the Middle East see Te´treault (2000b: 70-87f).
27 Hal nahnu raca¯ya¯ am muwa¯tinu¯n? Opening of the conference organised by the ‘Hi-
wa¯r al-thaqa¯fa¯t’ Society (Dialogue of Cultures) in Cairo in May 2004 (cAyya¯d 2005).
28 Before the 2007 reform, art. 1 read: ‘socialist democratic system based on the alliance
of the working forces of the people’.
29 See the debates on the Egyptian official daily al-Ahra¯m and the independent al-Misrı¯
al-Yawm (February-March 2007).
30 Tabdı¯l al-jinsı¯yah riddah wa-khiya¯nah (al-Jaza¯’irı¯ 1993).
31 For the 2004 Moroccan Family Code (mudawwanat al-usrah), see art. 2(1)(1) of the
Zahı¯r sharı¯f 1-04-22 issued on 3 February 2004.
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Glossary of Arabic legal terms
cabd – slave
adha¯n – call to prayer
cadı¯m al-jinsı¯yah – stateless
cahd – pact, covenant
cahd al-dhimmah – protection covenant
ahl – people
ahl al-bayt – household of Muhammad
ahl al-dhimmah – non-Muslims living in the da¯r al-isla¯m
ahl al-kita¯b – People of the Book, Abrahamic non-Muslims
ahlı¯yah – capacity
ahlı¯yah ka¯milah – full capacity
acjam – non-Arab foreigner (originally Persian)
ajnabı¯ – non-Arab foreigner
ama¯n – safe-conduct
ama¯n mu’abbad – perpetual safe-conduct
ama¯n mu’aqqat – short-term, temporary safe-conduct
amn al-dawlah – state security
caqd – contract
caqd al-khila¯fah – caliphate contract
caqı¯dah – creed, faith, belief
ca¯qil – sane
ca¯qilah – patron’s protection
caql – reason
aqwa¯l ka¯dhibah – deceit, mendacious statements
ca¯r – shame, disgrace, dishonour
carab – Arabs
arsh – penalty for certain wounds
casabı¯yah – group solidarity
cashı¯rah – tribe
asl (pl. usu¯l) – origin, root
usu¯l al-fiqh – ‘roots’ of Islamic law
’a¯tha¯r – effects
’a¯tha¯r ca¯’ilı¯yah – familial effects (of naturalisation)
’a¯tha¯r ca¯mmah – general effects (of naturalisation)
’a¯tha¯r fardı¯yah – individual effects (of naturalisation)
’a¯tha¯r kha¯ssah – special effects (of naturalisation)
ba¯b – door
badw – nomad
baghı¯ (plur. bugha¯h) – rebel
ba¯ligh – of age
ba¯til – invalid, null and void
baycah – oath, homage
bayyinah – evidence
bunu¯wah – filiation
bunu¯wah sharcı¯yah – legitimate filiation
dama¯n – liability
da¯r – home, territory
da¯r al-harb – home of war, enemy territory
da¯r al-isla¯m – home of Islam, territory of the Islamic state
da¯r al-riddah – home of apostasy, territory of apostasy
darı¯bah – impost, tax
daru¯rah – necessity
dawlah – state
dawlah watanı¯yah – nation-state
dhimmah – engagement, undertaking, care as a duty of conscience
dhimmı¯ – non-Muslim protected by a treaty of surrender
dı¯n – religion
diyah – blood-money
diya¯nah – religion, conscience, forum internum
du¯n shuru¯t – unconditional
dustu¯r – constitution
faqd (or fiqda¯n) al-jinsı¯yah – loss, withdrawal of nationality
faqd bi-l-taghyı¯r – loss due to change
faqı¯h (plur. fuqaha¯’) – jurist, religious lawyer of Islam
farc (plur. furu¯c) – branch
furu¯c al-fiqh – ‘branches’ of Islamic law
fard – individual
fard – duty
fard cayn – individual duty
fard kifa¯yah – communal duty
faskh – cancellation
fa¯sid – defective, voidable
fatwa` (plur. fata¯wa`) – considered legal opinion of a muftı¯
fiqh – Islamic jurisprudence
fitrah – innate religion
ghanı¯mah – booty
ghashsh – fraud, deceit
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ghayr la¯zim – revocable (contract)
ghayr sharcı¯ – illegitimate
ghazw – assault, raid, incursion
habr – non-Muslim religious authority
habs – imprisonment
hadar – not protected
hadar – settled population
hadd (plur. hudu¯d) – fixed punishment
hadı¯th (plur. aha¯dı¯th) – formal tradition deriving from Muhammad
hajı¯n – offspring of an Arab man and a foreign woman (acjamı¯yah)
hakam – arbitrator
hala¯l – not forbidden
ha¯lah ma¯ddı¯yah – economic condition
haqq (plur. huqu¯q) – right, jus
haqq al-dam – jus sanguinis
haqq al-dam al-abawı¯ – paternal jus sanguinis
haqq al-dam al-umu¯mı¯ or al-ummı¯ – maternal jus sanguinis
haqq al-dam mucazzaz bi-haqq al-iqlı¯m – jus sanguinis strengthened by
jus soli
haqq al-iqlı¯m – jus soli
haqq al-iqlı¯m muda¯cafan – double jus soli
huqu¯q al-insa¯n – human rights
huqu¯q al-muwa¯tanah – citizenship rights
huqu¯q siya¯sı¯yah – political rights
haram – sacred area, sanctuary
hara¯m – forbidden
harb – war
harbı¯ – enemy alien
hijrah – migration (Hegira)
hijrah ajnabı¯yah – foreign migration
hı¯lah (plur. hiyal) – legal device, evasion
hilf – alliance
hilm – gentleness, temperance, insight
hizb – party
hudnah – truce
hukm (plur. ahka¯m) – legal qualification
al-ahka¯m al-khamsah – the five legal qualifications
ica¯dat al-jinsı¯yah – return of nationality
ciba¯da¯t – acts of devotion, religious observances
ibn (plur. banu¯n and abna¯’) – son
idhn – permission
ifta¯’ – deliverance of formal legal opinions
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ijma¯c – consensus
ijtiha¯d – effort
ijtiha¯d al-ra’y – use of individual reasoning
ikhtila¯f – disagreement, difference
ikra¯h – duress
iktisa¯b or kasb – acquisition
iktisa¯b al-jinsı¯yah – acquisition of nationality
ilgha¯’ al-muddah – elimination of residency requirement
cilm – science
cilm al-fiqh – legal science, jurisprudence
cilm al-nasab – science of lineages, genealogy
ilma¯m bi-l-lughah – language knowledge
ima¯m – leader
ı¯ma¯n – faith, belief
imtiya¯za¯t – capitulations
infisa¯l – secession
intiqa¯l carabı¯ – inter-Arab migration
ciqa¯b – punishment, penalty
iqa¯mah – residency
iqa¯mah madı¯dah – prolonged residency
iqa¯mah tawı¯lah – long residency
iqlı¯m – territory
iqra¯r – acknowledgement, confession
irtida¯d – apostasy
ism – given name
isna¯d – chain of transmitters of a hadı¯th
isqa¯t al-jinsı¯yah – relinquishment, deprivation, loss of nationality
isqa¯t jawa¯zı¯ – optional loss
isqa¯t wuju¯bı¯ – mandatory loss
istica¯dat al-jinsı¯yah – resumption of nationality
istirda¯d al-jinsı¯yah – vindication, restoration of nationality
istirja¯c al-jinsı¯yah – resumption of nationality
istita¯bah – call on the apostate to repent
ja¯’iz – allowed, unobjectable
jamc – collection, combination
jamc bayna jinsı¯yatayn – dual nationality
jama¯cah – group
jama¯hı¯rı¯yah – ochlocracy
ja¯mic – great, central mosque
jamcı¯yah – association
jarı¯mah (plur. jara¯’im) – crime
jara¯’im khulqı¯yah – crimes against public morality
jara¯’im al-sharaf – infamous crimes
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jina¯yah – tort, delict
jinsı¯yah – nationality
jinsı¯yat al-asl or jinsı¯yah aslı¯yah – original nationality
jinsı¯yat al-mı¯la¯d – nationality of birth
jinsı¯yat al-nasab – nationality by descent
jinsı¯yat al-tacmı¯r – populating nationality
jinsı¯yat al-ta’sı¯s – founding nationality
jinsı¯yah la¯hiqah – subsequent nationality
jinsı¯yah mafru¯dah – imposed nationality
jinsı¯yah mamnu¯hah – granted nationality
jinsı¯yah mukhta¯rah – elective nationality
jinsı¯yah muktasabah – acquired nationality
jinsı¯yah tha¯nawı¯yah – secondary nationality
jinsı¯yah ta¯ri’ah – foreign nationality
jiwa¯r – protection
jizyah – poll-tax
jumhu¯rı¯yah – republic
kafa¯’ah – wedding adequacy, equality by birth
ka¯fir – unbeliever
ka¯hin – soothsayer
khalc – expulsion from the group
khalı¯c – dismissed or expelled member of a group
khara¯j – land-tax
khasa¯rat al-jinsı¯yah – loss of nationality
khata’ – mistake, error
khidmah (plur. khidma¯t) – service
khidma¯t dha¯t sha’n – important services
khidma¯t jalı¯lah – outstanding services
khidma¯t istithna¯’ı¯yah – exceptional services
khita¯n – circumcision
khiya¯nah – treason
kunyah – agnomen
la¯’ihah tanfı¯dhı¯yah – executive regulations
laqab – surname
laqı¯t – foundling
la¯zim – binding
madhhab – rite or school of religious law
madrasah – school
mahkamah – court, tribunal
mahkamah dustu¯rı¯yah – constitutional court
mahkamah ibtida¯’ı¯yah – court of first instance
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mahkamah al-isti’na¯f – court of appeal
mahkamat al-naqd – court of cassation (Egypt)
mahkamat al-tamyı¯z – court of cassation (Lebanon, Syria)
mahkamah culya¯ – supreme court
mahr – nuptial gift
makru¯h – reprehensible, disapproved
majallah – lawbook, code
majhu¯l – unknown
majhu¯l al-jinsı¯yah – of unknown nationality
majlis – gathering, council
majlis al-acya¯n – council of notables, senate
majlis al-dawlah – council of state
majlis dustu¯rı¯ – constitutional council
majlis al-shacb – people’s assembly
majlis al-shu¯ra` – consultative council
majlis al-ummah – national assembly
majlis watanı¯ – national assembly
majlis al-wuzara¯’ – council of ministers
majnu¯n – insane
mala’ – tribal gathering of notables
maclu¯m – known, certain
mandu¯b – recommended
manh – granting, bestowal
marsu¯m – decree
marsu¯m amı¯rı¯ – emiri decree (Kuwait)
marsu¯m bi-qa¯nu¯n – decree-law
marsu¯m ishtira¯cı¯ – legislative decree (Lebanon)
marsu¯m malikı¯ – royal decree
marsu¯m sulta¯nı¯ – sultani decree (Oman)
marsu¯m tashrı¯cı¯ – legislative decree (Syria)
masjid – mosque
maslahah – interest
maslahah ca¯mmah – public interest
matn – text (of a hadı¯th)
mawla` – client or patron
mawtu¯r – lawful avenger of blood
mı¯la¯d muda¯caf – double jus soli
millah – community
muca¯hadah – (international) treaty
mu’a¯kha¯ – fictitious brotherhood
muca¯mala¯t – (pecuniary) transactions
muba¯h – indifferent
muftı¯ – specialist in religious law (fiqh) who gives an authoritative opi-
nion (fatwa`)
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mughtarib – expatriate
muka¯fa’at al-jinsı¯yah – awarding of nationality
mukallaf – charged, responsabile
mukhta¯r – free to choose, having the choice or option
mulk – rule, supreme authority
mumayyiz – intelligent, discriminating minor
murtadd – apostate
murtadd fitrı¯ – apostate (Muslim by birth)
murtadd millı¯ – apostate (Muslim convert)
mustahabb – recommended
musta’min – non-Muslim granted a safe-conduct (ama¯n)
mutajannis – naturalised citizen
mutawallı¯ – (waqf) administrator, person in charge
muwa¯faqah – agreement, assent
muwa¯tanah – citizenship
muwa¯tin – citizen
nabı¯ – prophet
na¯dı¯ or nadwah – circle, tribal assembly
nahdah (carabı¯yah) – Arab renaissance
na¯’ib – deputy
nasab – patronymic (‘son of’)
naskh – repeal
niza¯m – ordinance
nı¯yah – intention, intent
qabı¯lah – tribe
qa¯dı¯ – Islamic judge
qa¯’id – leader, commander
qa¯cidah (plur. qawa¯cid) – base, rule, maxim
qa¯nu¯n – (secular) law, code
qa¯nu¯n al-jiha¯d aw al-harb – Islamic law of war
al-qa¯nu¯n al-isla¯mı¯ li-l-umam – Islamic law of nations
qara¯r – decision
qara¯r wiza¯rı¯ – ministerial decision
qasd – aim, purpose
qawmı¯yah – nationalism
al-qawmı¯yah al-carabı¯yah – Arab nationalism
qiblah – direction of ritual prayer
qı¯mah – value
qisa¯s – retaliation
qiya¯s – analogy, parity of reasoning
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ra¯bitah – bond, tie, connection
ra¯bitat al-jinsı¯yah – bond of nationality
ra¯bitat al-mawtin – bond of residency
rada¯c – fosterage
radd al-jinsı¯yah – return of nationality
rahn (plur. ruhu¯n) – hostage
ra¯cı¯ – shepherd
ra’ı¯s – head, chief
racı¯yah (plur. raca¯ya¯) – subject, herd, flock
rashwah – bribery
rasu¯l – messenger, prophet
ra’y – opinion, individual reasoning
riddah – secession, apostasy
rukn (plur. arka¯n) – essential element
sadaqah – charitable gift
sahb al-jinsı¯yah – withdrawal of nationality
sahı¯h – valid, legally effective
sahwah (isla¯mı¯yah) – Islamic awakening, re-Islamisation
sala¯h – ritual prayer
sarı¯h – explicit (declaration)
sayyid – master, chieftain
shaha¯dah – testimony, evidence of witnesses, certificate
sharaf – nobility, honour, glory
sharı¯cah – sacred law
sharı¯f (plur. ashra¯f) – eminent, notable, noble
shart (plur. shuru¯t) – prerequisite, condition
shart al-mı¯la¯d al-mawsu¯f – condition of a particular birth
shart al-wila¯dah marratayn – condition of double birth
shaykh (plur. shuyu¯kh) – elder, notable, chieftain
shibh – quasi-
shu¯ra` – consultation
siya¯sah – policy, politics, administrative justice
siya¯sah sharcı¯yah – siya¯sah within the boundaries of sharı¯cah
sulh or musa¯lahah – amicable settlement
sulta¯n – authority, dominion, ruling power
sunnah – precedent, normative legal custom
tabannı¯ – adoption
ta¯bic (plur. atba¯c) – subject, dependent
tafrı¯q – dissolution of marriage
taghyı¯r al-ism – name change
tahdı¯th – modernisation
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tahkı¯m – arbitration
tahqı¯q – verification
ta¯’ifah – group, denomination, community
ta¯’ifı¯yah – communitarianism, sectarianism
tajannus – naturalisation
tajannus ca¯dı¯ – ordinary naturalisation
tajannus bi-l-wira¯thah – hereditary naturalisation
tajannus kha¯ss – extraordinary naturalisation
tajannus istithna¯’ı¯ – exceptional naturalisation
tajrı¯d – deprivation
takfı¯r – accusation of apostasy
takhallı¯ can al-jinsı¯yah – renunciation of nationality
takhfı¯f al-muddah – shortening of residency requirement
takhtı¯t – laying out of settlements
tala¯q – repudiation
tamsı¯r – laying out of settlements
taqı¯yah – simulation
taqwa` – piety
tard – expulsion
tarkhı¯s – permission, authorisation
tashrı¯c – legislation
tasmiyah – naming, appellation
tawbah – repentance
taczı¯r – discretionary punishment awarded by the qa¯dı¯
tazwı¯r – forgery, falsification
tazyı¯f – falsification, counterfeiting
tha¯’ir – lawful avenger of blood
tha’r – vengeance
thiqah – trust
thubu¯t – determination
thubu¯t al-jinsı¯yah – determination of nationality
thubu¯t al-nasab – determination of descent
cudu¯l (sing.: cadl) – professional witness, notary
ujrah – hire, rent
culama¯’ (sing.: ca¯lim) – religious scholars (experts in legal and religious
matters)
ummah – community (the Islamic community, par excellence)
al-ummah al-carabı¯yah – Arab community
al-ummah al-isla¯mı¯yah – Islamic community
al-ummah al-watanı¯yah – national community
cumrah – minor pilgrimage to Mecca
curf – custom
usrah – family
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wafd (plur. wufu¯d) – delegation
wa¯jib – obligatory, binding, due
wakı¯l – deputy, agent, proxy
wala¯’ – loyalty
wala¯’ or wala¯’ ciqd – clientage, relationship of client and patron
wala¯’ al-isla¯m – conversion clientage
wala¯’ al-khidmah – service clientage
wala¯’ al-muwa¯la¯h – friendship clientage
wala¯’ al-taba¯cah – dependency clientage
wala¯’ citq – manumission clientage
walad – offspring
walad ghayr sharcı¯ – illegitimate offspring
walı¯ – legal guardian
walı¯ al-dam – lawful avenger of blood
waqf – pious foundation, mortmain
wası¯ – executor, guardian appointed by testament
wası¯yah – testament, legacy
watan – homeland, nation
al-watan al-carabı¯ – the Arab nation
wathı¯qah – written document
waza¯’if cumu¯mı¯yah or al-ca¯mmah – civil service
wila¯dah mutakarrirah – recurring birth
wila¯yah – authority, competence, jurisdiction
wila¯yah mutacaddı¯yah – ‘transitive’ authority
wila¯yat al-khalı¯fah – caliphal authority
wisa¯tah jina¯’ı¯yah – criminal mediation
wuqu¯f – abeyance (of rights and legal effects)
yaqzah (carabı¯yah) – Arab renaissance
zahı¯r – decree (Morocco)
zaka¯h – alms-tax
zawa¯j – marriage
zawa¯j mukhtalit – mixed marriage
zawa¯l al-jinsı¯yah – extinction of nationality
zindı¯q – freethinker, atheist
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